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Abstract
This thesis is a theoretical study of the role of credit market imperfections in business
cycle dynamics. In particular, Chapters 2 to 4 focus on the credit channel of the
monetary transmission mechanism, while Chapter 5 studies the role of shocks to
credit markets in generating business cycle dynamics. The common framework used
throughout the thesis is a New Keynesian (NK) framework characterised by imperfect
competition and staggered pricesetting.
The essence of the credit channel of monetary transmission is endogenous move-
ments in the external nance premium, which, in turn, are caused by endogenous
movements of agency costs generated in the presence of credit frictions. The credit
channel works to complement the interest rate channel inherent to the standard NK
model.
Chapter 2 aims to shed light on the workings of the credit channel by present-
ing an analytical solution for the simplied case where agency costs are modelled
acyclical. I show that when acyclical agency costs are incorporated into an otherwise
standard NK model, they amplify the real impact of money shocks but reduce the
persistence of the real e¤ects. This happens because credit frictions atten both
aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD) relations of the model, where
the former is essentially the New Keynesian Phillips curve while the latter is derived
from the consumption Euler equation and money market equilibrium condition.
Chapter 3 replaces the assumption of economy-wide input markets made in Chap-
ter 2 with the one of segmented input markets. The reason for doing this is twofold.
First, the latter assumption seems to capture the reality better. Second, the previous
literature shows that the segmented market assumption is a crucial determinant for
the degree of the persistence of the real e¤ects of money shocks. I show that for given
agency costs, both the real impact of money shocks and the persistence of the real
e¤ects are much greater in a model with the segmented input market assumption.
This happens because the new assumption greatly attens the AS curve.
Chapter 4 directly studies the workings of the endogenous agency costs. Fo-
cusing on credit frictions in borrowing by rms (entrepreneurs), it compares the
di¤erent business cycle dynamics generated by two alternative modelling strategies.
The rst assumes that entrepreneurs make a consumption/saving decision to max-
imise their intertemporal utility, but have a higher discount rate than households
(original lenders). The second assumes that a constant fraction of entrepreneurs die
each period and they consume all the accumulated wealth just before their death.
These assumptions are widely used in the literature to keep agency costs operative. I
show that the choice of the modelling strategies is key to the way the credit channel
operates within the NK framework.
Chapter 5 investigates the e¤ect of shocks to credit markets on business cycle
dynamics. Using the framework developed in Chapter 2, I show that shocks to
credit markets a¤ect agency costs and thus the external nance premium faced by
entrepreneurs (borrowers). In turn, this causes a change in output. Then, turning to
the framework developed in Chapter 4 with endogenous agency costs, I highlight that
there is a feedback e¤ect from macroeconomic conditions to the premium through
endogenous developments in entrepreneursnet worth. The change in the premium
caused by the feedback e¤ect leads to the further change in output.
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1 Chapter One: General Introduction
This thesis is a theoretical study of the role of credit markets in business cycles. In
particular, Chapters 2 to 4 of the thesis focus on the credit channel of the monetary
transmission mechanism. Chapter 5 studies the role of shocks to credit markets in
generating business cycle dynamics.
Chapters 2 to 4 consider the role of credit market imperfections particularly in the
output dynamics of the response to monetary shocks. The empirical evidence from
the vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, such as the one provided by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), suggests that exogenous monetary policy shocks have
sizable and persistent real e¤ects. One specic feature of the response of output is
that it shows a hump-shaped pattern. That is, if the shock is contractionary, a trough
is reached only after a lag.
However, it has been found that the sizable and persistent real e¤ects of mone-
tary shocks are unlikely to be explained in a framework with perfect competition and
exible prices and wages. In such a framework, money can have real e¤ects qualita-
tively, but the e¤ects are rather trivial quantitatively. For example, when money is
incorporated into an otherwise conventional real business cycle (RBC) model using
the Money in Utility (MIU) approach1, a persistent increase in money supply growth
rate causes a rise in expected ination, which then induces agents to hold less real
money balances. When their utility function is not separable between consumption
and real money balances, this, in turn, a¤ects their marginal utility of consumption
and thus a¤ects their labour/leisure choice. Thus money can have real e¤ects even
in the exible price environment. However, Walsh (2003, chapter 2), for example,
shows that the e¤ect is quantitatively weak.
In parallel to the development of the RBC theory, staggered price/wage set-
ting was studied as a potentially strong propagation mechanism of monetary shocks.
However, in early works such as Taylor (1979), parameters in the price/wage setting
1Alternatively, one can incorporate money into the standard RBC model using the Cash-in-
advance constraint as in Cooley and Hansen (1989).
1
equations are specied exogenously at the outset, not dependent on microeconomic
parameters. Although Blanchard and Fischer (1989) give some microfoundations
based on Blanchard and Kiyotakis (1987) static optimising model with imperfect
competition, dynamics in their staggered setting model is still superimposed. In
comparison with the RBC models, the microfoundations of those early works are
rather weak.
More recently, however, staggering has been studied in a model with proper mi-
crofoundations, where price/wage setting equations are derived as a result of the
rm/workers intertemporal optimisation subject to staggering as a constraint. That
is, the Keynesian idea of nominal rigidities (specically, staggered price/wage setting)
and imperfect competition has been integrated into the intertemporal optimisation
approach from the RBC literature. Galí (2008) call this integrated framework the
New Keynesian (NK) framework.2 The principal channel through which the NK
framework exhibits non-neutrality of monetary policy is the interest rate channel. In
the presence of nominal rigidities, changes in the nominal interest rate are reected in
the real interest rate. In turn, this a¤ects the consumption, investment and output.
Using a variant of the NK framework, a large number of works have studied
the staggered price/wage setting as a propagation mechanism to monetary shocks.
On the one hand, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) conclude that the staggered
price model does not produce the observed degree of persistence in the real e¤ects
of money shocks. Their work is thorough in the sense that they draw the conclusion
after taking into account a few mechanisms which are known to enhance persistence.3
On the other hand, Ascari (2000) argues that the staggered wage model does produce
strong persistence after money shocks, as long as the model is approximated around
the zero ination environment. In the paper, he shows that the source of the strong
persistence in his model comes from the segmentation of the input market implicit
in his set up, rather than the staggered wage setting itself. Edge (2002), Ascari
2Goodfriend and King (1997) denote this integration as the New Neoclassical Synthesis.
3One of the features considered in their paper is the "convex demand" (p.1169) as suggested
by Kimball (1995). When the elasticity of demand becomes larger as price increases, the mark-up
charged by monopolistic competitors becomes smaller. Then, after a monetary shock, they charge
less for a given change in marginal cost. This results in a more persistent movement in the output.
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(2003) and Woodford (2003, chapter 3) conrm his contention, showing that even in
the price staggered setting, the segmentation of the input markets results in strong
persistence. Realising that Chari et al. (2000) assume the economy wide input
markets rather than segmented ones in their framework, the segmentation of the
input markets seems to be a crucial factor for the staggered price/wage setting to
generate large persistence in the real e¤ects of monetary shocks. Indeed, Woodford
(2003, chapter 3) supports this, after comparing the segmented factor with other
persistence enhancing features.
Having acknowledged the potential importance of the segmented input markets
as a strong propagation enhancer in the NK models, it is noticeable that there is one
common feature in the aforementioned models, which is, in fact, shared by the many
of the NK models in the literature. That is, they ignore potential imperfections in
the credit market such as moral hazard due to asymmetric information. However,
ignoring credit frictions might not be an innocuous simplication, especially because
a streak of both theoretical and empirical literature has pointed out the potentially
important role of credit frictions in macroeconomy. Then, given the fact that the NK
framework has become an essential base for monetary policy analysis these days4, it
is important to clarify how credit frictions alter the output dynamics to monetary
shocks particularly within the framework.
From an empirical point of view, by pointing out that external capital is not a
perfect substitute for internal funds, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) argue
that nancing constraints are important determinants for investment decisions for
many rms. In general, Hubbard (1998) reviews the empirical literature of credit
market imperfections on investment and emphasises the importance of rms net
worth in investment decisions. As for the household side, while a number of papers
(for example, Hall and Mishkin (1982)) discuss the importance of current income in
explaining consumer behaviour thus challenging the Life-Cycle Permanent Income
Hypothesis, Jappelli and Pagano (1989) argue that the sensitivity of consumption to
current income can be due to capital market imperfections.
4See Woodford (1999), Walsh (2003) and Galí (2008) among others.
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As for a theoretical development, since the seminal work by Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), it has become popular to incorporate credit market frictions into a dynamic
general equilibrium (DGE) environment using the Costly state verication (CSV)
framework of Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985). Within the framework,
entrepreneurs (borrowers) can observe their production outcome costlessly while if
nancial intermediaries (lenders) want to know the outcome, they need to pay moni-
toring costs. This informational asymmetry causes a moral hazard problem, because
entrepreneurs, absent monitoring, might have an incentive to under-report their own
production outcome. After Bernanke and Gertler (1989), a large number of papers
such as a series of works by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 98, 2001) incorporate credit
market frictions into a DGE framework using the CSV approach.
Yet another popular way to model credit market imperfections is initiated by
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In their framework, credit constraints arise because it
is di¢ cult for lenders to force borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts are
secured by collateral. Thus, to the extent that the price of collateralized assets is
a¤ected by shocks to the economy, the credit limit is also a¤ected. This, in turn,
a¤ects the amount borrowers can spend and invest. What is more, credit limits
and asset prices turn out to interact in a dynamic way, which turns relatively small
disturbances to the economy into persistent uctuations in output. As an example
of papers based on their approach, Iacoviello (2005) demonstrates the importance
of collateral constraints tied to the value of real estate for households as well as for
rms in the business cycle dynamics.
Following the CSV approach and focusing on corporate borrowing (rather than
household borrowing), Chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis study the credit channels of
the monetary transmission mechanism specically within the NK framework. I rst
describe how credit channels work under the CSV approach intuitively. As pointed
out by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), the important aspect to look at is
the endogenous changes of the external nance premium, i.e. the cost of external
funds paid by borrowers minus the opportunity costs of their internal funds. Specif-
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ically, in the presence of informational asymmetry between lenders and borrowers,
the external nance premium is likely to be inversely related to borrowersnet worth.
Intuitively, for a given amount of nance required, the smaller borrowersnet worth
is, the larger the premium that is required, because agency costs caused by the infor-
mational asymmetry are aggravated when borrowersnancial position is weak (i.e.,
they have little net worth). Then, to the extent that monetary policy shocks inuence
borrowersnet worth in a pro-cyclical fashion, the external nance premium is ex-
pected to move counter-cyclically.5 In short, compared to the otherwise conventional
NK model, the dynamics in the face of monetary policy shocks are further enriched
by the endogenous movement of agency costs.
Then, the natural question is, how do the endogenous movements of agency
costs alter the output dynamics intrinsic to the otherwise conventional NK model?
Specically, what happens to amplication/persistence in the real e¤ects of mone-
tary shocks? Further, does the model with credit channels replicate the empirically
observed fact of the hump shaped reaction to the shocks? I address these questions
in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
However, before considering these questions, I would like to address a more fun-
damental question. That is, do we know everything about the workings of credit
channels within the NK framework? Although the endogenous movements of exter-
nal nance premium surely seem to be critical in the credit channel, is this really the
whole channel through which credit frictions alter the output dynamics? The reason
why I have this question is as follows. From a technical point of view, the endogenous
agency costs are generated by the addition of borrowersnet worth as a state vari-
able.6 This state variable works as a source of additional dynamics. However, when
the state variable is added to the NK framework, which already incorporates the
imperfect competition and staggered price/wage setting into the conventional RBC
5While Bernanke et al. (1999) primarily look at the corporate borrowing to see the e¤ect of
the endogenous premium on corporate investment, Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2004) focus on
household borrowing to see the e¤ect on housing investment and consumption.
6Strictly speaking, this is not precise in the model presented in Chapter 4. It shows that what is
predetermined is borrowerscapital holding. However, given that their net worth is mainly composed
of their capital, net worth is almost predetermined.
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framework, it makes it very di¢ cult to solve the system analytically. Thus, the mod-
els with endogenous agency costs are usually solved numerically. While convenient,
the numerical solution often makes it di¢ cult to obtain clear insights into what lies
behind the outcome.
Acknowledging this, Chapter 2 considers a NKmodel with credit frictions in which
agency costs are modelled as time-invariant, i.e. acyclical. Without the time-varying
agency costs, the model can be solved analytically. Indeed, Chapter 2 nds that
even when agency costs are acyclical, they still alter the output dynamics intrinsic to
the otherwise standard NK model. Given that the endogenous movements of agency
costs are deliberately set aside in the analysis, the primary purpose of Chapter 2 is
to shed more light on the workings of credit channels from a qualitative standpoint.
The model in Chapter 2 nests a standard NK model such as the baseline model
of Chari, et.al (2000) as a special case where credit frictions are absent. When
frictions are incorporated (so that acyclical agency costs are present), they amplify
the impact of an unexpected change in money supply on real output while actually
reducing the persistence of the real e¤ects. Analytical solution claries that these
e¤ects take place because credit frictions work to atten both the aggregate supply
(AS) and aggregate demand (AD) relations, where the former relation is essentially
so-called the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) and the latter is derived from
the consumption Euler equation and money market equilibrium condition. Then,
for a given upward shift in the AD relation caused by a money supply shock, the
impact e¤ect on real output is amplied. As for persistence of real e¤ects, the atter
AS curve works to enhance the persistence while the atter AD reduces it. Overall,
however, the persistence turns out to be smaller. The main purpose of Chapter 2
is to elaborate how (acyclical) agency costs atten both the AS and AD curves. A
supplementary quantitative investigation indicates that the amplication of impact
can be signicant, but the e¤ect on persistence is rather trivial. Thus, in the light
of the VAR analysis which reveals that exogenous monetary shocks have sizable
and persistent real e¤ects, the acyclical agency costs, on their own, appear to be
6
a modication in the direction towards greater realism. (As pointed out, however,
since the cyclical movements of agency costs are set aside, the quantitative result
needs to be interpreted with care.)
Chapter 3 is an extension to Chapter 2. As mentioned above, the literature
points out that the crucial factor which enhances the persistence of the real e¤ects
of money shocks within the NK framework is the segmentation of input markets.
What characterises segmented input markets is that movements of inputs such as
labour across segments of the economy are restricted. The lack of free movement of
labour can prevent wages from being equalised across the segments such as industries.
Within the NK framework, the absence of transmission of pressure on wages is shown
to be a decisive factor in enhancing the degree of persistence of real e¤ects of money
shocks. Besides, the assumption seems plausible, especially in the short run. It
certainly appears di¢ cult for workers to move to other industries freely since it often
requires them to acquire di¤erent kinds of skills.
Acknowledging its potential relevance for monetary transmission and greater de-
scriptive realism, Chapter 3 replaces Chapter 2s assumption of economy-wide input
markets (where input costs are always equalised by the free movement of inputs)
with the segmented input markets assumption. The model is again solved analyti-
cally. First, I nd that the e¤ect of time-invariant agency costs on output dynamics
is robust to the di¤erent ways of modelling input markets. That is, even with the
segmented markets assumption, they amplify the real impact of money shocks while
reducing the persistence of the real e¤ect. Second, for a given level of credit frictions,
i.e. for the same agency costs, both the real impact of money shocks and the persis-
tence of the e¤ects are much greater with segmented input markets. Essentially, this
happens because the segmented markets assumption attens the AS relation greatly.
Then, this indicates that the segmented markets assumption seems to be an impor-
tant modication in the direction towards greater realism even in an environment
where credit markets are imperfect.
Having analysed the workings of credit channel within the NK framework in Chap-
7
ters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 directly highlights the role of endogenous agency costs. As
pointed out by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), for exam-
ple, when one studies the role of endogenous agency costs in business cycles, there is
normally one important modelling issue. That is, the situation can ultimately arise
where rms (entrepreneurs) accumulate enough net worth so that external nance
is not required and thus agency costs disappear.7 To avoid this situation, the liter-
ature typically o¤ers two alternative modelling strategies whereby the accumulation
of entrepreneurial net worth is dampened. The rst strategy assumes that entrepre-
neurs make a consumption/saving decision to maximise their intertemporal utility,
but have a higher discount rate than households (original lenders). The second as-
sumes that a constant fraction of entrepreneurs die each period and they consume
all the accumulated wealth just before their death. The population is kept constant
by the birth of new entrepreneurs. For instance, the former is adopted by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997, 98) while the latter is by Bernanke et al. (1999). Then, based on
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), Chapter 4 compares the output dynamics in the face
of monetary shocks between the two modelling strategies within the NK framework.
In fact, it shows that the dynamics generated are quite di¤erent depending on the
strategies adopted. The main di¤erence from Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) is that
they compare the dynamics caused by monetary shocks between the two strategies
in a exible price environment.
While Chapters 2 and 3 focus on an exogenous shock to the money supply, Chap-
ter 4 assumes that monetary policy is represented by an interest rate rule and consid-
ers a shock to the rule. Given that most central banks today use a nominal interest
rate as the instrument for policy implementation, one might argue that this is a more
realistic approach. Under this assumption, the output dynamics in response to the
interest shock di¤ers between the two strategies as follows. In the former case where
entrepreneurs make consumption/saving decision following the Euler equation, the
output dynamics are characterised by a hump-shaped reaction. Although the VAR
7In the framework of Chapters 2 and 3, this issue does not arise because I there assume that
borrowers live only one period and their saving decision is irrelevant. (In fact, this assumption helps
me present analytical solutions in those chapters.)
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analysis in the literature typically reveals this sort of reaction to the shock, a stan-
dard NK model often fails to replicate this reaction. Meanwhile, in the latter case
with a constant death ratio, although the real impact is not amplied (compared to
a standard NK case), the dynamics are characterised by greater persistence in the
real e¤ects. It turns out that what causes these di¤erent output dynamics between
the two strategies is the di¤erent developments of entrepreneursnet worth. Indeed,
how to model entrepreneursconsumption/saving decision is critical to the way the
credit channel operates within the NK framework.
However, I argue that the output dynamics observed under the latter strategy
(with a constant death ratio) is more realistic. The reason is as follows. Throughout
the chapter, entrepreneurs (borrowers) are assumed to be risk neutral in order to
simplify the contracting problem with nancial intermediaries. In fact, assuming
risk-averse entrepreneurs complicates the problem greatly. Then, under the former
strategy (with entrepreneurs whose consumption/saving decision follows the Euler
equation), what is implied is the lack of consumption smoothing. In relation to this,
entrepreneursconsumption pattern turns out to show rather extreme volatility. As
elaborated below, this volatile consumption is a natural outcome of their rational
behaviour to maximise their intertemporal utility. However, it is found that the
volatility is unrealistically large. On the other hand, with the latter assumption with
a constant death ratio, aggregate entrepreneurial consumption/saving changes rather
smoothly after the shock. Thus, to the extent that entrepreneurs have a consumption
smoothing motive, I tend to argue that the assumption of a constant death ratio leads
to more realistic dynamics. Thus, I conclude that the dening e¤ect of endogenous
agency costs in the NK model is to make real e¤ects more persistent. However, since
the real impact is not amplied, the endogenous agency costs are not necessarily a
modication towards greater realism.
Having studied the credit channels of monetary transmission in Chapters 2 to 4,
Chapter 5 looks at the role of shocks to credit markets in generating business cycle
dynamics. Although a large number of studies have discussed the role of exogenous
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shocks such as technology shocks or monetary shocks in business cycle dynamics,
since many of the models do not take account of credit market imperfections, shocks
happening to credit markets are often ignored. Given this, Chapter 5 studies the
potential importance of such shocks as drivers of the business cycles.
As in Chapters 2 to 4, Chapter 5 models credit market imperfections following the
CSV approach. As an example of shocks to credit markets, I focus on the shock to
the variance of idiosyncratic shocks entrepreneurs (borrowers) are subject to. Based
on the framework developed in Chapter 2, I show that an increase in the variance
lead to an increase in the external nance premium faced by entrepreneurs. This
happens because given that entrepreneursproduction outcome is their own private
information, a rise in the variance, implying the aggravation of the informational
asymmetry with nancial institutions (lenders), increases agency costs. The increase
in the premium, in turn, decreases production. Also, I observe that an increase in
the variance causes higher ination. This is because an increase in agency costs
(deadweight loss) is reected in an increase in prices.
Then, I move on to study the e¤ect of the credit market shock in the framework
developed in Chapter 4. Using this framework with endogenous net worth, I highlight
that there is a feedback e¤ect from macroeconomic conditions to the external nance
premium through endogenous movements in entrepreneursnet worth. In fact, as
long as the credit market shock has a recessionary e¤ect, their net worth decreases.
Then, as emphasised in Chapter 4, the decrease in net worth brings about an increase
in the external nance premium. This feedback e¤ect, in turn, further decreases
production. As in Chapter 4, how net worth evolves depends on the assumption
made on the entrepreneursconsumption/saving decisions. Therefore, the choice of
the assumption matters when one considers the propagation of credit market shocks
into the economy. However, again for the reason specied above (entrepreneurs
consumption shows rather extreme volatility when risk neutral entrepreneurs follow
consumption Euler equation), the dynamics under the assumption with a constant
death ratio seems more plausible. With this assumption, in the face of an exogenous
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increase in the variance, the output dynamics is characterised by highly persistent
movement. That is, recession persists for long time. Also, high ination turns out to
persist too. In short, an increase in the variance leads to prolonged stagation.
In the sense that the particular credit market shock is a second moment shock in
nature, Chapter 5 is related to the literature which studies the role of uncertainty in
the business cycles. For example, Bernanke (1983) shows that under the assumption
that investment project is irreversible due to high adjustment costs, events whose
long run implications are uncertain gives investors an incentive to wait for under-
taking investment. More recently, looking at a wide range of proxies for uncertainty
both in micro and macro levels, Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2009) propose the
following stylised fact:8 both idiosyncratic uncertainty about the evolution of micro
level variables and aggregate uncertainty about the evolution of macro level variables
are strongly countercyclical. Then, they construct a general equilibrium model and
show that a rise in uncertainty at both micro and macro levels leads to a drop in
output9. In their model, the important feature which causes the second moment
shock to have the real e¤ects is the non-convex adjustment costs in both capital and
labour. When uncertainty is high, rms become cautious and their investment and
hiring slow down thus output falls. Meanwhile, Chapter 5 observes that an increase in
uncertainty at micro level can have an adverse macro e¤ect including the fall in out-
put. However, the propagation mechanism is the endogenous developments in credit
markets. Thus, the chapter implies that credit market imperfections also might be
a factor which explains the stylised fact of countercyclical micro level uncertainty
observed by Bloom et al. (2009).
8As for micro level, their proxies include the cross-sectional spread of rm-level sales growth
rates and also the spread of industry-level sales growth rates, while the proxies for uncertainty at
macro level includes an index of stock market volatility.
9They also report the overshooting phenomenon: output rebounds and increases beyond the
initial level.
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2 Chapter Two: Credit Market Imperfections, Stag-
gered Pricesetting, and Output Dynamics of the
Response to Money Shocks
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study the role of credit frictions in the monetary transmission an-
alytically. To solve the model analytically, agency costs due to credit frictions are
modelled as acyclical. As emphasised in the general introduction, the baseline frame-
work is the NK framework. I show that when acyclical agency costs are incorporated
into an otherwise standard NK model with economy-wide input markets, they am-
plify the impact of money shocks on output while reducing the persistence of the real
e¤ects. Analytical solution claries that credit frictions a¤ect monetary transmission
by changing the slopes of both aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD)
curves of the model.
To see the intuition behind the result, I rst describe the exact nature of credit
frictions in the model. Agents called entrepreneurs have production opportunities,
but lack internal funds to employ labour as the input for production. This induces
them to seek external funds. Meanwhile, households, separate agents, have some
funds to spare, but do not have the production opportunities. Thus, entrepreneurs
borrow funds from households through nancial intermediaries called banks. En-
trepreneursproduction is subject to an idiosyncratic shock. Credit frictions arise
because the outcome of production is entrepreneursprivate information and it is
costly for banks to monitor it. This informational asymmetry causes a moral hazard
problem, since entrepreneurs, in the absence of monitoring, could have an incentive
to under-report their own production to increase the prots. In the literature, this
sort of framework is known as the costly state verication framework (Townsend,
1979).
Importantly, monitoring costs create a wedge between household consumption,
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ct and output, yt, where ct and yt are log deviations from the steady state values10.
Intuitively, the wedge is created as follows. First, when monitoring costs are absent,
entrepreneurs do not make prots because their ability of monitoring their own in-
vestment outcome free is virtually shared by lenders and thus it does not earn them
economic rents. The absence of economic rents results in zero entrepreneurial
consumption.11 Then, when output in the model is composed of household and en-
trepreneurial consumptions, household consumption corresponds to output; ct = yt.
However, when it is costly for lenders to monitor the outcome, entrepreneurs do
enjoy rents because their ability of free monitoring is now special. Thus, entrepre-
neurial consumption is not trivial any more. Meanwhile, suppose that aggregate
output increases due to an unexpected increase in money supply. This bids up the
price of goods entrepreneurs produce relative to the price of separate goods they con-
sume. This increase in the relative price makes entrepreneurial consumption increase
more than output, i.e. one percent increase in output is accompanied by more than
one percent increase in entrepreneurial consumption. Correspondingly, household
consumption increases less than proportionally. Thus, in terms of ct = dyt, monitor-
ing costs decrease the value of d from unity. The wedge is thus created between ct
and yt.
Having observed this, I can show how monitoring costs a¤ect the real e¤ect of
money shocks. Imagine the following static money demand equation; mt   pt =
ct where mt is the aggregate money demand, pt is the aggregate price and ct is
household consumption, all variables in terms of log deviation from the steady state.
Incorporating ct = dyt discussed above, this becomes mt   pt = dyt. Assuming
that the money market is in equilibrium, I interpret this as an aggregate demand
(AD) relation. Notice that monitoring costs atten the AD relation by lowering d
(in a space where the horizontal axis represents output and the vertical axis price).
Now, suppose that there is an unexpected permanent increase in the money supply.
10It is below dened as the zero ination rate steady state.
11Strictly speaking, since entrepreneursproduction function exhibits decreasing returns to scale,
they obtain some prot and their consumption is not zero even in the absence of monitoring costs.
However, I here ignore this prot for the intuitive discussion.
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This shifts up the AD curve in the space. Then, the atter the curve is, the more
output increases (given upward sloping aggregate supply (AS) curve). Monitoring
costs amplify the real impact of money shock by attening the AD curve.
The impact e¤ect is further amplied because monitoring costs also atten the
AS curve12. Households supply labour in the (economy-wide) labour market. In
the model, the equilibrium real wage is subject to an income e¤ect, i.e. the wage
is increasing in household consumption. However, since monitoring costs create a
wedge between ct and yt, the wage does not change much for given yt. Meanwhile,
there are other agents called retailers, who are monopolistic competitors subject to
staggered pricesetting. The smaller change in the wage caused by the weaker income
e¤ect leads to a smaller change in retailersreal marginal cost. That is, monitoring
costs make the real marginal cost less pro-cyclical. This, in turn, attens the AS
relation. Indeed, the atter AS curve also amplies the real impact of money shock.
Overall, the atter AD and AS curves both contribute to the amplication of impact.
Next, given that staggered pricesetting makes the real e¤ect of the shock persist,
how do monitoring costs a¤ect the degree of persistence? On the one hand, the atter
AS relation implies a slower adjustment of aggregate price during the transition after
the money shock. In turn, this implies the slower change in output. The atter AS
relation actually makes the persistence greater. However, the atter AD relation is
shown to reduce persistence of the shock.13 Although the e¤ects through AD and
AS relations contradict, I theoretically show that the one through the AD relation is
dominant so that monitoring costs reduce the persistence overall.
The structure of the model in this chapter is similar to some NK models with
credit frictions in the literature, such as Bernanke et al. (1999). As pointed out,
however, the crucial di¤erence is that my model limits agency costs to be acyclical
while their models endogenise them. The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on
the working of credit channel of monetary transmission within the NK framework by
12As shown below, this is essentially the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
13Although in a di¤erent context, Taylor (1979) also reports that a atter AD relation leads to
smaller persistence. In his case, the slope of AD relation is determined by the degree of accommo-
dation of aggregate demand policy to wage changes.
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presenting the analytical solutions for the simplied model.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the model.
Section 3 studies how credit frictions, represented by non trivial monitoring costs,
make retailersreal marginal cost less pro-cyclical. Then, section 4 shows that credit
frictions atten the AS relation. Section 5 looks at how they also atten the AD
relation. Having seen the e¤ects on AS and AD relations, Section 6 studies how
credit frictions alter output dynamics of the response to money shocks. Section 7
conducts quantitative analysis. Section 8 checks the robustness of the results by
generalising householdsutility function. Section 9 concludes.
2.2 The model: overview
Figure 1 shows the overview of the model.
Households
Funds to spare
Consuming final goods
Banks
Intermediaries
Monitoring
Final goods producers
Perfect competition
CES production function
Entrepreneurs
Producing wholesale goods
Consuming final goods
Retailers
Monopolistic competition
Staggered pricesetting
Government
Transfer of money
Figure 1: Overview of the model
Entrepreneurs produce homogeneous goods called wholesale goods employing
labour supplied by households. Lacking internal funds, they borrow the labour cost
from households through banks. Given that the outcome of wholesale goods pro-
duction is entrepreneursprivate information, banks need to pay monitoring costs
to observe it. As mentioned, this asymmetry of information is the source of credit
frictions.
15
Using wholesale goods as the only input, retailers produce di¤erentiated retail
goods. Being monopolistic competitors, they are subject to the Calvo style stag-
gered pricesetting (Calvo 1983): in each period, only a fraction of randomly selected
retailers are given an opportunity to reset their prices. The reason why I model
entrepreneurs and retailers as separate producers is to consider a contracting prob-
lem with banks and an intertemporal prot maximisation problem under staggered
pricesetting separately. This strategy is often taken when one incorporates credit
frictions into the NK framework.14
Retailers face a downward sloping demand curve because of nal goods produc-
ers. Being perfect competitors, nal goods producers make composite retail goods
called nal goods relying on the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production
function.15 Households and entrepreneurs consume nal goods.
As a money shock, this chapter focuses on an unexpected permanent increase
in the money supply. Raising revenue through seigniorage, the government makes
a direct transfer of money to households. For simplicity, there is no government
spending.
2.3 Retailersreal marginal cost
To see how monitoring costs alter output dynamics of the response to the money
shock, I rst study their e¤ect on retailersreal marginal cost. Assuming that retail-
ersproduction function exhibits constant returns to scale, the real marginal cost is
equal to the real price of wholesale goods. Thus, I now study how the real price of
wholesale goods is determined.
14Examples are Bernanke et al. (1999), Iacoviello (2005) and Faia and Monacelli (2007).
15It should be clear that our "retailers" are not sellers of nal goods, contrary to the everyday
meaning of the word.
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2.3.1 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneur j produces wholesale goods, Y Wt (j) using household labour, Ht (j).
The production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale:
Y Wt (j) = !t (j)Ht (j)
 ; (1)
where 0 <  < 1. !t (j) is an iid random variable with an expected value of unity;
E (!) = 1. It represents an idiosyncratic shock to the production. The distribution
of the random variable is common across individuals and also time-invariant.
Entrepreneurs, who live only one period, have no initial wealth. I assume that
household labour cost,WtHt (j) ; whereWt is nominal wage, has to be paid before the
production takes place16. Thus, entrepreneurs need to raise the labour cost externally.
Meanwhile, households, who do not have an access to this production technology,
have funds to spare. Entrepreneurs borrow the input cost from households through
banks.
Costly state verication framework The realised value of the idiosyncratic
shock is entrepreneur js private information. In order for banks to observe the ac-
tual amount of wholesale goods produced, they need to incur monitoring costs. This
framework is known as the costly state verication (CSV) framework (Townsend,
1979). I assume that the cost for monitoring entrepreneur js production is a pro-
portion of the expected amount of production, i.e. Ht (j)
. The monitoring costs
parameter,  is common across entrepreneurs and time-invariant.17
Standard debt contract Under the CSV framework, the form of optimal contract
is derived as a standard debt contract (Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985)).
16Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998, 2001) also assume this, although in their models, the input bill
contains capital rental fee as well.
17I assume that  < 1, since  of as high as 1 implies that monitoring costs amount to the
expected wholesale goods production. Monitoring costs should not be that high. For example, a
possible range of the parameter,  suggested by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) is between 0:04 and
0:36.
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If the production of wholesale goods happens to exceed the predetermined amount
of repayment, entrepreneur j pays this predetermined amount and keeps the rest.
However, if it turns out to be less, he defaults and his bank pays monitoring cost and
takes all the remaining goods.18
The amount of repayment is expressed as 	tWtHt (j) in nominal terms, where
	t is the predetermined gross interest rate. Denoting the nominal price of wholesale
goods as PWt , notice that there is a cut-o¤ value of !t (j), !t (j) such that
	tWtHt (j) = !t (j)P
W
t H

t :
That is, if !t (j) turns out to be below the cut-o¤ value, he defaults.
The contract between entrepreneur j and his bank is made before the idiosyncratic
shock is realised. It determines !t(j) and the size of the project represented by
Ht (j). As mentioned, entrepreneurs consume nal goods. Given that entrepreneurs
live only one period, they consume all the prots they have made. Then, practically,
entrepreneurs aim for maximising their expected consumption of nal goods.
Assuming that lending takes place within a period, the net interest rate house-
holds obtain from lending to banks is zero, because their opportunity cost of not
lending is zero.19 For simplicity, banks do not employ inputs to operate. Assuming
that perfect competition prevails in the banking sector, banks do not make any prof-
its. By lending the input costs, WtHt (j) to a large number of entrepreneurs, they
recoup the amount they have lent on average.
Denoting the real price of wholesale goods as 't

=
PWt
Pt
where Pt is the price of nal goods

and real wage as wt

= Wt
Pt

, the contracting problem is formally expressed as:
maximise
'tf (!t (j))Ht (j)
 ; (2)
18Given that monitoring takes place only when entrepreneurs go bankrupt, the monitoring costs
can be interpreted as bankruptcy costs, which include not only direct costs for auditing but also
indirect costs such as costs from asset liquidation and the interruption of business.
19Because of this intra period nature of the loan, lending to entrepreneurs does not compete with
investing in an interest bearing bond whose return is paid intertemporally.
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with respect to !t (j) and Ht (j), subject to
'tg (!t (j))Ht (j)
 = wtHt (j) : (3)
Entrepreneur js expected real prot is expressed as 'tf (!t (j))Ht (j)
, where f (!t (j))
is his expected share of the real revenue from wholesale goods production. Under the
standard debt contract, the share is expressed as:
f (!t (j)) =
Z 1
!t(j)
!d (!)  (1   (!t (j)))!t (j) ; (4)
where  stands for a cumulative distribution function of !20. In the bankspartici-
pation constraint (Eq.3), g (!t (j)) is the banksexpected share of the revenue. The
share is given as
g (!t (j)) =
Z !t(j)
0
!d (!) + (1   (!t (j)))!t (j)   (!t (j)) : (5)
Notice that there is deadweight loss under this setting. Adding the shares, f (!t (j))
and g (!t (j)), I obtain:
f (!t (j)) + g (!t (j)) = 1   (!t (j)) :
This claries that, on average, the fraction,  (!t (j)) of the wholesale goods pro-
duction is lost in the monitoring process. This deadweight loss represents agency
costs from the informational asymmetry.
Real price of wholesale goods, 't Solving the contracting problem, I rst derive
the following implicit labour demand function:
wt =
1
s (!t (j))
'tHt (j)
 1 ;
20 will be used for its probability density function.
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where
s (!t (j)) =
1
1   (!t (j)) + (!t(j))f(!t(j))f 0(!t(j))
:
Substituting this into the constraint, 'tg (!t (j))Ht (j)
 = wtHt (j), I obtain
 = g (!t (j)) s (!t (j)) : (6)
Given that the distribution of ! is common to all the entrepreneurs and time-
invariant, the cut-o¤ value is also common and time-invariant: !t (j) = !. Thus,
Eq.6 simplies to:
 = g (!) s (!) ; (7)
where
s (!) =
1
1   (!) + (!)f(!)
f 0(!)
: (8)
This relation indicates that once the distribution of ! is fully specied, the cut-o¤
value of ! can be obtained for given  and .
Furthermore, since !t (j) = !, I know from the labour demand function that
the demand is symmetric across entrepreneurs, Ht (j) = Ht. Thus, the function is
rewritten as:
wt =
1
s (!)
'tH
 1
t :
Rearranging this, I obtain:
't = s (!)
1
H 1t
wt: (9)
This relation says that the relative price of wholesale goods, 't is set as the mark up,
s (!) over wholesalersreal marginal cost, 1
H 1t
wt. Intuitively, entrepreneurs need
to charge the mark up in order to cover the agency costs. Indeed, s (!) takes unity
in the absence of monitoring costs ( = 0). However, when  > 0, s (!) is larger
than one given that f 0 (!) (=   (1   (!))) < 0.
Finally, notice that the agency costs,  (!) (and the mark, s (!)) is acyclical.
Once the time-invariant distribution function of ! is specied, this can be obtained
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for given values of  and . The acyclical agency costs enable me to obtain below
the explicit solution for the output dynamics to the money shock.
2.3.2 Households
Having looked at entrepreneursbehaviour to obtain the pricing relation (Eq.9), I
now turn to the representative households utility maximisation problem. The repre-
sentative household cares about consumption of nal goods, C, real money balances,
M
P
and labour supply H. I assume that a rise in real money balances increases utility,
given that it facilitates transaction. For simplicity, the utility function is assumed to
be separable. The utility function is given as:
1X
t=0
t
0B@ C1 t
1   + (1  )

Mt
Pt
1 
1     H

t
1CA ; (10)
where  is the discount rate and it is assumed that 0 <  < 1;   0;   0;  > 0;
and  > 1. The budget constraint is expressed as:
PtCt +Mt +Bt = WtHt +Mt 1 + (1 + it 1)Bt 1 + t + Tt;
where Bt is bond holding, it 1 is a nominal interest rate (accrued in period t), t is
prot share from retailers21, and Tt is a lump sum tax, all in nominal terms. In the
equilibrium, the aggregate supply of bonds is zero.
The government budget constraint is Mt  Mt 1 = Tt. In case Tt > 0, it means
that the government makes a direct transfer of money to households, raising revenue
through seigniorage. In case Tt < 0, it is actually a tax collected by the government
from households. The government spending is zero in the model.
Solving this utility maximisation problem, I obtain the consumption Euler equa-
tion,
C t =  (1 + rt)C
 
t+1; (11)
21Households are the shareholders of retailers.
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the money demand function,
Mt
Pt
=

1  

1 + it
it
Ct
 1

; (12)
and the labour supply function
wt =


H 1t
C t
: (13)
In deriving money demand function, use is made of the consumption Euler equation
and the Fisher equation: 1 + rt  (1 + it) PtPt+1 :
2.3.3 Elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost with respect to output
Substituting the labour supply function (Eq.13) into the wholesalerspricing relation
(Eq.9) and rearranging, I can express the real price of wholesale goods, equivalently
retailersreal marginal cost, as a function of household consumption Ct and employ-
ment, Ht:
't =


1

s (!)Ct H
 
t
22: (14)
In order to derive the elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost with respect to output,
I now rewrite 't as a function of output, Yt.
Elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost with respect to output Entrepre-
neur js production function is given as Y Wt (j) = !tH

t .
23 Given E (!) = 1, the
grossaggregate production of wholesale goods is Ht . Subtracting the aggregate
deadweight loss due to monitoring,  (!)Ht , I obtain the netaggregate wholesale
good production, Y Wt as follows:
Y Wt = (1   (!))Ht : (15)
22In fact, this is a labour market equilibrium condition.
23Remember that Ht(j) = Ht for all j.
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Under the assumption that entrepreneurs spend all the prots on the consumption
of nal goods, the aggregate entrepreneurial consumption, Cet is given as
Cet = 'tf (!)H

t :
Using Eq.15, this becomes
Cet = 't
f (!)
1   (!)Y
W
t : (16)
Meanwhile, the market clearing condition for the nal good is:
Yt = Ct + C
e
t ; (17)
where Yt is aggregate nal good production and Ct is aggregate household consump-
tion. From Eqs.16 and 17, Ct is expressed as:
Ct = Yt   'tf (!)
Y Wt
1   (!) : (18)
Finally, using Eqs.15 and 18, retailersreal marginal cost (Eq.14) is rewritten as:
't =


1

s (!)

Yt   't
f (!)
1   (!)Y
W
t
 
Y Wt
1   (!)
  

: (19)
Observe that there is 't in the expression for Ct on the right hand side. This
is because Cet is a function of 't: the higher the relative price of wholesale goods,
the more entrepreneurs consume on aggregate. Generally, 't can not be factored out
apart from the case where  = 0 or  = 1.  represents the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of consumption.  = 0 indicates that the subutility over consumption is
linear, Ct, while  = 1 implies that it is logarithmic,  lnCt. Due to the extremity
of the former case, my focus will be on the latter ( = 1) from here onwards.
With  = 1, the real marginal cost, 't can be written as a function of Y
W
t and
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Yt:
't
 
Y Wt ; Yt

=


1

s (!)

YWt
1 (!)
  

Yt
1 + 

1

s (!) f (!)

YWt
1 (!)
 

:24 (20)
I now log-linearise Eq.20 around the exible price steady state to obtain the
elasticity of the real marginal cost with respect to output. To do this, I rst show
that aggregate wholesale good production, Y Wt and aggregate nal good production,
Yt are the same in the steady state, i.e. Y W = Y (see Appendix 1). The appendix
also shows that the log deviation of Y Wt from Y ,
dY Wt and the deviation of Yt from
Y , bYt are the same, i.e. dY Wt = bYt.
Incorporating these ndings, log-linearisation yields:
b't =  bYt; (21)
where
 =
 
'YW
 
Y ; Y

+ 'Y
 
Y ; Y

Y
'
 
Y ; Y
 : (22)
In Eq.21, b't is the log deviation of 't from the steady state, '. In Eq.22, 'YW  Y ; Y 
is the rst order partial derivative of ' with respect to Y W evaluated at the steady
state and 'Y
 
Y ; Y

is dened likewise. Thus,  represents the elasticity of retailers
real marginal cost with respect to output. In order to express  as a function of deep
parameters of the model, I now show how the steady state value of Y is determined.
Flexible price steady state Retailers, monopolistic competitors, face a downward
sloping demand curve. In order to derive the demand curve, I study the behaviour
of nal good producers. They produce the nal good (composite retail good) using
all the di¤erentiated retail goods. Their production function is of the CES type:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
; (23)
24The cuto¤ value, ! is a function of neither Yt nor YWt , since it is modelled as acyclical (see
Eq.7).
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where Yt is the nal good and Yt (z) is the retail good produced by retailer z. Solving
their cost minimisation problem, I obtain the following demand function for retail
good z,
Yt (z) = Yt

Pt (z)
Pt
 
; (24)
where
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
: (25)
Since nal good producers act competitively and have a constant returns to scale
technology, Pt is the price of the nal good as well as the price index of the retail
goods.
To dene the output in the exible price steady state, Y , I study how retailer z
behaves in a exible price setting. Given that there are a large number of retailers, the
aggregate price, Pt is treated as given. As mentioned, retailers use wholesale goods
as the only input. They transform homogeneous wholesale goods into di¤erentiated
retail goods using constant returns to scale technology. Thus, retailer zs production
function is simply given as: Yt (z) = Y Wt (z) : Then, his prot maximisation problem
is expressed as:
maximise
t (z) = Pt (z)Yt (z)  PWt Yt (z)
subject to
Yt (z) = Yt

Pt (z)
Pt
 
:
Solving this yields
Pt (z)
Pt
=

  1't; (26)
where 't =
PWt
Pt
. The optimal real price is expressed as the mark up 
 1 over the real
marginal cost.
In a exible price steady state, every retailer is symmetric and charges the same
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price. Then, given that Pt (z) = Pt, I obtain the following relation:
1 =

  1'
 
Y ; Y

: (27)
This relation implicitly denes Y . Incorporating Eq.27 into Eq.22, the expression for
the elasticity,  is derived as:
 =



1    1

f (!)
1   (!)

: (28)
In order to see the e¤ect of monitoring costs parameter,  on the elasticity, , I now
specify the distribution function of ! and derive the expression for the entrepreneurs
share of net revenue from wholesale goods production, f(!)
1 (!) .
Entrepreneurs share of the net revenue, f(!)
1 (!) I assume that the distri-
bution function of ! is uniform in the region [1   ; 1 + ] (0 <   1) so that
E (!) = 1 and V ar (!) = 1
3
2. With the uniform distribution, it can be obtained that
 (!) = 1
2
;  (!) = ! (1 )
2
; f (!) = ((1+) !)
2
4
; and g (!) = 4 2(! (1 )) ((1+) !)
2
4
:
Having specied the distribution as uniform, the cut o¤value, ! is now derived as
a function of , , and  from Eq.7:  = g (!) s (!) ; where s (!) = 1
1 (!)+(!)f(!)
f 0(!)
:
First, I obtain the following two potential values of !:
! = (1 + )  + 1
2
(
p
22 + (1  )(42 + 16  16)); (29)
where inside the root is larger than 22 since  < 1 and  < 1. It can be shown
that the larger value of ! in Eq.29 is greater than 1 + . Thus, the only feasible
option is the smaller one:
! = (1 + )  + "; (30)
where
" =
1
2
( 
p
22 + (1  )(42 + 16  16)): (31)
To see that this value indeed maximises the entrepreneursexpected prot, I study
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the second order condition for this problem in Appendix 2. There, I prove that the
smaller value is the optimal cut-o¤ value chosen by entrepreneurs.
With the uniform distribution, the entrepreneursshare of the net revenue, f(!)
1 (!)
is expressed as:
f (!)
1   (!) =
(!   (1 + ))2
4  2(!   (1  )) : (32)
Substituting Eq.30 into Eq.32, f(!)
1 (!) is now obtained as a function of , , and :
f (!)
1   (!) =
(  ")2
4 (1  ) + 2 (  ") : (33)
Observe that in the absence of monitoring costs ( = 0), it simplies to:
f (!)
1   (!) = 1  :
25 (34)
Monitoring costs and the elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost with re-
spect to output Finally, substituting Eq.33 into Eq.28:  = 


1   1

f(!)
1 (!)

,
I obtain the expression of the elasticity as a function of deep variables of the model
including the monitoring costs parameter, .
It is now clear that monitoring costs a¤ect the elasticity through the entre-
preneurs share of the net revenue, f(!)
1 (!) . I can show that for any values of 
(0 <  < 1),  (0 <  < 1) and  (0 <  < 1), the entrepreneursshare, f(!)
1 (!) is
an increase function of monitoring costs parameter, :
@ f(!)
1 (!)
@
> 0: (35)
Intuitively, as it becomes more costly for banks to monitor entrepreneurs invest-
ment outcome, entrepreneurs enjoy a higher economic rent because they have the
special ability of monitoring the outcome costlessly. This leads to an increase in the
entrepreneursshare of the net revenue, f(!)
1 (!) .
Overall, I know from Eq.28 that the elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost with
25In fact, this is the case regardless of the distribution of !.
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respect to output is a decreasing function of monitoring cost:
@
@
< 0: (36)
In short, monitoring costs make retailersreal marginal cost less pro-cyclical.
2.3.4 Intuition behind the e¤ect of monitoring costs on the elasticity
To see the intuition behind how monitoring costs make retailersreal marginal cost
less pro-cyclical, I again look at the wholesalerspricing relation: 't = s (!)
1
H 1t
wt
(Eq.9). It says that the real price of wholesale goods is determined as a time-invariant
mark up, s (!) over the marginal cost, 1
H 1t
wt. Log linearising this, I have:
b't = (1  )cHt + bwt:26 (37)
Given that the CRRA parameter,  is set to be unity in the households utility
function, the equilibrium real wage is obtained as wt =


CtH
 1
t (see Eq.13). Notice
that wt is subject to an income e¤ect. Log linearising this yields
bwt = bCt + (   1)cHt: (38)
Substituting Eq.38 into 37, we obtain
b't = bCt + (   )cHt: (39)
The retailersreal marginal cost is an increasing function of household consumption
due to the income e¤ect.
It is the case that Yt = (1   (!))Ht around the steady state (see Eq.15).27
Log linearising this leads to cHt = 1

bYt: (40)
26As before, the hat notation indicates the log deviation from the steady state.
27Remember that YWt = Yt around the steady state.
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Substituting Eq.40 and b't =  bYt into Eq.39 and rearranging, I obtain the relation
between household consumption bCt and output bYt:
bCt = dbYt; (41)
where
d = 1  

  1

f (!)
1   (!) : (42)
I assume that 0 < d < 1. Given that
@
f(!)
1 (!)
@
> 0 (Eq.35), d is a decreasing function
in :
@d
@
< 0: (43)
That is, the wedge between bCt and bYt becomes wider as monitoring costs increase.
It is thus clear that monitoring costs make retailersreal marginal cost less pro-
cyclical by weakening the income e¤ect. When monitoring costs are high, household
consumption does not increase much for a given change in output. This, in turn,
leads to a smaller increase in the real wage and retailersreal marginal cost.
Then, why does an increase in monitoring costs widen the wedge between house-
hold consumption and output? To grasp this intuitively, observe rst that the market
clearing condition of the nal good, Yt = Ct +Cet implies the following identity rela-
tion: bYt = C
Y
bCt + Ce
Y
cCet ; (44)
where C and Ce are the steady state values of each variable andcCet is the log deviation
of Cet .
Here I focus on the case where  is close to 1, i.e. entrepreneursproduction
technology almost exhibits constant returns to scale. In this case, the prots en-
trepreneurs obtain in the absence of monitoring costs are negligible. Indeed, when
 = 0, entrepreneursability of observing their own investment outcomes free does
not earn them economic rents because the ability is virtually shared by banks. Thus,
entrepreneurial consumption is negligible. In Eq.44, C
e
Y
is almost zero when  = 0,
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which results in the approximate relation of bCt = bYt.
However, when it is costly for banks to monitor entrepreneursinvestment out-
comes and only entrepreneurs can monitor them free, entrepreneurs do enjoy eco-
nomic rents in the contract. This implies that C
e
Y
is not negligible any more. Next,
given that cCet is expressed as (1 + ) bYt (see Eq.16) and  > 0 (Eq.28), I know thatcCet > bYt. That is, one percent increase in output from the steady state corresponds
to more than one percent increase in entrepreneurial consumption. Intuitively, an
increase in aggregate output bids up the relative price of wholesale goods, P
W
t
Pt
, which
brings about the more than proportional increase in entrepreneurial consumption.
Then, Eq.44 claries that cCet > bYt, coupled with the non trivial share of Ce in Y ,
implies that household consumption increases less than proportionally, i.e. bCt < bYt.
Monitoring costs create the wedge.
2.3.5 Discussion: The model as a generalisation of a standard NK model
Here, I discuss that this model with credit frictions can be regarded as a generalisation
of a standard NK model such as the baseline model by Chari et al. (2000, Section 5).
When their model adopts the same utility function as mine (Eq.10), my model nests
their baseline model as a special case in which monitoring costs are absent ( = 0)
and the wholesalersproduction technology exhibits near constant returns to scale
( close to 1).28
Chari et al. (2000) do not consider credit market imperfections in their analysis
of the real e¤ect of monetary shocks. In their paper, households provide labour
supply to monopolistic competitors called retailers.29 In their baseline model, capital
is ignored and retailers use the labour as the only input for production. When the
production technology exhibits constant returns to scale, retailersreal marginal cost
is equal to the real wage. Then, if the householdsutility function is the same as
the one in my model with  = 1, the log deviation of real marginal cost is given as:
28What I call their baseline model is the model introduced in the section 5 of their paper, where
they ignore capital as I do in this chapter.
29As in my model, retailers face a downward sloping demand curve due to the nal good producer
who makes the composite retail good (nal good) following a CES production function.
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bCt + (   1)cHt: Given that the market clearing condition in their baseline model is
given as Yt = Ct, it is the case that bCt = bYt. Also it can be shown that cHt = bYt.30
Then, the elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost with respect to output is given as
.
Meanwhile, in the special case of my model in which credit frictions are absent
( = 0) and  is set close to 1, retailers real marginal cost, 't is approximately
equal to the real wage, wt (see Eq.9). As argued, in this special case, entrepreneurial
consumption, Cet is negligible so that it is approximately case that bCt = bYt andcHt = bYt. Then, the elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost with respect to output,
 is given as  as in Chari et als baseline case. In this sense, our model nests the
standard NK model as the special case.
2.4 Aggregate supply (AS) relation
The previous section saw that monitoring costs render the retailersreal marginal cost
less pro-cyclical. This section incorporates this insight into the determination of the
AS relation of the model. To do this, I rst derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC) from the retailers intertemporal prot maximisation problem subject to
the Calvo style staggered pricesetting.
2.4.1 New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC)
Retailers (monopolistic competitors) are subject to Calvo style staggered pricing. In
each period, only the proportion 1  of randomly selected retailers are given an
opportunity to adjust their prices.  is naturally a measure of the degree of price
stickiness, i.e. the higher  is, the stickier price is, because the higher value of  means
the longer expected interval between price changes. When they have a chance to set
prices, they set prices in such a way that the expected discounted value of current and
30This can be shown as follows. Given that the production function of retailer z is Yt (z) =
Ht (z), aggregate employment is expressed as Ht =
R 1
0
Yt (z) dz. Log-linearisation of this yieldscHt = R 10 \Yt (z)dz. The production function of the nal good producer takes the CES type: Yt =R 1
0
Yt (z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
. When I log linearising this, I obtain bYt = R 10 \Yt (z)dz. Thus, cHt = bYt.
31
future prots is maximised. Since this Calvo lotterytakes place every period and
past history does not a¤ect the probability of winning, the winning retailers choose
the same new price. I denote this reset price as P calvo. However, before studying how
the reset price is determined, I rst look at the relation between a given reset price,
P calvo and ination rate. The following derivation of the NKPC is mainly based on
Walsh (2003, chapter 5).
Relation between reset price and ination rate The price index (equivalently,
the price of nal good) is given as (Eq.25); Pt =
R 1
0
Pt (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
, where Pt (z)
is the price charged by retailer z in period t. Under the Calvo price setting, the
aggregate price index is determined as an average of the price charged by retailers
not having an opportunity to adjust their prices at time t (proportion, ) and the
reset price at time t (proportion, 1  ). Since price adjusters are randomly selected,
the average of non adjusters (who adjusted at di¤erent times in the past) is equal to
the aggregate price in the previous period, Pt 1. Then, given that the adjusters set
the same reset price, P calvo;t, the price index is expressed as:
Pt =
 
P 1 t 1 + (1  )P 1 calvo;t
 1
1  : (45)
I denote the relative reset price,
P calvo;t
Pt
as Qt. Also, denoting the ination rate in
time t, Pt Pt 1
Pt 1
as t, Eq.45 can be written as:
1 =
 
 (1 + t)
 1 + (1  )Q1 t
 1
1  : (46)
I linearise this Eq.46 around the zero ination steady state. In terms of price levels,
this means that Pss = Pt 1 = Pt. Then, in this steady state, the aggregate price
is dened as Pss =
 
P 1 ss + (1  )P 1 calvo;ss
 1
1  . This, in turn, implies that the
reset price equals the price index, Pss = P calvo;ss, thus Qss = 1. In the zero ination
steady state, every retailer charges the same price as in the exible price steady state.
Linearising Eq.46 around the steady state yields the following relation between the
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target price and ination rate:
bqt = 
1  t; (47)
where bqt is the percentage deviation from the steady state: bqt = Qt QssQss :
Determination of reset price Given the chance to adjust their prices, retailers
set the price so that the expected discounted value of current and future prots is
maximised. Retailers use the wholesale good as the single input in production and
the production exhibits constant returns to scale. Then, given the chance in period
t, retailer z chooses the price, Pt (z) to maximise
1X
i=0
it;t+i

Pt (z)
Pt+i
Yt+i (z)  P
W
t+i
Pt+i
Yt+i (z)

;
where t;t+i is the retailers discount rate for time t + i. Incorporating the demand
function for retailer z (Eq.24), the above objective can be rewritten as
1X
i=0
it;t+i

Pt (z)  PWt+i
Pt+i

Pt (z)
Pt+i
 
Yt+i
Di¤erentiating this with respect to Pt (z) and setting it to zero, I obtain
P calvo;t
Pt
=

  1
P1
i=0

it;t+i
PWt+i
Pt+i

Pt+i
Pt

Yt+i

P1
i=0

it;t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Yt+i
 :
Using Qt =
P calvo;t
Pt
and 't+i =
PWt+i
Pt+i
, this is expressed as
Qt =

  1
P1
i=0

it;t+i't+i

Pt+i
Pt

Yt+i

P1
i=0

it;t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Yt+i
 : (48)
The prots made by retailers are distributed among households (households are the
shareholders of retailers). Then, as in Walsh (Chapter 5, 2003), the retailers discount
factor, t;t+i is given by the households discount rate, 
i and the marginal utility of
their consumption in period t+i relative to the one in period t. From the households
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utility function (Eq.10), t;t+i is derived as:
t;t+i = 
i

Ct+i
Ct
 1
:3132 (49)
Substituting Eq.49 into Eq.48, I obtain
1X
i=0
 
iiC 1t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Yt+i
!
Qt =

  1
1X
i=0

iiC 1t+i't+i

Pt+i
Pt

Yt+i

: (50)
Log linearising both sides around the steady state and doing some further manipu-
lation (see Appendix 3), what I have in the end is
bqt = (1  ) b't +  (dqt+1 + t+1) ; (51)
where b't denotes the percentage deviation of 't from the zero ination steady state
value.
New Keynesian Phillips curve From Eq.47 and Eq.51, I obtain:
t =  b't + t+1; (52)
where
 =
1  

(1  ) : (53)
This is the relation known as the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). The NKPC
says that current ination is a function of the retailersreal marginal cost expressed as
a percentage deviation from the steady state value and the expected future ination33.
I now rewrite this as a function of output instead of the marginal cost to derive
the aggregate supply (AS) relation.
31 is set to be 1.
32Looking at the consumption Euler equation (Eq.11), this discount factor can be interpreted
more intuitively. This is simply the inverse of the product of the gross real interest rates from
period t to t+ i  1; i

Ct+i
Ct
 1
= 1(1+rt)(1+rt+1)(1+rt+i 1) :
33Notice that since the model is deterministic, the expected ination is simply denoted as t+1.
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2.4.2 Monitoring costs and AS relation
Previously, I obtained b't =  bYt; where  =  1   1 f(!)1 (!) (Eqs.21 and 28).
There, the hat notation was dened as the percentage deviation from the exible
price steady state. However, the exible price and zero ination steady states are the
same, since every retailer charges the same price in both states. Then, the NKPC is
expressed as a function of output:
t = bYt + t+1; (54)
where
 = : (55)
The NKPC, the relation between ination and output can be rewritten into a
relation between price and output. Realising that t is approximated as lnPt lnPt 1,
Eq.54 is written as:
lnPt   lnPt 1 = bYt +  (lnPt+1   lnPt) : (56)
I here specify the nature of money shocks. In this chapter, I focus on an unex-
pected one-o¤ permanent money increase. Initially, money supply is constant and
the economy is in the steady state. Then in Period 0, money supply increases by one
percent and it stays at that new level indenitely. Denote the price level in the initial
steady state (that is, the price in the period  1) as P . Also denote the percentage
deviation of the price level for the period k  0 from P ascPk, which is approximately
lnPk   lnP . Then, Eq.56 is expressed as: cPk  [Pk 1 =  bYk +  [Pk+1  cPk, wherebYk = lnYk   lnY : Rearranging this yields
cPk = 
1 + 
bYk + 1
1 + 

[Pk 1 + [Pk+1

: (57)
The fact that an increase in monitoring costs,  leads to a decrease in the elasticity,
35
 (Eq.36) indicates that
@
@
< 0: (58)
It is now clear that monitoring costs make the AS relation atter.
2.5 Aggregate demand (AD) relation
2.5.1 Derivation of AD relation
To derive the aggregate demand (AD) relation, I now assume that  = 1 in house-
holdsutility function (Eq.10). That is, the real balance component of the function
takes a logarithmic form. As seen from the money demand function (Eq.12), 1

rep-
resents interest elasticity of money demand so that  = 1 implies the elasticity of
unity.34 I assume this to derive an interest-insensitive aggregate demand (AD) re-
lation (Fender and Rankin (2003)). That is, there is some sort of the dichotomy
between real and nominal sector of the economy. As seen below, this helps me to
obtain an explicit solution for the output dynamics to an unexpected permanent
money shock.
With  = 1, the money demand function is expressed as:
Mt
Pt
=
1  

1 + it
it
Ct: (59)
Assuming that the money market is in equilibrium, the equilibrium condition repre-
sents a money market equilibrium condition. Using the consumption Euler equation
(Eq.11) and the Fisher equation, Eq.59 can be rewritten as: 1 
Mt
= 
PtCt
  
Pt+1Ct+1
.
Then, by multiplying both sides by Mt+1, this becomes
t+1 =
1
	t+1
t  
1
	t+1
1  

; (60)
where t =
Mt
PtCt
and 	t+1 = MtMt+1 . This is a rst order di¤erence equation in the
34More specically, what is meant by the interest elasticity of money demand is the elasticity of
money demand with respect to opportunity cost variable, it1+it .
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inverse velocity, t.
As noted above, I focus on the situation where money supply, M increases unex-
pectedly at Period 0 and then stays at the high level permanently. Then, the inverse
of money supply increase, 	k+1 always equals 1 for k  0. Because the inverse veloc-
ity is not a predetermined variable, this di¤erence equation (Eq.60) has to be solved
in a forward looking manner. Then, for this equation to exhibit the saddlepoint sta-
bility, 	k+1 needs to be less than 1. This requirement is indeed satised given that
	k+1 equals 1 and the discount factor,  is less than 1. This observation now enables
me to conclude that the inverse velocity is constant:
 =
1
1  
1  

: (61)
Thus, I have the following AD relation:
Ck =
1

Mk
Pk
: (62)
This shows the negative relation between price and consumption for a given level of
money supply. With the AD relation, it is now clear that the nominal interest rate
is constant despite the change in Money supply; i = 1 

:
Log linearising the AD relation around the initial steady state (the state before
Period 0) yields cPk = cMk  cCk; (63)
where cCk = lnCk   lnC and cMk = lnMk   lnM , where M represents the level of
money supply before the shock.
2.5.2 Monitoring costs and AD relation
I now rewrite the above AD relation using output instead of the household consump-
tion. I showed above that cCk = d bYk; where d = 1     1 f(!)1 (!) (Eqs.41 and 42).35
35Eq.41 was originally obtained as the deviation from the exible price steady state, while I am
here talking about the deviation from the zero ination steady state. However, since the two steady
37
With this relation, Eq.63 is expressed as:
cPk = cMk   d bYk: (64)
Assuming that 0 < d < 1, the AD relation is negatively sloped. Since the wedge
between cCk and bYk becomes wider as  increases (Eq.43), monitoring costs make the
slope of AD curve atter.
2.6 Output dynamics
Having obtained the AS and AD relations (Eqs.57 and 64), I now show how moni-
toring costs a¤ect the output dynamics of the response to the unexpected permanent
increase in money supply. With one percent increase in money, Eq.64 becomes
cPk = 1  d bYk:
Substituting this into the AS relation, the following second order di¤erence equation
is obtained:
[Pk+1   1 +  + e

cPk + 1

[Pk 1 =   e

; (65)
where
e =

d
: (66)
Given that the shock hits in Period 0, the initial condition of the di¤erence equation
is given by dP 1 = 0: Since money is neutral in the long run, the terminal condition
is given by limk!1cPk = 1:
As mentioned above, I assume that 0 < d < 1. The reason for this is that when
d takes a negative value and the AD curve is positively sloped, the characteristic
equation of the associated homogeneous equation of Eq.65 has no real roots. To
avoid this scenario and focus on the case where it does have distinct real roots, I
impose this assumption.
states are the same, this relation still holds.
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When d is positive, e is also positive (Eqs.55 and 66). Then, the solution for the
second order di¤erence equation is obtained as follows (Appendix 4). For any k  0,
cPk = 1  bk+11 ; (67)
where
b1 =
 a1  
p
a21   4a2
2
: (68)
In Eq.68, a1 =  1++e and a2 = 1 : I show in the appendix that 0 < b1 < 1. Thus,
the terminal condition is satised.
Given that cPk + cCk = 1, I obtain for any k  0,
cCk = bk+11 : (69)
Using cCk = d bYk, this is expressed in terms of output:
bYk = 1
d
bk+11 : (70)
This shows the evolution of output after the money shock.
Notice that the output dynamics is characterised by the impactparameter, b1
d
,
which is output in Period 0, and the persistence parameter, b1. Then, how do
monitoring costs a¤ect these parameters?
2.6.1 E¤ect of monitoring costs on the impact and persistence of the
money shock
Since the impact parameter, b1
d
contains the persistence parameter, b1, I rst see the
e¤ect of monitoring costs on b1.
E¤ect on the persistence parameter, b1 To see the e¤ect, the key parameter to
focus on is e(= 
d
) (Eq.66). Notice from Eq.68 that the parameter b1 is a decreasing
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function of e:
@b1
@e
< 0: (71)
A larger value of e leads to smaller persistence.
Remember that higher monitoring costs make both AS and AD relations atter.
A atter AS curve is represented by a smaller value of  (Eq.57). A smaller  corre-
sponds to a smaller e (for given d). That is, higher monitoring costs lead to greater
persistence by attening the AS curve. Meanwhile, a atter AD curve corresponds
to a smaller value of d, which, in turn, implies a larger e (for given ). This results
in smaller persistence. Indeed, monitoring costs,  exert contrasting e¤ects on the
persistence through the AS and AD curves.
However, it turns out that the second e¤ect through the AD curve is dominant.
In order to see this, notice rst that the signs of @e
@
and @

d
@
are the same. Next,
substituting cCk = d bYk (Eq.41) and cHk = 1 bYk (Eq.40) into c'k = cCk + (   )cHk
(Eq.39), I have
c'k = (d+     ) bYk:
Given that c'k =  bYk, I know:
 = d+
   

; (72)
where d (and ) is a decreasing function of . Since the constant term,  

is
positive36, I can say that @

d
@
> 0. This, in turn, indicates @e
@
> 0: It is thus clear that
the e¤ect of monitoring costs through the AD curve dominates the one through the
AS curve.
Finally, given that b1 is a decreasing function of e (Eq.71),  is negatively related
with b1:
@b1
@
< 0: (73)
An increase in monitoring costs makes the real e¤ects of money shock less persistent.
36The preference parameter,  is strictly greater than 1 and the technology parameter  is between
0 and 1.
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E¤ect on the impact parameter, b1
d
Given that @d
@
< 0 and @b1
@
< 0 (Eqs.43
and 73), the overall e¤ect of  on the impact parameter, b1
d
might seem ambiguous.
However, making use of  = d+  

(Eq.72), I can unambiguously show that
@ b1
d
@
> 0: (74)
The higher monitoring costs are, the greater the impact of money shock becomes.
Overall, monitoring costs amplify the impact of money shock on real output while
they reduce the persistence of the shock.
2.7 Quantitative analysis
2.7.1 Parameter values
In order to quantify the e¤ects of monitoring costs on the impact and persistence
of the money shock, I now set parameter values. Some parameter values are set
previously ( = 1 and  = 1). For the other parameters, I mainly follow the values
used in the literature (see Table 1).
Table 1: Parameter values
: preference parameter 4.5
: technology parameter 0.99
: elasticity of demand 10
: monitoring costs 0.20
: distribution function parameter unobserved (to be calibrated)
: discount factor 0.99
: stickiness parameter 0.75
   1 is the elasticity of marginal disutility with respect to work. As pointed
out by Ascari (2000), the value of  is di¢ cult to pin down. As a tentative value,
I follow Ascari and set  = 4:5. Concerning , I set  = 0:99, which allows me to
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focus on economic rents from entrepreneursmonitoring ability as the main source of
their prots. As argued above, the model nests the standard NK model as a special
case of  close to 1 and  equal to 0. Thus, with  = 0:99 (close to 1), output
dynamics in the case of  = 0 can be regarded as the one of a standard NK model.
The elasticity of demand (for retail goods) is 10, following Chari et al. (2000). The
monitoring costs parameter,  is di¢ cult to determine. For example, Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001) argue for a possible lower bound of 0:04 and an upper bound of 0:36
after looking at some empirical studies (for the lower bound, Warner (1977), for the
upper bound, Alderson and Betker (1995)). Here, I take the intermediate value of
0:20. The distribution function parameter of the idiosyncratic shock,  is treated as
unobservable as in Fuerst (1995). I calibrate this parameter value below. Discount
factor,  is set 0:99, a fairly conventional value. Finally, the stickiness parameter in
Calvo staggered setting,  is set 0:75, following Jeanne (1997).
Calibration of the distribution function parameter,  The distribution func-
tion of ! is assumed to be uniform with a support [1   ; 1 + ]. Since ! does not
take a negative value,  takes a value between 0 and 1: 0 <  < 1: I tie down this
unobservable parameter by looking at the empirical measure of quarterly default rate.
The time unit is set as a quarter. Then, the quarterly default rate is given by
 (!) in the model. With Eq.30, the default rate is given as:
 (; ; ) =
2  + "
2
:
Following the work by Fuerst (1995) and series of work by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997,
1998, 2001),  is here set 0:974% (originally reported by Fisher (1994)). Given that
 = 0:99 and  = 0:20, the value of  is tied down as 0:11.
2.7.2 Output dynamics of the response to the money shock
The qualitative analysis shows that monitoring costs amplify the impact of the money
shock while reducing the persistence of the e¤ects (Eqs.73 and 74). I now compare
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the values of the impact and persistent parameters between  = 0 and 0:20.
First, knowing that entrepreneurs share of net revenue from wholesale goods
production, f(!)
1 (!) is expressed as a function of , , and  (Eq.33), I obtain that
f(!)
1 (!) = 0:11 for  = 0:20. Meanwhile, in case  = 0, the share takes a trivial value
of 0:01 (Eq.34). Next, I calculate the elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost with
respect to output,  and the wedge between household consumption and output, d
for  = 0 and 0:20 (Table 2). Since  is set 0:99 (close to 1), the case with  = 0
approximates the standard NK model in which  =  and d = 1. In case  = 0:20,
f(!)
1 (!) increases to 0:11, which leads to the fall in  from 4:50 to 4:10. Also, the
monitoring costs widen the wedge so that d = 0:56.37
Table 2: Entrepreneursshare, elasticity and wedge for  = 0 and 0:20
 Entrepreneursshare, f(!)
1 (!) Elasticity,  Wedge, d
0 0:01 4:50 0:96
0:20 0:11 4:10 0:56
Finally, being the composite of the parameters discussed, the impact parameter,
b1
d
and persistence parameter, b1 are obtained for  = 0 and 0:20 (Table 3). The
parameters for  = 0 approximate the ones for the standard NK case.
Table 3: Impact parameter and persistence parameter for  = 0 and 0:20
Monitoring costs Impact parameter, b1
d
Persistence parameter, b1
0 (standard NK case) 0:56 0:54
0:20 (with credit frictions) 0:83 0:46
The dynamics is drawn in Figure 2. As seen there, the impact e¤ect of monitoring
costs is signicant. With credit frictions present, the impact of the money shock is
48 % larger compared to the standard NK case without credit frictions. Although
the e¤ect on persistence is less noticeable, it is not negligible. When  = 0:20, the
parameter takes 0:46, which is 15% less than the case with  = 0. Thus, although
37Note that 0 < d < 1.
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the impact is much greater in a model with credit frictions, the real e¤ect is almost
the same as the standard case after a few periods.
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Figure 2: Output dynamics to the unexpected permanent increase in money supply
2.8 Robustness
Throughout the qualitative and quantitative analyses conducted above, the subutility
over real balances has been assumed to take a log form, i.e.  = 1 (Eq.10). Given that
the interest elasticity of money demand is given by 1

, this implies that the elasticity
is unity.38 This assumption, leading to the dichotomy between real variables and the
nominal interest rate, has enabled me to proceed analytically. However, empirical
studies tend to show that the interest elasticity of money demand is less than unity,
equivalently,  > 1. Chari et al. (2000) and Ireland (2001) report the elasticity of
0:39, i.e.  = 2:56 and 0:12 i.e.  = 8:33 respectively.39 Given this, I now relax the
assumption of  = 1 to check the robustness of the results obtained above.
I rst study the AS and AD relations for the case of  > 1. In fact, the AS relation
of the model is not a¤ected by the relaxation of the assumption. For convenience, I
38As pointed out above, 1 is the elasticity of money demand with respect to the opportunity cost
variable, i1+i . However, I simply call this an interest elasticity of money demand.
39The elasticity of 0:12 by Ireland is especially the one for the post-1979 US data.
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here replicate the AS relation (Eq.57);
cPk = 
1 + 
bYk + 1
1 + 

[Pk 1 + [Pk+1

: (75)
However, the AD relation is now di¤erent when  6= 1. To see this, I rst log
linearise the consumption Euler equation (Eq.11) to obtain
bCt = dCt+1   (bit   t+1); (76)
where bit represents the log deviation of gross interest rate from the steady state value.
In terms of price, this is expressed as
bCt = dCt+1   (bit  dPt+1 + bPt): (77)
This can be regarded as a dynamic IS relation. Meanwhile, log-linearising the money
demand relation (Eq.12) yields
cMt   bPt =  1


1  
bit + 1

bCt:40 (78)
With the assumption that money market is in equilibrium, this relation can be seen
as a LM relation.
Combining the IS and LM relations (Eqs.77 and 78) and incorporating the relation
between household consumption and output (Eq.41): bCt = dbYt 41, I can obtain a
dynamic AD relation. Given that money supply increases by 1% in Period 0 and
remains at the new level indenitely, the AD relation is expressed as follows (for
k  0):
cPk =   d
(1  ) + 
bYk + 
(1  ) + 

[Pk+1 + ddYk+1 +  (1  )


: (79)
40As noted, bit denotes log deviation of 1 + it from the steady state value. Then, given that
ln(1 + it) ' it, this equation implies that the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to
interest rate, it is given by   1 1  .
41This relation is not a¤ected by the relaxation of the assumption of  = 1.
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From the AS and AD relations (Eq.75 and Eq.79), I obtain the following third
order di¤erence equation:
[Pk+2   2d+ d + 
d
[Pk+1 +
d+ 2d +  (1  ) + 
d2
cPk   1
2
[Pk 1 =
 (1  )
d2
:
(80)
Suppose that I set the interest elasticity of money demand to be 0:5, i.e.  = 2, while
other parameter values are the same as before. This di¤erence equation can be solved
numerically for  = 0 and 0:20 (Appendix 5). It turns out that the characteristic
equation of the di¤erence equation gives only one stable root, b1 for each . This
guarantees the existence of saddle path solution, since there is a single predetermined
variable. Using the initial condition of dP 1 = 0 and the steady state value of cPk,bP = 1, the evolution of price is obtained as:
cPk = 1  bk+11 : (81)
Substituting this into the AS relation (Eq.75) yields
bYk = 


b1   1

(b1   1)
b1
bk+11 : (82)
This represents the evolution of output for  6= 1. In this case, the impact parameter
is given by 


b1   1

(b1   1) and the persistence parameter by b1.
Table 4 shows that even when  = 2, monitoring costs amplify the impact of
the money shock, while reducing the persistence of the e¤ects. The result remains
the same with an even lower value of interest elasticity of money demand, 0:125,
i.e.  = 8. As in  = 2, there is only one stable eigenvalue, b1 for each  and it is
smaller when  = 0:20. The impact parameter is again greater when credit frictions
are present. From a quantitative perspective, the signicant e¤ect is mainly seen in
the amplication of the impact. The results are robust to the change in households
preferences.
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Table 4: Impact and persistence parameter for  = 1; 2; 8
Monitoring costs Impact parameter Persistence parameter
0
0:20
 = 1  = 2  = 8
0:560 0:568 0:614
0:829 0:839 0:892
 = 1  = 2  = 8
0:537 0:534 0:515
0:462 0:459 0:442
Incidentally, I nd that for given monitoring costs, a decrease in the interest
elasticity of money demand (an increase in ) leads to an increase in the impact and
a decrease in the persistence. The intuition can be given as follows. First, notice
that an increase in  attens the (dynamic) AD relation (Eq.79). This comes from
the e¤ect of  on the money demand (Eq.78). In the money demand function, 1

also
represents the elasticity of money demand with respect to consumption. In the period
of the money increase, if other things are equal, larger  implies a larger increase in
consumption therefore output. That is, the impact is amplied. Also, the attening
of the AD curve due to an increase in  results in the reduction in persistence.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have studied how output dynamics of the response to money shocks
are altered when credit market imperfections are incorporated into an otherwise
standard NK framework. By modelling agency costs as acyclical, I managed to
study the e¤ect of imperfections analytically. I nd that monitoring costs atten
both AS and AD curves of the model so that the real impact of the money shock is
amplied while persistence of the e¤ects is reduced. The supplementary quantitative
analysis indicates that the amplication of the impact can be signicant while the
e¤ect on persistence is rather small. Thus, in the light of the VAR analysis which
indicates that exogenous monetary shocks have sizable and persistent real e¤ects,
the acyclical agency costs, on their own, appear to be a modication in the direction
towards greater realism.
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2.10 Appendices to Chapter Two
2.10.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Y = Y W and bYt = dY Wt
I rst show that aggregate production of the nal good and net aggregate production
of the wholesale good are the same in the exible price steady state. That is,
Y = Y W ;
where Y and Y W are the steady state values of Yt and Y Wt , respectively.
When every retailer sets the same price, P (z) = P (Eq.25). In this case, they
also produce the same amount. Then, it is clear from the production function of nal
goods (Eq.23) that Yt = Yt (z) in the steady state. Remember that the production
function of retailer z is Yt (z) = Y Wt (z). Further, the net aggregate production of the
wholesale good, Y Wt is given by
R 1
0
Y Wt (z) dz. Then, when Y
W
t (z) is the same across
all the retailers z, I know Y Wt (z) = Y
W
t : Therefore, Yt = Yt (z) = Y
W
t (z) = Y
W
t in
the steady state. Indeed, Y = Y W .
Also, it can be shown that bYt = dY Wt ;
where bYt is the percentage deviation of Yt from Y , while dY Wt is the percentage devi-
ation of Y Wt from Y W .
The production function of the nal good is Yt =
R 1
0
Yt (z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
(Eq.23).
Since the production function of the retail good is Yt (z) = Y Wt (z), this can be
rewritten as: Yt =
R 1
0
Y Wt (z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
. Log linearising this around the steady
state (where Yt = Yt (z) = Y Wt (z) = Y
W
t ), I have
bYt = Z 1
0
\Y Wt (z)dz; (83)
where \Y Wt (z) =
YWt (z) Y
Y
. Meanwhile, Y Wt =
R 1
0
Y Wt (z) dz by denition. Log lin-
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earising this, I obtain dY Wt = Z 1
0
\Y Wt (z)dz: (84)
From Eqs.83 and 84, I know bYt = dY Wt .
2.10.2 Appendix 2: Optimal cut-o¤ value of !, !
I here show that the optimal cut-o¤ value of ! is given by
! = (1 + )  + ";
where " = 1
2
(  p22 + (1  )(42 + 16  16)) (Eqs. 30 and 31). I rst
conrm that the banksshare of the net production of wholesale good, g (!) is hump
shaped.
The general form of g (!) is given as: g (!) =
R !
0
!d (!)+(1   (!))!  (!)
(see Eq.5): Di¤erentiating once, we have g0 (!) = (1   (!))   (!) : Rearranging
this yields
g0 (!) = (1   (!))

1    (!)
1   (!)

; (85)
where (!)
1 (!) is the hazard rate. For the uniform distribution, it is obtained as:
(!)
1 (!) =
1
(1+) ! : Substituting this into Eq.85, I nd that g
0 (!) = 0 at the point
where ! = (1 + )  . Given that the hazard rate is an increasing function in !, I
nd that g0 (!) > 0 (< 0) at the point where ! is less (larger) than (1 + ) . That
is, the function g (!) is hump shaped.
Since  < 1 and  < 1, " is negative. Then, ! = (1 + )  + " is located where
g0 (!) > 0. Looking at the second order condition of the optimisation problem, this
value of !, which corresponds to g0 (!) > 0, is proved to be the optimal cut-o¤ value
chosen by the entrepreneurs. The prot maximisation problem of entrepreneur j is
replicated for convenience (Eqs.2 and 3):
maximise
'tf (!t (j))Ht (j)
 ;
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with respect to !t (j) and Ht (j), subject to
'tg (!t (j))Ht (j)
 = wtHt (j) :
The Lagrangian of this problem can be set up as:
L (!t (j) ; Ht (j) ; t (j)) = 'tf (!t (j))Ht (j)
+t (j) ('tg (!t (j))Ht (j)
   wtHt (j)) :
Solving this, we obtain Eq.6:  = g (!t (j)) s (!t (j)). Then, as argued above, the
cuto¤ value is found to be common across entrepreneurs and also time invariant,
!t (j) = !t = !. With this insight, we also nd that Ht (j) = Ht. Now, notice that
the value of the multiplier, t (j) is also common and time invariant:  =  f 0(!)g0(!) :
The bordered Hessian is expressed as:
0BBBB@
0 @h
@!
@h
@Ht
@h
@!
@2L
@!2
@2L
@!@Ht
@h
@Ht
@2L
@Ht@!
@2L
@H2t
1CCCCA ;
where h (!;Ht) = 'tg (!)H

t   wtHt. Subsequently, the determinant is given as:
  ('tg0 (!)Ht )2 't (  1)H 2t (f (!) + g (!))
 'tHt (f 00 (!) + g00 (!))
 
'tg (!)H
 1
t   wt
2
: (86)
I know that g0 (!) > 0 at ! = (1 + )    + ". Then, I check the sign of this
determinant for the case of g0 (!) > 0. For the prot to be maximised, the sign of
the determinant has to be positive. To nd out the sign, I rst discuss the signs of
f (!) + g (!)and f 00 (!) + g00 (!)in the determinant.
Sign of f (!) + g (!)
Given that  =  f 0(!)
g0(!) , f (!) + g (!) = f (!)  f
0(!)
g0(!)g (!). Di¤erentiating f (!)
(=
R1
!
!d (!)   (1   (!))! (Eq.4)), I obtain f 0 (!) =   (1   (!)) ; which is
negative. Thus, when g0 (!) > 0, it is the case that f (!) + g (!) > 0.
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Sign of f 00 (!) + g00 (!)
f 00 (!) is given as f 00 (!) =  (!) : Further, I obtain that g00 (!) =  

@(!)
@!
+  (!)

:
In the case of the uniform distribution of !, f 00 (!) + g00 (!) can be simplied to:
 (!)
g0(!) , where  (!) =
1
2
. Then, when g0 (!) > 0, f 00 (!) +g00 (!) is negative as long
as  > 0.
These observations enables me to conclude that the determinant of the bordered
Hessian is positive when g0 (!) > 0. Thus, ! = (1 + )  + " is the optimal cut-o¤
value.
2.10.3 Appendix 3: Derivation of Eq.51
As mentioned above, the derivation presented below is largely based on Walsh (2003,
Chapter 5).
Solving the retailers intertemporal prot maximisation problem under Calvo style
price stickiness, I obtain the following relation (Eq.50):
1X
i=0
 
iiC 1t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Yt+i
!
Qt =

  1
1X
i=0

iiC 1t+i't+i

Pt+i
Pt

Yt+i

:
To obtain Eq.51, I rst linearise the above relation around the zero ination steady
state. To do this, I need to obtain the steady state value of the marginal cost (for
retailers), 'ss. Remember that in the zero ination steady state, Qt = 1, that is, the
optimal reset price, P calvo;t is the same as the price index, Pt. Then, I know from
Eq.48 that 'ss =
 1

:
Using this, the linearisation of Eq.50 results in
bqt
1   =
1X
i=0
ii
d't+i + dPt+i   bPt :
Multiplying the both sides by 1   and add bPt to the both, I obtain
bqt + bPt = (1  ) 1X
i=0
ii
d't+i + dPt+i : (87)
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Realising (1  )P1i=1 ii d't+i + dPt+i =  dqt+1 + dPt+1, Eq.87 is now rewrit-
ten as:
bqt = (1  ) b't +  dqt+1 + dPt+1   bPt : (88)
Finally, since t+1 = dPt+1   bPt, I obtain Eq.51:
bqt = (1  ) b't +  (dqt+1 + t+1) :
2.10.4 Appendix 4: Solving the 2nd order di¤erence equation, Eq.65
with e > 0
Denoting  1++e

as a1 and 1 as a2, Eq.65 can be written as: [Pk+1 +a1cPk +a2[Pk 1 =
  e

. When e is positive, it is the case that a21 > 4a2. Then, as long as a
2
1 > 4a2, the
solution of this di¤erence equation takes the following form:
cPk = A1bk1 + A2bk2 + bP ; (89)
where A1 and A2 are constants to be determined and b1 and b2 are the eigenvalues
determined from the characteristic equation:
b2 + a1b+ a2 = 0:
In Eq.89, bP is the steady state value of cPk. From Eq.65, bP is equal to 1. Solving the
characteristic equation, I have b1 =
 a1 
p
a21 4a2
2
and b2 =
 a1+
p
a21 4a2
2
:
I can say that 0 < b1 < 1 and b2 > 1 as follows. The left hand side of the above
characteristic equation, D (b) = b2 + a1b + a2 is a quadratic function and takes a
parabola shape exhibiting a valley. Given D (0) > 0 and D (1) < 0, it is the case
that 0 < b1 < 1. Further, since D
 
 1

< 0, b2 is larger than 
 1, i.e. larger than 1.
Then, to prevent the system from becoming explosive, the value of A2 is set to be 0.
This guarantees the saddle path solution for the model:
cPk = A1bk1 + 1: (90)
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Using the initial condition ofdP 1 = 0, the value of A1 is tied down as  b1. Then,
Eq.90 becomes cPk = 1  bk+11 ;
as given in Eq.67.
2.10.5 Appendix 5: Solving the 3rd order di¤erence equation, Eq.80
Denoting  2d+d+
d
= a1,
d+2d+(1 )+
d2
= a2, and   12 = a3, Eq.80 becomes
[Pk+2 + a1[Pk+1 + a2cPk + a3[Pk 1 =  (1  )
d2
:
The solution to this di¤erence equation takes the following form:
cPk = A1bk1 + A2bk2 + A3bk3 + bP ; (91)
where A1, A2 and A3 are constants to be determined and b1, b2 and b3 are the
eigenvalues determined from the characteristic equation:
b3 + a1b
2 + a2b+ a1 = 0:
Also, bP is the steady state value of cPk. I know from Eq.80 that bP is equal to 1.
Now, setting  = 2, I solve the characteristic equation for each value of  ( = 0
and 0:20). When  = 0:20, it turns out that b1 = 0:46, b2 = 1:02 and b3 = 2:18. To
prevent the explosive path and guarantee the saddle-path stability for cPk, A2 and A3
are set to be 0. The coe¢ cient A1 can be tied down by realising thatdP 1 = 0. FromdP 1 = A1b 11 + 1, I know that A1 =  b1. Then, I obtain the saddle-path solution for
the di¤erence equation (Eq.81):
cPk = 1  bk+11 :
Substituting this into bYk =  [Pk+1 + 1+ cPk   1[Pk 1 (the AS relation (Eq.57)) and
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rearranging, I have (Eq.82):
bYk = 


b1   1

(b1   1)
b1
bk+11 :
For  = 0 as well, I obtain the only one stable eigenvalue. Thus, the output dynamics
is given by the same equation.
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3 Chapter Three: Credit Market Imperfections,
Staggered Pricesetting, and Output Dynamics
of the Response to Money Shocks -extension to
segmented input markets-
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter studied how acyclical agency costs alter the output dynamics of
the response to money shocks within the New Keynesian (NK) framework. It revealed
that they amplify the impact on real output of money shocks while they reduce the
persistence of the real e¤ects. Analytical solution claried that credit frictions atten
both the aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD) relations of the model.
Quantitatively, I found that the amplication of the impact can be signicant, but
the e¤ect on persistence is rather small.
One important assumption of the previous framework is the existence of economy-
wide input markets. However, one might argue that the assumption of economy-wide
input markets is not innocuous, especially in the short run (for example, Woodford
(2003, chapter 3)). In a model with economy-wide input markets, there is always a
common input price across the economy. What is assumed is that inputs are perfectly
mobile across di¤erent segments of the economy such as industries or geographic
areas. This free mobility guarantees a common input price in the economy. However,
in practice, movement of inputs might be rather restricted especially in the short
run.
Suppose that some exogenous shock brings about the situation in which salaries
for workers are di¤erent in di¤erent sectors of the economy. Although workers in
a sector with low salaries might have an incentive to move to the one with high
salaries, they might nd it di¢ cult to move instantaneously if the move requires
them to acquire di¤erent kind of skills. As for the capital market, although capital
should be transferred from the sector with low utilisation rate to the one with high
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rate, instantaneous transfer is quite unlikely. Then, it might be more plausible to
assume that inputs do not move across di¤erent sectors, i.e. input markets are
segmented across sectors. In particular, this assumption seems more realistic in a
short run analysis. Acknowledging this argument, this chapter considers the role of
credit market frictions in the NK model with segmented input markets.
Credit frictions temporarily aside, the segmentation of input markets leads to
greater persistence in the real e¤ects of money shocks with staggered price/wage
setting (Ascari (2000), Edge (2002) and Woodford (2003)). Focusing on staggered
prices, intuition can be given as follows. Suppose that there is an increase in aggregate
demand due to an unexpected increase in money supply. After the shock, the demand
for the price-keeping monopolistic competitors (the ones who keep their prices xed
due to the staggered setting) could go up greatly. To satisfy this increase in demand,
they require more inputs, which bids up the price of the inputs. Meanwhile, the
demand for the price-resetting producers (the ones who reset their prices) does not
go up as much, because they tend to increase their prices. When economy-wide input
markets are assumed so that inputs move freely, the bidding from the price keeping
producers a¤ects the input prices for price resetting ones as well, i.e. they also go up
greatly. However, when the movement of inputs is absent, price-resetting producers
do not su¤er from the spill-over e¤ect. This leads to rather low reset prices and
thus aggregate price. In turn, the slow adjustment of aggregate price implies greater
persistence in the real e¤ects of the money shock.
This chapter has two ndings. First, when the segmented input market assump-
tion is incorporated in the NK model with credit frictions, the qualitative and quan-
titative results obtained with the economy wide input markets still hold. That is,
credit frictions still amplify the impact e¤ect of the shock while reducing the persis-
tence of the e¤ects. Also, the impact e¤ect can be quantitatively signicant, but the
e¤ect on persistence is rather small. Second, for a given degree of credit frictions (for
given agency costs), both the impact and persistence of the shocks are much greater
in a framework with segmented input markets than in one with economy-wide mar-
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kets. I show that this happens because for given credit frictions, the AS relation is
much atter with segmented markets.
The structure of the paper is parallel to the Chapter 2. Section 2 gives the
overview of the model. In section 3, I look at the e¤ect of credit frictions on the
monopolistic competitors(retailers) real marginal costs. Then, section 4 studies the
e¤ect of credit frictions on the AS relation. Section 5 turns to their e¤ect on the
AD relation. Having seen the e¤ects of credit frictions on the AS and AD relations,
section 6 analyses their qualitative e¤ect on the output dynamics to money shocks.
Given that the most of the arguments in sections 4-6 overlap with the ones in the
corresponding sections in Chapter 2, those sections are kept brief. Section 7 conducts
a quantitative analysis Section 8 concludes.
3.2 The model: overview
As in Chapter 2, the current framework has three types of producers. First, retail-
ers, who are monopolistic competitors subject to Calvo-style staggered pricesetting
(Calvo 1983), produce di¤erentiated retail goods. They face a downward sloping
demand curve due to the second type of producers, nal good producers. Being per-
fect competitors, they make the composite retail good (the nal good) with the CES
production function. Retailers use the wholesale goods as the only input, which are
made by entrepreneurs, the third type of producers. Entrepreneurs employ household
labour as the input for production. They are the ones who lack internal funds for
production and thus borrow funds from banks. Credit frictions are again modelled
following the Costly State Verication (CSV) framework (Townsend 1979).
The distinctive feature of this new framework is that the whole production process
(apart from the production of nal goods) is divided into a large number of indus-
tries (Figure 3). Each industry consists of its own set of agents, i.e. households,
banks, entrepreneurs and retailers. Importantly, inputs markets (household labour
and wholesale goods markets) are segmented across industries. This means that the
ow of inputs is cut o¤ across industries. This lack of ow can be justied when the
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inputs are industry specic and households and entrepreneurs nd it too costly to
acquire di¤erent production skills specic to di¤erent industries.
Households
Entrepreneurs
Retailers
Banks
Industry A
Government
Final goods
producers
Households
Banks
Entrepreneurs
Retailers
Industry B Industry C,D,E…
Banks
Households
Entrepreneurs
Retailers
Figure 3: Overview of the model
Following Woodford (2003), I assume that retailers from the same industry always
reset their price at the same time, in other words, they draw the Calvo lottery
together. Further, although they adjust price simultaneously, they do so in a non-
collusive way. Given that they always charge the same price, the demand for their
goods is also the same. However, since retailers from di¤erent industries draw the
lottery separately and can charge di¤erent prices, the demand for goods produced
in di¤erent industries can be di¤erent. This leads to di¤erent input prices across
industries.
Although retailers from the same industry always charge the same price, they
actually produce di¤erentiated goods. However, I assume (probably plausibly) that
retail goods from the same industry are di¤erentiated rather slightly, while goods from
di¤erent industries are di¤erentiated largely. In short, there are two stages of product
di¤erentiation in the current framework: within industry and across industries. This
implies that when all the retail goods are used by perfectly competitive nal good
producers, the substitutability of the goods within an industry is higher than across
industries.
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As in Chapter 2, the nal goods are consumed by both households and entre-
preneurs. The only role of government is to make a direct transfer of money to
households in each industry after raising revenue through seigniorage. There is no
government spending.
3.3 Retailersreal marginal cost in each industry
This section studies the elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost in each industry with
respect to aggregate output. I focus on the elasticity in a exible price environment.
Knowing this turns out to be useful to derive the AS relation in the presence of stag-
gered pricesetting. Assuming that retailersproduction function exhibits constant
returns to scale, retailersmarginal cost in industry z is equivalent to the price of
wholesale goods in the same industry. Thus, I rst study how the price of wholesale
goods is determined.
3.3.1 Entrepreneurs
The production function of individual entrepreneur j from industry z is given as:
Y Wt (j; z) = !t (j; z)Ht (j; z)
 ; (92)
whereHt (j; z) is household labour employed by the entrepreneur. Assuming that 0 <
 < 1, the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. !t (j; z), being
an iid random variable with an expected value of unity, represents an idiosyncratic
shock occurring to the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs live only one period. At the beginning of each period, they come
into the scene with zero initial wealth. Since they pay the household wage before
starting the production of wholesale goods, they need to borrow the input cost. They
raise funds from households through banks. While households have funds to spare,
they do not have technology to produce wholesale goods.
Credit frictions between entrepreneur j from industry z and a perfectly competi-
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tive bank in industry z is again modelled following Townsends costly state verication
(CSV) framework. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the optimal contract under the CSV
setting is the standard debt contract. Given that the nature of the CSV framework
and the standard debt contract were explained in Chapter 2, I do not repeat here.
The contract between entrepreneur j and the bank species the threshold value
of !, !t(j; z) and the amount of labour employed Ht (j; z). The monitoring costs
are a fraction,  of the expected wholesale good production, i.e. Ht (j; z)
. The
parameter  is common to all the retailers across industries and also time-invariant.
Entrepreneurs live only one period and consume all the prots they have obtained42.
While entrepreneur j maximises the expected consumption of nal goods, perfectly
competitive banks break even. By lending to a large number of entrepreneurs, banks
simply recoup the labour cost, wt (z)Ht (j; z) on average. wt (z) is the real wage
prevailing in industry z.
Formally, I have the maximisation problem:
maximise
't (z) f (!t (j; z))Ht (j; z)
 (93)
with respect to !t (j; z) and Ht (j; z) subject to
't (z) g (!t (j; z))Ht (z)
 = wt (z)Ht (j; z) . (94)
Denoting the price of nal goods as Pt, 't (z) (=
Pt(z)
Pt
) is the real price of the wholesale
goods in industry z. Since entrepreneurs do not have any market power in industry
z, 't (z) is taken as given. The functions f (!t (j; z)) and g (!t (j; z)) represent the
expected shares of the wholesale goods production taken by the entrepreneur and
the bank, respectively. The distribution of the idiosyncratic shock is time invariant
and identical to all the entrepreneurs across industries. Under the standard debt
42If they default, they consume nothing.
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contract, the expected shares are expressed as:
f (!t (j; z)) =
Z 1
!t(j;z)
!d (!)  (1   (!t (j; z)))!t (j; z)
and
g (!t (j; z)) =
Z !t(j;z)
0
!d (!) + (1   (!t (j; z)))!t (j; z)   (!t (j; z)) :
There,  represents a cumulative distribution function of ! (and  is used for its
probability density function).
As in Chapter 2, notice that f (!t (j; z)) + g (!t (j; z)) = 1    (!t (j; z)) : This
implies that on average, the fraction of  (!t (j; z)) is lost through monitoring. This
deadweight loss represents the agency cost of the model.
Solving the maximisation problem, what we obtain rst is the following (implicit)
labour demand function:
wt (z) =
1
s (!t (j; z))
't (z)Ht (j; z)
 1 ; (95)
where
s (!t (j; z)) =
1
1   (!t (j; z)) + (!t(j;z))f(!t(j;z))f 0(!t(j;z))
:
Substituting this into the constraint (Eq.94), we obtain  = g (!t (j; z)) s (!t (j; z)) :
Given that both the distribution of idiosyncratic shock and monitoring costs are
time invariant and identical across industries, the cut-o¤ value of ! is also time-
invariant and identical to all the entrepreneurs across industries, i.e. !t (j; z) =
! (j; z) = !. Replacing !t (j; z) with !, I have:
 = g (!) s (!) ; (96)
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where
s (!) =
1
1   (!) + (!)f(!)
f 0(!)
: (97)
Thus, once the distribution of idiosyncratic shock, ! is specied, the cuto¤ value of
! is obtained for given  and .
Likewise, the labour demand function (Eq.95) can be rewritten as: wt (z) =
1
s(!)
't (z)Ht (j; z)
 1. Then, I know from this relation that Ht (j; z) = Ht(z). That
is, entrepreneurs from the same industry employ the same amount of household
labour. Incorporating this, the labour demand function is expressed as
wt (z) =
1
s (!)
't (z)Ht (z)
 1 :
Finally, notice that this implicit labour demand function also represents entre-
preneurspricing equation. Rewriting this, we obtain
't (z) = s (!)
1
Ht (z)
 1wt (z) : (98)
The real price of wholesale goods in industry z, 't (z) is determined as a mark up,
s (!) over the real marginal cost, 1
Ht(z)
 1wt (z). In case monitoring costs are present
( > 0), the mark up, s (!) is greater than unity.43 On the other hand, in the absence
of monitoring costs ( = 0), s (!) = 1. When monitoring costs are non trivial, the
real price of wholesale goods has to be set higher than the real marginal cost to o¤set
the agency costs.44
3.3.2 Households
I now turn to the utility maximisation problem of households. Households within the
same industry are symmetric. The utility maximisation problem of a representative
household in industry z is as follows:
43This can be seen from the fact that f 0 (!) (=   (1   (!))) is negative in s (!) (Eq.97).
44Entrepreneurs charge the mark up not because they have the market power but because they
need to cover the agency costs.
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maximise
1X
t=0
t
0B@ lnCt (z) + (1  )

Mt(z)
Pt
1 
1     Ht (z)

1CA ; 45 (99)
subject to
PtCt (z)+Mt (z)+Bt (z) = Wt (z)Ht (z)+Mt 1 (z)+(1+it 1)Bt 1 (z)+t (z)+Tt (z) ;
(100)
where Ct (z), Mt (z), Bt (z), t (z) and Tt (z) are industry z consumption, money
holding, bond holding, prot from retailers46, and a lump sum tax, all variables in
nominal terms. it 1 is an nominal interest rate accrued in period t. Solving this, I
obtain the consumption Euler equation:
(Ct (z))
 1 =  (1 + rt) (Ct+1 (z))
 1 ;
the money demand function:
Mt (z)
Pt
=

1  

1 + it
it
Ct (z)
 1

:47
and the labour supply function:
wt (z) =


Ct (z)Ht (z)
 1
I assume that the prot share from retailers, t (z) and the lump sum tax, Tt (z)
are common across industries. However, as discussed above, wage and labour supply
can be di¤erent across industries under the staggered pricesetting. This would mean
that householdswealth levels would also be di¤erent across industries. Following
Ascari (2000) and Woodford (2003), I now assume that some insurance scheme is
45In the previous chapter, the subutility over consumption is initially set as the CRRA form and
later restricted as the logarithmic form. Here, I focus on the logarithmic form from the outset.
46Householders are the shareholders of retailers.
47As usual, in deriving the money demand function, use is made of the consumption Euler equation
and the Fisher equation: 1 + rt  (1 + it) PtPt+1 .
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available in the economy so that the di¤erence in householdswealth levels is o¤set
in every period. This implies that households in di¤erent industries always consume
exactly the same amount of nal goods and holds the same real balances, i.e. Ct (z) =
Ct and
Mt(z)
Pt
= Mt
Pt
. Thus, the consumption Euler equation and money demand
function become
C 1t =  (1 + rt)C
 1
t+1 (101)
and
Mt
Pt
=

1  

1 + it
it
Ct
 1

; (102)
respectively. Also, the labour supply relation can be rewritten as:
wt (z) =


CtHt (z)
 1 : (103)
Taking into account that the real price of wholesale goods in industry z, 't (z) is
equivalent to retailersreal marginal cost in the same industry, I know from Eqs.98
and 103 that the real marginal cost is expressed as:
't (z) =


1

s (!)CtHt (z)
  : (104)
Having obtained the expression for the retailersreal marginal cost in each indus-
try, I consider the elasticity of this marginal cost with respect to aggregate output.
Specically, I discuss the elasticity in a exible price environment.
I now look at how retailers in each industry behave when prices are exible.
3.3.3 Retailers prot maximisation problem in a exible price environ-
ment
First, the demand function for retail goods in each industry is derived by solving
nal goods producerscost minimisation problem. Final goods producers make nal
goods, using all the di¤erentiated retail goods from all the industries. As pointed
out above, there are two stages of product di¤erentiation: within an industry and
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across industries. Therefore, nal goods producersproduction function is expressed
as follows:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
; (105)
where
Yt (z) =
Z 1
0
Yt (j; z)
 1
 dj
 
 1
: (106)
Yt (j; z) is the amount of retail good produced by retailer j in industry z and Yt (z) is
the composite of all the retail goods from industry z. Likewise, Yt is the composite of
all the industry composite goods. It seems natural to assume that the substitutability
of retail goods within an industry is higher than composite goods across industries.
The di¤erence in substitutability is represented by   .
Given that perfect competition prevails in the nal goods sector, the nal goods
producers minimise the cost of production. In the rst stage, they minimise the cost
at an industry level. Solving the cost minimisation problem for any given industry
z, we obtain the demand function for retailer, j in industry z as follows:
Yt (j; z) = Yt(z)

Pt (j; z)
Pt (z)
 
(107)
where
Pt (z) =
Z 1
0
Pt (j; z)
1  dj
 1
1 
: (108)
In the second stage, the nal good producers minimise the cost at an economy-
wide level. The solution leads to the following demand function for an industry-
composite retail good:
Yt (z) = Yt

Pt (z)
Pt
 
; (109)
where
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
: (110)
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Pt is the price of the nal good. I now turn to retailersprot maximisation problem.
Retailers in industry z use the industry specic wholesale goods as the only input,
simply transforming them into di¤erentiated retail goods. Given that the produc-
tion technology shows constant returns to scale, retailer js production function is
expressed as
Yt (j; z) = Y
W
t (j; z) ;
where Y Wt (j; z) is the amount of industry zs wholesale goods used by retailer j. I
study his prot maximisation problem in a exible price environment.
Given the demand function for an individual retail good (Eq.107), retailer j from
industry z solves the following prot maximisation problem:
maximise
t (j; z) = Pt (j; z)Yt (j; z)  PWt (z)Yt (j; z) ;
where PWt (z) is the price of the industry-specic wholesale good, subject to
Yt (j; z) = Yt (z)

Pt (j; z)
Pt(z)
 
:
Since there are a large number of retailers in each industry, an individual retailer
does not have any market power in the industry specic wholesale goods market.
Therefore, retailer j takes the price of the wholesale good, PWt (z) as given. Also,
the fact that there are a large number of retailers in each industry implies that the
e¤ect of an individual price and output on the industry aggregate price and output,
Pt(z) and Yt (z) is negligible. Thus, Pt(z) and Yt (z) are given to retailer j.
The rst order condition for Pt (j; z) leads to the following relation:
P t (j;z)
Pt(z)
=

 1
PWt (z)
Pt(z)
, where P t (j; z) is his optimal price: Multiplying both sides by
Pt(z)
Pt
, this
becomes
P t (j; z)
Pt
=

   1't (z) ; (111)
where 't (z) is the real price of the industry z wholesale goods,
PWt (z)
Pt
. The real
optimal price under a exible price setting is a constant mark up, 
 1 over the real
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marginal cost, 't (z), with the size of the mark up determined by the elasticity of
demand, .
3.3.4 Elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost with respect to output
I now derive the elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost in each industry with respect
to output in a exible price environment. First, taking into account the deadweight
loss, the net industry aggregate wholesale good production, Y Wt (z) is given by
Y Wt (z) = (1   (!))Ht (z) : (112)
With retailers constant returns to scale technology, the industry aggregate retail
good production, Yt (z) 48 is equal to Y Wt (z). Incorporating this, Eq.112 becomes
Ht (z) =

Yt (z)
1   (!)
 1

: (113)
Meanwhile, the economy-wide aggregate consumption for entrepreneurs, Cet is
given as:
Cet = f (!)
Z
't (z)Ht (z)
 dz: (114)
Substituting Eq.113 into Eq.114, I obtain
Cet =
f (!)
1   (!)
Z
't (z)Yt (z) dz: (115)
From the market clearing condition, Yt = Ct + Cet , aggregate consumption, Ct is
expressed as
Ct = Yt   f (!)
1   (!)
Z
't (z)Yt (z) dz (116)
Substituting Eqs.113 and 116 into Eq.104, the real marginal cost in industry z,
48In principle, aggregate output of retail goods have to be dened by integrating output of each
type of good over, since retail goods are not homogeneous. However, under the symmetry in each
industry, aggregate output, Yt (z) is equal to output of a typical retailer, Yt (j; z).
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't (z) is expressed as:
't (z) =


1

s (!)

Yt   f (!)
1   (!)
Z
't (z)Yt (z) dz

Yt (z)
1   (!)
  

: (117)
Multiplying 't (z) by Yt (z) and then integrating over industries, I have
Z
't (z)Yt (z) dz
=


1

s (!)

Yt   f (!)
1   (!)
Z
't (z)Yt (z) dz

1
1   (!)
  

Z
Yt (z)

 dz:
Rearranging this yields
Z
't (z)Yt (z) dz =


1

s (!)

1
1 (!)
  

Yt
Z
Yt (z)

 dz
1 + f(!)
1 (!)


1

s (!)

1
1 (!)
  

Z
Yt (z)

 dz
: (118)
Substituting this back into Eq.117, I obtain
't (z) =


1

s (!)Yt
1 + 

1

s (!) f (!)

1
1 (!)
 

Z
Yt (z)

 dz

Yt (z)
1   (!)
  

: (119)
Recall that the real optimal price charged by retailer j in industry z under a
exible price setting, P

t (j;z)
Pt
is 
 1't (z). Substituting this into the demand function
(Eq.109), we obtain
Yt (z) = Yt


   1't (z)
 
:
Then, plugging this into Eq.119 and factoring out 't (z), I have
't (z) =
0BB@  1s (!)Yt
1 + 

1

s (!) f (!)

1
1 (!)
 

Z
Yt (z)

 dz
  

 1
 
1   (!)Yt
!  

1CCA
1
1+
 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Log linearising this around the exible price steady state49, I obtain
\'t (z) =  bYt; (120)
where
 =



1   1

f(!)
1 (!)

1 +  

: (121)
The hat notation represents the log deviation from the steady state. Indeed,  is the
elasticity of retailersreal marginal cost in industry z with respect to output in a
exible price environment.
E¤ect of monitoring costs on elasticity To see the e¤ect of monitoring costs
on the elasticity, the entrepreneursshare of the net revenue from wholesale goods
production, f(!)
1 (!) needs to be specied. As pointed out above, once the distribution
of idiosyncratic shock, ! is specied, the cuto¤ value of ! is obtained for given 
and  from  = g (!) s (!) (Eq.96). As in Chapter 2, I specify the distribution as
uniform in the region [1  ; 1 + ]. As shown there, ! is then obtained as a function
of , , and :
! = (1 + )  + "; (122)
where
" =
1
2
( 
p
22 + (1  )(42 + 16  16)):
With the uniform distribution, the entrepreneursshare, f(!)
1 (!) is obtained as
f (!)
1   (!) =
(!   (1 + ))2
4  2(!   (1  )) : (123)
Substituting Eq.122 in Eq.123, f(!)
1 (!) is expressed as a function of , , and 
f (!)
1   (!) =
(  ")2
4 (1  ) + 2 (  ") : (124)
49The steady state value of aggregate output, Y is obtained as follows. First, notice from Eq.111
that ' =  1 , where ' is the real marginal cost in the steady state. Then, given that ' can be
expressed as a function of Y from Eq.119, Y can be tied down.
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In the absence of monitoring costs ( = 0), it simplies to f(!)
1 (!) = 1  :
Chapter 2 also shows that f(!)
1 (!) is an increasing function in monitoring costs,
:
@ f(!)
1 (!)
@
> 0: (125)
Again, the intuition is that when monitoring costs become larger, entrepreneurs enjoy
the higher economic rent because of their special ability of monitoring the outcome
of their projects costlessly. I thus know from Eq.121 that
@
@
< 0: (126)
In short, monitoring costs make the real marginal cost for retailers in industry z less
pro-cyclical.
3.4 Aggregate supply (AS) relation
I obtained the elasticity of retailersreal marginal costs with respect to output in a
exible price setting. Given this, I derive the AS relation when prices are set in a
staggered way. The derivation is based on Woodford (2003).
As in Chapter 2, I rst obtain the relation between the reset price under Calvo
staggering, P calvo;t and ination rate, t. Denoting the relative reset price,
P calvo;t
Pt
as
Qt, I have bqt = 
1  t; (127)
where bqt is the log deviation of Qt from the zero ination steady state value (unity)
and  is the proportion of industries which do not have a chance to reset their prices.
Next, given the chance to reset the price, retailer j from industry z choose Pt (j; z)
to maximise
1X
i=0
it;t+i

Pt (j; z)
Pt+i
Yt+i (j; z)  P
W
t+i (z)
Pt+i
Yt+i (j; z)

;
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where t;t+i is the discount factor.50 Incorporating the demand function, Yt (j; z) =
Yt(z)

Pt(j;z)
Pt(z)
 
(Eq.107), this becomes
1X
i=0
it;t+i

Pt (j; z)  PWt+i (z)
Pt+i

Pt (j; z)
Pt+i (z)
 
Yt+i (z) : (128)
Now, remember that in a exible price environment, the optimal relative price,
P t (j;z)
Pt
is proportional to the marginal cost, 't (z). Then, given that \'t (z) =  bYt
(Eq.120), I obtain ln

P t (j;z)
Pt

=  bYt. Therefore, when I di¤erentiate Eq.128 with
respect to Pt (j; z), set it to zero and further log-linearise, I have
1X
i=0
()i

ln

P calvo;t
Pt+i

  dYt+i = 0:51
This can be further rewritten as:
bqt = (1  )  bYt +  (dqt+1 + t+1) : (129)
From Eqs.127 and 129, I obtain the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC):
t = bYt + t+1: (130)
There,  =  where  = 1 

(1  ) : In the following, I assume that there is an
unexpected permanent increase in money supply in Period 0 and the economy was
in its steady state before the shock. Expressing Eq.130 in terms of price for k  0, I
obtain the following AS relation:
cPk = 
1 + 
bYk + 1
1 + 

[Pk 1 + [Pk+1

; (131)
where cPk represents the log deviation of price from the initial steady state value.
50The discount factor t;t+i is exactly the same as the previous paper: t;t+i = 
i

Ct+i
Ct
 1
,
where  is the discount rate. In fact, this simply represents the inverse of the product of the gross
real interest rates from period t to t+ i  1.
51In the zero ination steady state, t;t+i is simply 
i.
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Given that @
@
< 0 (Eq.126), it is the case that
@
@
< 0: (132)
That is, monitoring costs make the AS curve atter.
3.4.1 Discussion: comparison of the slope of the AS curve between seg-
mented and economy-wide input markets assumptions
Notice that the di¤erence in the slope comes from the di¤erence in the elasticity
of retailersreal marginal cost with respect to output. Denoting the elasticity for
economy-wide input markets as econwide, Eq.28 in Chapter 2 says
econwide =



1    1

f (!)
1   (!)

:
I denote the elasticity with the segmented market as segmented. For simplicity,
suppose that  = , i.e. the substitutability of retail goods within an industry is the
same as the one of the composite goods across industries. Then, I have
segmented =



1   1

f(!)
1 (!)

1 +  

:
Given that 0 <  < 1,  > 1, and  > 1, the denominator of the expression for
segmented is greater than unity. I can thus say that for given parameter values,
segmented < econwide: (133)
The elasticity is smaller with the assumption of segmented input markets. This is
because the spill-over of the upward pressure of input prices across industries is absent
when markets are segmented.
Therefore, I can say that for given parameter values, the slope of the AS curve is
atter with the segmented input markets.
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3.5 Aggregate demand (AD) relation
As in Chapter 2, when  = 1, i.e. the subutility over real balance takes a log form in
the householdsutility function, the consumption Euler equation and money demand
function (Eqs.101 and 102) lead to the rst order di¤erence equation in the inverse
velocity, Mt
PtCt
. Solving this in the case of the unexpected permanent increase in money
supply in Period 0, I again obtain the following AD relation:
cPk = cMk  cCk; (134)
where k  0. cMk is the log deviation from the initial steady state.
Now, substituting Eq.118 into Eq.116 and log linearising around the zero ination
steady state, I obtain: bCt = dbYt; (135)
where
d = 1  

   1

f (!)
1   (!) : (136)
With Eq.134, I obtain: cPk = cMk   d bYk: (137)
Assuming that 0 < d < 1, the relation is negatively sloped. Since f(!)
1 (!) is increasing
in monitoring costs,  (Eq.125), higher monitoring costs,  atten the AD relation.
Finally, I compare the slope of AD curve with the one with the economy-wide
input markets. In Chapter 2, I obtained d = 1   

 1

f(!)
1 (!) for the economy-wide
markets (Eq.42). Then, I nd that as long as  = , the slope is the same between
the two cases.
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3.6 Output dynamics
Suppose that money supply increases permanently by 1% in Period 0. Then, Eq.137
becomes cPk = 1  d bYk.
Substituting this into the AS relation (Eq.131), I have the same second order di¤er-
ence equation as the one in Chapter 2:
[Pk+1   1 +  + e

cPk + 1

[Pk 1 =   e

;
where e = 
d
: Solving this, I have the output dynamics equation:
bYk = 1
d
bk+11 ; (138)
where
b1 =
 a1  
p
a21   4a2
2
52:
Eq.138 indicates that the output dynamics is characterised by the impactparame-
ter, b1
d
and the persistenceparameter, b1.
3.6.1 E¤ect of monitoring costs on the impact and persistence of the
money shock
Following the line of proof given in Chapter 2, it can be again shown that
@ b1
d
@
> 0;
and
@b1
@
< 0:
In words, monitoring costs amplify the impact e¤ect of the money shock while re-
ducing the persistence of the real e¤ects. Thus, I conclude that the qualitative result
52a1 and a2 are given as: a1 =   1++e and a2 = 1 .
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obtained in Chapter 2 is robust to the change in the way of modelling input markets.
3.7 Quantitative analysis
In this section, I conduct a simple calibration exercise to see if the assumption of
segmented input markets makes a notable quantitative change. As for parameters,
the only new element in the current framework is that I now have two parameters for
di¤erent elasticity of demand, i.e.  and . For simplicity, I set  = . All the other
parameter values are set to be the same as Chapter 2. I here replicate the parameters
for convenience.
Table 5: Parameter values
: preference parameter 4.5
: technology parameter 0.99
; : elasticity of demand 10
: monitoring costs 0.20
: distribution function parameter 0.1153
: discount factor 0.99
: stickiness parameter 0.75
Table 6 shows the values of the elasticity of the retailersreal marginal costs with
respect to output,  and the wedge between the household consumption and output,
d for  = 0 (no credit frictions) and 0:20. The values of  in brackets are the values in
the framework with economy-wide input markets.54 Indeed,  is much smaller with
segmented input markets for given monitoring costs (as implied by Eq.133).
53 As explained in Chapter 2, the value of  is calibrated to match the quarterly default rate of
0:974% (Fisher (1994)).
54The values of d are the same between the two frameworks for each .
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Table 6: Values of  and d for each 
  d
0 (no credit frictions) 0:12 (4:50) 0:96
0:20 0:11 (4:10) 0:56
The values of the impact and persistence parameters are given in Table 7. Again,
the values in the brackets are the ones obtained for the case of economy-wide input
markets. Focusing on the impact parameters for the segmented input case, monitor-
ing costs make a huge di¤erence; compared to the case without frictions, the impact
with  = 0:20 is 68 % higher than the one with  = 0. On the other hand, although
monitoring costs reduce the degree of persistence, the e¤ect is small.
Table 7: Impact parameter and persistence parameter for  = 0 and 0:20
 Impact parameter, b1
d
Persistence parameter, b1
0 0:94 (0:56) 0:90 (0:54)
0:20 1:58 (0:83) 0:88 (0:46)
Having seen the values of the impact and persistence parameters, the output
dynamics of the response to the unexpected permanent increase in money supply is
drawn in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Output dynamics with segmented input markets
Next, I compare the output dynamics between segmented and economy-wide input
market cases for  = 0:20. Table 7 indicates that the assumption of segmented input
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markets notably enhances both the impact and persistence. The di¤erence in output
dynamics is clear (Figure 5). For given agency costs55, the real e¤ects of the money
shock are much more signicant with segmented input markets.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Time
Ou
tp
ut
mu=0.20
segmented
economy-wide
Figure 5: Comparison of output dynamics between di¤erent input market structures
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter replaced the economy-wide input markets assumption made in Chapter
2 with the segmented input markets assumption. I showed that the e¤ect of credit
market imperfections on the output dynamics in response to money shocks is robust
to the di¤erent ways of modelling input markets. Qualitatively, they still amplify the
impact of money shocks on output while reducing the persistence of the real e¤ects.
Quantitatively, the amplication of the impact is signicant, but the e¤ect on persis-
tence is small. I also showed that, for given agency costs, both the impact of money
on output and the persistence of the e¤ects are much greater in a framework with
segmented input markets. Analytical solutions claried that this happens because
the segmented input market assumption attens the AS relation greatly. Thus, in
the light of the VAR analysis, the segmented markets assumption seems to be an im-
portant modication in the direction towards greater realism even in an environment
where credit markets are imperfect.
55Indeed, the deadweight loss,  (!) is the same for both frameworks.
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4 Chapter Four: The Role of Net Worth in Busi-
ness Cycle Dynamics
4.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I studied how agency costs, when modelled as acyclical,
a¤ect the real e¤ect of money shocks within the NK framework. By modelling the
agency costs as acyclical, I managed to present the analytical solution. Now, I turn
my focus directly on the role of endogenous movements of agency costs. What is
behind them is the movements of borrowers(entrepreneurs) net worth. Intuitively,
greater net worth corresponds to smaller agency costs. This is because when en-
trepreneursnet worth is large, the discrepancy in interests between entrepreneurs
and banks is reduced. Thus, agency costs become smaller. Further, if agency costs
are smaller, the premium charged on entrepreneursborrowing falls. This, in turn,
increases their production. Indeed, the way net worth evolves has an important
implication on business cycle dynamics through its e¤ect on agency costs.
This chapter compares business cycle dynamics between the two di¤erent mod-
elling strategies. The aim of these strategies is to avoid the situation where entrepre-
neurs ultimately become self-nanced.56 The rst strategy assumes that entrepre-
neurs make a consumption/saving decision to maximise their intertemporal utility,
but they have a higher discount rate than households. The second strategy assumes
that a constant fraction of entrepreneurs die each period and they consume all the
accumulated wealth just before their death. The population is held constant by the
birth of new entrepreneurs. This is equivalent to assuming that a constant frac-
tion of entrepreneursprot is consumed/saved in each period. For example, the
former strategy is adopted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 98), while the second
by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). For convenience, I call the rst type
of entrepreneurs as Euler equation entrepreneurs, while the second as overlapping-
generations (OLG) entrepreneurs. Based on Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), I show
56If that happened, agency costs would not arise any more.
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that the two di¤erent strategies lead to di¤erent business cycle dynamics in the re-
sponse to monetary policy shock. The di¤erence from their work is that I make the
comparison in the NK framework, while they do so in a exible price framework.
Focusing on the output dynamics, the dynamics with Euler equation entrepre-
neurs are characterised by the hump shaped reaction. This type of reaction, although
widely observed in the VAR studies, is normally not reproduced in the standard NK
model. With OLG entrepreneurs, however, the dening feature of the dynamics is
its high persistence. Indeed, for a given shock, the real e¤ect persists much longer
than the standard case. I show that the di¤erent reactions of net worth to the same
monetary shock between the two strategies are the key factor to grasp the di¤erent
output dynamics.
Suppose that there is an expansionary monetary shock in Period 0. First, note
that net worth, which is mainly composed of their capital holding, is practically
predetermined. Euler equation entrepreneurs increase savings at the end of Period 0
so that their net worth greatly increases in Period 1. Doing this reduces agency costs
and the external nance premium in the subsequent periods, which enables them to
consume more and enjoy higher utility in the long run. Because of the large decrease
in the external nance premium in Period 1, entrepreneurs produce more in Period
1 than in Period 0. This is what is behind the hump shaped reaction of output with
Euler equation entrepreneurs.
Meanwhile, in the case of OLG entrepreneurs, with whom a constant fraction of
aggregate prots is consumed and saved, the large increase in net worth in Period 1
is absent. In fact, net worth changes only gradually over time, which in turn causes a
gradual change in the external nance premium. With small change in the premium
each period, entrepreneursproduction also changes only gradually. This results in
the greater persistence in output dynamics than in the standard NK case. Indeed, the
way the credit channel works within the NK framework depends on the assumption
one makes on entrepreneursconsumption/saving decisions.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model with endogenous
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net worth. Section 3 conducts simulation analysis to compare the impulse responses
to monetary policy shock between the two strategies. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 The model
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs with measure 1   b, who own production
technology to produce wholesale goods. In addition to their initial net worth, they
seek external nance to maximise the prots from their production. They are risk
neutral. Meanwhile, households with a continuum of measure b, have funds to spare.
However, they do not have an access to the production technology. What happens
in equilibrium is that entrepreneurs borrow funds from households through banks.
4.2.1 Credit frictions
Unlike the previous chapters, entrepreneurs live long.57 Since they are subject to
idiosyncratic shocks each period, they are not homogenous. In fact, there is a distri-
bution of net worth across entrepreneurs at a given period. For each di¤erent level
of net worth, there are a large number of entrepreneurs. In principle, entrepreneurs
with di¤erent levels of net worth face di¤erent interest rates and di¤erent production
choices.
Entrepreneurs produce wholesale goods using labour as well as capital. The
labour input is the composite of labour provided by households and entrepreneurs.
Homogeneous capital is provided by both households and entrepreneurs. In nominal
terms, entrepreneurs with an initial net worth of Nt require the loan of ANt   Nt,
where ANt is the whole nance required to undertake the production. As seen below,
both entrepreneurs and households consume nal goods whose price is Pt. Then, in
real terms (relative to nal goods), they seek for the loan of
ant   nt;
57As seen below, Euler equation entrepreneurs live indenitely. Meanwhile, OLG entrepreneurs
die some point. However, as long as the death probability each period is not unity, some of them
are bound to live for multiple periods. In fact, the expected periods of survival depends on the
probability of death.
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where ant is the whole real nance required by entrepreneurs with real net worth of
nt.
I assume that all the input costs have to be paid before the production takes
place.58 Then, ant is expressed as:
ant = wtH
n
t + w
e
tH
en
t + rtK
n
t : (139)
wt, wet , and rt are the household and entrepreneurial real wages and real capital
rental rate. Hnt and H
en
t are the household and entrepreneurial labour employed
by an entrepreneur with real net worth of nt and Knt is the capital rented by the
entrepreneur.59
To explain the nature of frictions, I rst introduce the entrepreneurs production
function:
Y Wnt = !tF (H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ); (140)
where Y Wnt is the production of goods by entrepreneur with net worth of nt. Specif-
ically, the technology exhibits constant returns to scale:
F (Hnt ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ) =

(Hnt )

 (Hent )
1 


(Knt )
1  : (141)
In Eq.140, !t is an iid random variable with an expected value of unity (E (!t) = 1),
which represents an idiosyncratic shock to the production. Since the distribution of
the random variable is common to all the entrepreneurs with di¤erent net worth,
there is no superscript n.
Credit frictions are modelled following the costly state verication (CSV) frame-
work. Since Chapter 2 provided the detailed discussion, I here discuss it briey.
The realised value of the idiosyncratic shock, !t is the private information of the
entrepreneur who actually undertakes the production. In order for banks (or any
58Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998, 2001) also assume this.
59An entrepreneur obtains entrepreneurial labour from a competitive market. Meanwhile, he
himself provides labour to the market and obtains the wage. Having this source of income (entre-
preneurial wage) prevents their net worth from becoming zero even after he defaults. Aggregation
can be done easily when every entrepreneur has positive net worth, however small it is.
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other agents) to observe the actual amount of wholesale goods produced, they need
to incur monitoring costs. Without monitoring, entrepreneurs have an incentive to
underreport the production outcome. This moral hazard problem is the source of
agency costs of the model. The cost of monitoring an entrepreneur with net worth
of nt is a proportion of his expected amount of production, i.e. F (Hnt ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ). I
assume that the monitoring costs parameter,  is time-invariant and common across
entrepreneurs with di¤erent levels of net worth.
4.2.2 Contracting problem
As mentioned in Chapter 2, under the CSV framework, the form of optimal contract
is derived as a standard debt contract. Briey speaking, if the production of wholesale
goods happens to exceed the predetermined amount of repayment, an entrepreneur
pays this predetermined amount and keeps the rest. However, if it turns out to be
less, he defaults and his bank pays monitoring cost and takes all the remaining goods.
The amount of repayment is expressed as 	nt (a
n
t   nt), where 	nt is the gross
interest rate. Denoting the nominal price of wholesale goods as PWt , the real price
of wholesale goods is 't

=
PWt
Pt

. Now, notice that there is a cut-o¤ value of !t, !tn
such that
	nt (a
n
t   nt) = !tn'tF (Hnt ; Hent ; Knt ): (142)
If !t turns out to be below the cut-o¤ value, he can not repay the debt.
The contract between entrepreneurs and banks is made before the idiosyncratic
shock is realised. For an entrepreneur with initial net worth of nt, the contract deter-
mines !tn as well as the size of the project, i.e., the amount of each input used, Hnt ,
Hent and K
n
t . In the contract, entrepreneurs aim to maximise the expected prots.
Meanwhile, perfectly competitive banks simply recoup the amount they have lent.
They manage to break even by lending to a large number of entrepreneurs. Banks
do not incur any cost for their operation. Lending takes place within a period.60
60Notice that entrepreneurs simply rent capital. Indeed, capital is treated in a similar way to
labour as an input.
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Then, the prot maximisation problem of an entrepreneur with net worth of nt
is expressed as:
maximise
'tf (!t
n)F (Hnt ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ); (143)
with respect to !tn, Hnt , H
en
t and K
n
t subject to
'tg (!t
n)F (Hnt ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ) = a
n
t   nt: (144)
In the expression for the entrepreneurs expected real prot, f (!tn) is their expected
share of the real revenue from wholesale goods production. Under the standard debt
contract, the share is expressed as:
f (!t
n) =
Z 1
!tn
!d (!)  (1   (!tn))!tn; (145)
where  stands for a cumulative distribution function of !. In the bankspartici-
pation constraint (Eq.144), g (!tn) is the banksexpected share of the revenue. The
share is expressed as
g (!t
n) =
Z !tn
0
!d (!) + (1   (!tn))!tn    (!tn) : (146)
Adding the shares, f (!tn) and g (!tn), I obtain:
f (!t
n) + g (!t
n) = 1   (!tn) : (147)
As in the previous chapters, there is deadweight loss. On average, the fraction,
 (!t
n) of the wholesale goods production is lost in the bankruptcy process. This
represents the agency costs.
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Solving the problem Solving the contracting problem, I rst derive the implicit
demand functions for each input:
wt =
't
snt
FH(H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ); (148)
wet =
't
snt
FHe(H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ); (149)
and
rt =
't
snt
FK(H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ): (150)
In those equations,
snt =
1
1   (!tn) + (!tn)f(!tn)f 0(!tn)
; (151)
where  represents the probability density function of !.
Since the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, Eulers theorem
indicates that
F (Hnt ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ) = HtFH(H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t )+H
en
t FHe(H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t )+K
n
t FK(H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ):
(152)
I obtain from the implicit demand functions (Eqs.148 to 150) and Eq.152 that
snt a
n
t = 'tF (H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ): (153)
Given that ant and 'tF (H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ) are total costs and revenue, s
n
t can be inter-
preted as a mark up over the production costs. Notice from Eq.151 that snt is unity
when  = 0 while greater than unity when  > 061. This mark up is imposed to
cover the agency costs in the presence of monitoring costs.
Notice from Eqs.148 to 150 that the marginal rate of technical substitution
(MRTS) between any of two inputs is the same regardless of the initial net worth.62
Since the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, the MRTS is con-
61This is because f 0 (!) (=   (1   (!))) < 0.
62For example, if it is between household and entrepreneurial labour, Eqs.148 and 149 tell us
FH(H
n
t ;H
en
t ;K
n
t )
FHe (H
n
t ;H
en
t ;K
n
t )
= wtwet
.
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stant along the rays from the origin. Then, the ratio of the inputs required by
entrepreneurs is the same regardless of the level of net worth. Thus, the marginal
product of each input is also the same. This realisation, combined with any of the
implicit demand functions, indicates that snt is a common value for any entrepreneur
with di¤erent net worth, i.e. snt = st. Given that the distribution of ! is common, I
know from Eq.151 that the cuto¤ value of ! is also a common value, i.e. !tn = !t.63
Substituting Eq.153 into the banksparticipation constraint (Eq.146) and incor-
porating !tn = !t and snt = st, I obtain
g (!t) st = 1  nt
ant
: (154)
It is thus clear that the ratio of net worth, nt to the whole nance required, ant is
also common across entrepreneurs with di¤erent net worth.
Further, combining Eqs.153 and 154, I obtain the expression for common expected
return on the entrepreneurs net worth (internal funds), t
64:
'tf (!t)F (H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ) = tnt; (155)
where
t =
stf (!t)
1  stg (!t) : (156)
External nance premium From Eq.142, the gross interest rate, 	nt is expressed
as:
	nt =
1
ant   nt
!t'tF (H
n
t ; H
en
t ; K
n
t ):
Using Eqs.153 and 154, this is simplied as: 	nt =
!t
g(!t)
: Given that this is a common
value, I express it as:
	t (!t) =
!t
g (!t)
: (157)
63Unlike the previous chapters, the cut-o¤ value and mark-up are time-varying.
64Given that entrepreneurs could always receive zero return on the internal fund within a period,
t has to be larger than unity. This is conrmed later in a quantitative analysis.
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Regardless of the level of net worth, entrepreneurs face the same loan interest rate.65
Intuitively, this is because entrepreneurs contribution in their projects, nt
ant
is the
same regardless of their net worth (see Eq.154)
As in Faia and Monacelli (2007), I dene the external nance premium as the
gross interest rate minus the safe gross rate of return. Given that the lending takes
place within a period, the safe rate of return is unity. Thus, the external nance
premium,  t (= 	t   1) is given as:
 (!t) =
!t
g (!t)
  1: (158)
4.2.3 Households
Having discussed the contracting problem, I now discuss how households (original
lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers) behave in a dynamic economy.
The representative household gains utility from consumption of the nal goods
Cht
66. They also benet from holding real money balances, Mt
Pt
and enjoying leisure,
1 Ht, where Ht is household labour supply. The utility function is separable:
1X
t=0
t
0B@ Cht 1 
1   +

Mt
Pt
1 
1     (Ht)

1CA ; (159)
where  is the discount rate and   1.
The budget constraint in nominal terms is given as:
PtC
h
t +Mt+Bt+PtK
h
t = WtHt+RtK
h
t 1+(1  )PtKht 1+(1+it 1)Bt 1+Mt 1+t+Tt;
(160)
where Mt is nominal money, Bt is bond holding67, Rt is a nominal rental rate of
capital68, Kht is households capital holding,  is the depreciation rate, it 1 is a
65Even when  = 0, 	t is larger than unity. This reects the fact that banks still need to be
compensated for the fact that some of the entrepreneurs go bankrupt and fail to repay their debt.
66In the previous chapters, it is expressed as Ct.
67In equilibrium, the aggregate supply of bonds is zero.
68Thus, the real rental rate of capital rt is given by RtPt .
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nominal interest rate accrued in period t, t is prot share from retailers69, and Tt
is a lump sum tax. The left hand side of the constraint shows the allocation of his
total income in period t, which is composed of the expressions in the right hand side.
He has two ways to save: either investing in bonds or capital. I assume that the
arbitrage condition ensures that the real returns from each investment are the same,
i.e.
1 + it
1 + t+1
= rt+1 + 1  ; (161)
where t+1

= Pt+1 Pt
Pt

is the ination rate and rt+1 is the real rental rate of capital.
Unlike investment in bonds or capital, lending to banks takes place within a
period. Then, since the opportunity costs of not lending is zero, the net interest rate
households obtain from lending to banks is zero in equilibrium. This is the reason
why the return from lending to the bank does not appear in the budget constraint.
The government budget constraint is Mt  Mt 1 = Tt. In case Tt > 0, it means
that the government makes a direct transfer of money to households, raising revenue
through seigniorage. In case Tt < 0, Tt is actually a tax collected by the government
from households. The government spending is zero.
Solving this utility maximisation problem, I obtain the consumption Euler equa-
tion,  
Cht
 
= 
 
Cht+1
  1 + it
1 + t+1
: (162)
I also have the money demand function,
Mt
Pt
=

1 + it
it
 
Cht
 1
; (163)
and the labour supply function
wt = 
 
Cht

H 1t : (164)
In deriving the money demand function, use is made of the consumption Euler
69Households are the shareholders of retailers.
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equation:
4.2.4 Entrepreneurs
Previously in a discussion of the contracting problem, entrepreneursinitial net worth
was taken as given. I rst show how it is actually determined. Then, for the case
where entrepreneurs do not default, I discuss how they spend the prots after re-
payment of the debts. Specically, I study their consumption/saving decisions about
nal goods. However, if they default, they consume/save nothing. The sequence of
events happening to an individual entrepreneur j is summarised in Table 8.
Table 8: Sequence of events happening to entrepreneur j in a given period t
1: Aggregate shock (monetary shock) is realised.
2: Entrepreneur j with initial net worth, nt pays for input costs, ant .
(The di¤erence is borrowed from the bank.)
3: Using the inputs, he produces wholesale goods.
(The outcome of production is subject to an idiosyncratic shock.)
4: If !t (j)  !, he repays his debt. If not, he goes bankrupt
and the bank pays monitoring costs and takes the remaining.
5: In the former case, he makes a consumption/saving decision.
Determination of net worth Entrepreneurs net worth is composed of gross
return from their capital holding and wage they earn by providing one unit of their
labour inelastically. Formally, entrepreneur js net worth, nt is expressed as (rt +
1   )Ket (j) + wet ; where  is the depreciation rate, Ket (j) is the capital holding by
entrepreneur j, and wet is the entrepreneurial real wage. If their capital holding is
zero, their net worth is simply wet . Aggregating across all the entrepreneurs, I have
nwt = (rt + 1  )Ket + wet ; (165)
where nwt and Ket are aggregate net worth and entrepreneurial capital.
88
Consumption/saving decision If entrepreneur j is solvent after the production
and still keeps the real prot of (!t (j)  !t)'tF (Hnt ; Hent ; Knt )70, he then decides
how much of the nal goods to consume and how much to save for the next period.
If saved, its gross return from the capital market forms a part of his period t+ 1 net
worth.
Given that the production function of wholesale goods exhibits constant returns
to scale, I obtain the following aggregate relation (cf. Eq.143):
'tf (!t)F (Ht; H
e
t ; Kt) = C
e
t +K
e
t+1; (166)
where Ht, Het , and Kt
 
= bKht + (1  b)Ket

are aggregate household and entrepre-
neurial labour and aggregate capital. Cet and K
e
t+1 are aggregate entrepreneurial
consumption in period t and capital in period t+ 1.
In what follows, I compare two alternative modelling strategies for entrepreneurs
consumption/saving decision. The strategies are useful to avoid the situation where
entrepreneurs ultimately become self nanced (by accumulating enough net worth)
and agency costs become irrelevant. In the rst strategy, they make the decision
to maximise their intertemporal utility, but they have a higher discount rate than
households. Since they make a decision so as to satisfy the Euler equation, I call them
Euler equation entrepreneurs. In the second, a constant fraction of entrepreneurs die
each period and they consume all the accumulated wealth just before their death.
The population is kept constant by the birth of new entrepreneurs.71 In this case, a
constant share of aggregate prot, 'tf (!t)F (Ht; H
e
t ; Kt) is consumed/saved in each
period. I call them overlapping-generations (OLG) entrepreneurs. The rst strategy
is adopted, for example, by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and the latter adopted by
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).72 I show below that the e¤ects of credit
70Using the external nance premium, the prot can also be expressed as
!t (j)'tF (H
n
t ; H
en
t ;K
n
t )  (1 +  t) (ant   nt).
71The initial net worth of the newly born entrepreneurs is wet .
72As noted in the introduction, the comparison of the strategies was made by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001). The di¤erence from their work is that I make the comparison in the NK framework,
while they do so in a exible price framework.
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frictions on business cycles di¤er depending on which strategy is taken.
Euler equation entrepreneurs I specify Euler equation entrepreneur js util-
ity function as:
Et
1X
t=0
()tCet (j) : (167)
where Cet (j) is his consumption in period t. Under the assumption that entrepre-
neurs are risk neutral, the utility function is linear. Since entrepreneurs have the
investment technology to produce wholesale goods, their expected return from the
investment is greater than householdsinvestment return. To eliminate the scenario
in which entrepreneurs keep postponing their consumption to the future and accu-
mulating large wealth, I assume that entrepreneurs discount utility at a higher rate
than households, i.e. 0 <  < 1.
Saving one unit of nal good and investing in the capital market in period t,
he has rt+1 + 1    unit of the good at the beginning of period t + 1. Then, by
investing this into the production of wholesale good, he has an expected gross return
of t+1 =
st+1f(!t+1)
1 st+1g(!t+1) (Eq.156) within period t + 1. Then, his expected gross real
return across the periods is t+1 (rt+1 + 1  ).73
Now, given that the utility function takes a linear form, I can tell that his con-
sumption/saving decision is governed by the following Euler equation:
1 = t+1 (rt+1 + 1  ) : (168)
The left hand side is the utility he obtains from consuming one unit of nal good in
period t. The right hand side is the utility obtained in period t+ 1 from consuming
the expected return from the saved one unit in period t, multiplied by the discount
factor of . When they are equal, he is indi¤erent between consumption and saving,
which should be the case when he makes the optimal choice. Observe that this is
also an aggregate relation.
73However, householdsintertemporal return is just rt+1 + 1   , since their investment is more
limited than entrepreneurs.
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Overlapping-generations (OLG) entrepreneurs I denote the exogenous
probability of death for any entrepreneur as  .74 As noted, the population is held
constant by the birth of new entrepreneurs. Given that OLG entrepreneurs consume
all the accumulated wealth just before death, aggregate entrepreneurial consumption,
Cet is simply given as:
Cet =  'tf (!t)F (Ht; H
e
t ; Kt) . (169)
  also represents a constant share of aggregate entrepreneurial prot allocated on
consumption each period.
4.2.5 Final goods producers
Households and entrepreneurs consume nal goods. Entrepreneurs produce wholesale
goods, which are, in turn, used by retailers as the input (Figure 6). Retailers are
monopolistic competitors who maximise prots intertemporally subject to staggered
pricesetting.75 The nal goods are a composite of all the retail goods.
Households
Holding funds to spare
Consuming/saving final goods
Banks
Perfect competition
Monitoring
Final goods producers
Perfect competition
CES production function
Entrepreneurs
Producing wholesale goods
Consuming/saving final goods
Retailers
Monopolistic competition
Staggered pricesetting
Government
Transfer of money
Figure 6: Overview of the model
Final goods producers problem is identical to the one in Chapter 2. They are
perfect competitors and their production function is of the CES (constant elasticity
74This implies that their expected survival periods are 1  periods.
75As stated in Chapter 2, the reason why I model two di¤erent sets of intermediate goods pro-
ducers is to separate the contracting problem from the intertemporal prot maximisation problem
with staggered pricesetting.
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of substitution) type:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
; (170)
where Yt is the production of nal goods and Yt (z) is the retail good produced by
retailer z. Solving their cost minimisation problem, I obtain the following demand
function for retail good z,
Yt (z) = Yt

Pt (z)
Pt
 
; (171)
where
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
: (172)
Pt is the price of the nal good.  represents the elasticity of demand.
4.2.6 Retailers
Since retailersproblem is also the same as the one in Chapter 2, I describe it only
briey.
Retailers produce retail goods using wholesale goods as the only input. The pro-
duction function exhibits constant returns to scale. Facing the downward sloping
demand curve (Eq.171), retailers act as monopolistic competitors. Retailers are sub-
ject to Calvo-style staggered pricesetting. Thus, once they are given a chance to reset
their prices in period t, retailer z chooses the price, Pt (z) to maximise
1X
i=0
it;t+i

Pt (z)
Pt+i
Yt+i (z)  't+iYt+i (z)

; (173)
where  is the probability of not obtaining the opportunity to change the price, t;t+i
is the retailers discount rate for time t+ i76, Yt+i (z) is the production by retailer z at
time t+ i, and 't+i is the real price of wholesale good at time t+ i. Incorporating the
demand function for retailer z (Eq.171), di¤erentiating the expression with respect
76The discount rate is dened as the inverse of the product of the gross real interest rates from
period t to t+ i  1, i.e., 1(1+rt)(1+rt+1)(1+rt+i 1) :
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to Pt (z) and setting it to zero, I obtain
Qt =

  1
P1
i=0

it;t+i't+i

Pt+i
Pt

Yt+i

P1
i=0

it;t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Yt+i
 ; (174)
where Qt is the optimal real price chosen by the retailer, i.e., Qt =
P calvo;t
Pt
.
Under Calvo price setting, the price index is determined as an average of the
price charged by retailers without an opportunity of adjusting their prices at time
t (proportion of ) and the reset price at time t (proportion of 1   ). Given that
price adjusters are randomly selected, the average price of non adjusters in period t
is the aggregate price in the previous period, Pt 1. Since the adjusters set the same
nominal price P calvo;t, the price index in period t is given as:
Pt =
 
P 1 t 1 + (1  )P 1 calvo;t
 1
1  :
Using ination rate, this can be rewritten as:
1 =
 
 (1 + t)
 1 + (1  )Q1 t
 1
1  : (175)
4.2.7 Equilibrium
I now collect the equilibrium conditions for the model. The solution of the contracting
problem can be summarised as (c.f. Eq.155)
'tf (!t)Y
W
t = tnwt: (176)
Given that each entrepreneur provides one unit of labour inelastically, the aggregate
production of wholesale goods, Y Wt is given as:
Y Wt = H


t K
1 
t . (177)
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The aggregate return on the entrepreneurs net worth (internal funds), t is given as
(Eq.156):
t =
stf (!t)
1  stg (!t) ; (178)
where the mark up, st is expressed as (Eq.151):
st =
1
1   (!t) + (!t)f(!t)f 0(!t)
: (179)
Incorporating the demand functions for capital and entrepreneurial labour (Eqs.149
and 150) into Eq.165, aggregate net worth is given as:
nwt =

't
st
Y Wt
Kt
(1  ) + 1  

Ket +
't
st
Y Wt (1  
): (180)
Taking into account that retailersproduction function shows constant returns to
scale and that a fraction of the wholesale goods is lost through monitoring, I have
the following relation77:
(1   (!t))Y Wt = Yt; (181)
where the left hand side is the net (after deducting the deadweight loss) aggregate
production of wholesale goods and the right hand side is the aggregate production of
nal goods. With Eq.181, the market clearing condition for the nal goods is given
as:
(1   (!t))Y Wt = bCht + (1  b)Cet +Kt+1   (1  )Kt (182)
Eqs.148 and 164 give the household labour market equilibrium condition:

 
Cht

H 1t =
't
st
Y Wt
Ht

: (183)
Householdsconsumption/saving relation is governed by the Euler equation (Eq.162):
 
Cht
 
= 
 
Cht+1
  't+1
st+1
Y Wt+1
Kt+1
(1  ) + 1  

: (184)
77Strictly speaking, this has to be proved and this is the case only as an approximation around
the zero ination steady state. The proof is found in Chapter 2.
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Also, the arbitrage condition (Eq.161) ensures
1 + it
1 + t+1
=
't+1
st+1
Y Wt+1
Kt+1
(1  ) + 1  ; (185)
Entrepreneurs aggregate prot, 'tf (!t)Y
W
t (= tnwt) is either consumed or
saved (Eq.166):
'tf (!t)Y
W
t = C
e
t +K
e
t+1: (186)
In the case of Euler equation entrepreneurs, entrepreneursconsumption/saving de-
cision is governed by (Eq.168):
1 = t+1

't+1
st+1
Y Wt+1
Kt+1
(1  ) + 1  

: (187)
Meanwhile, with OLG entrepreneurs, I have the following relation (Eq.169):
Cet =  'tf (!t)Y
W
t : (188)
Finally, the retailerspricing decision and the evolution of aggregate price are
summarised by Eqs.174 and 175:
Qt =

  1
P1
i=0

it;t+i't+i

Pt+i
Pt

Yt+i

P1
i=0

it;t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Yt+i
 ; (189)
where Qt

=
P calvo;t
Pt

is the retailersreal reset price and
1 =
 
 (1 + t)
 1 + (1  )Q1 t
 1
1  ; (190)
where t

= Pt Pt 1
Pt 1

is the ination rate of nal goods price.
There are 15 variables to be determined: !t, st, t, nwt, Ht, Kt, K
e
t , 't, Y
W
t , Yt,
Cht , C
e
t , Qt, t and it. Meanwhile, there are 14 equations for each case with Euler
equations entrepreneurs and OLG entrepreneurs. The model is then closed with an
interest rate rule (introduced below).
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4.3 Simulations
I compare the business cycle dynamics in response to monetary policy shocks for the
cases with Euler equations and OLG entrepreneurs. To do this, I log linearise the
model around the zero ination steady state and conduct numerical simulations. The
reason why I use simulation is because the model with endogenous agency costs78 has
multiple state variables (as claried soon) and thus it is di¢ cult to solve analytically.
Indeed, the aim of simulations is to explore theoretical possibilities for both cases.
In what follows, I rst discuss how to calibrate the model. Then, I explain the
solution strategy to obtain the state space form for each case.
4.3.1 Calibration
The time unit is a quarter. I assume that the distribution function of idiosyncratic
shock to entrepreneurs, !t is uniform in the region [1  ; 1 + ] so that E (!t) = 1
and V ar (!t) = 13
2. Concerning monitoring costs parameter of , I set  = 0:20
as in Chapter 2. Then, I calibrate the steady state cuto¤ value and the distribution
parameter,  such that the quarterly default ratio,  (!t) is 0:974% and the quarterly
external nance premium,  (!t) is 0:5%. The former value is taken from the series
of works by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 98 and 2001) and the latter from Faia and
Monacelli (2007). With  = 0:20, I obtain  = 0:609 and ! = 0:403 (the steady state
value of cut o¤ value), which in turn implies the steady state mark up, s and the
entrepreneursreturn on the net worth,  of 1:112 and 1:199, respectively.
Euler equation entrepreneurs are more impatient than households. Combining
the two Euler equations (Eqs.184 and 187), I have  = 1

in the steady state. This
enables me to obtain the patience parameter,  of 0:834.
All the baseline parameter values of the model are summarised in Table 9.
78Endogenous agency costs are represented by  (!t). Unlike the previous chapters, the cut-o¤
value !t is not time-invariant.
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Table 9: Parameter values
: bankruptcy cost parameter 0.20
: distribution function parameter 0.61
: patience parameter (for Euler equation entrepreneurs) 0.83
: preference parameter (1) 1
: preference parameter (2) 4.5
: technology parameter (1) 0.67

: technology parameter (2) 0.99
: elasticity of demand 10
: discount factor 0.99
b: householdsproportion 0.7
: depreciation rate 0.025
: stickiness parameter 0.75
 : constant consumption ratio (for ad hoc entrepreneurs) 0.18
The value of households preference parameter,  (its inverse is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of consumption) is set to be unity.    1 is the elasticity
of marginal disutility with respect to work. Following Ascari (2000), I set  = 4:5.
The production function of wholesale goods is

(Ht)

 (Het )
1 


(Kt)
1 , where I
set  = 0:67 and 
 = 0:99. The elasticity of demand for retail goods is 10, following
Chari et al. (2000). Discount factor,  is set 0:99. In the continuum of 1, the
households share b is 0:7. The depreciation rate of  = 0:025 is from Faia and
Monacelli (2007). Finally, following Jeanne (1997), the stickiness parameter in Calvo
staggered setting,  is set 0:75.
Having set the parameter values, I can obtain values of each variable for the
Euler equation entrepreneurs in the zero ination steady state. The only parameter
value specic to the case with OLG entrepreneurs (instead of the patience parameter,
) is the constant ratio of entrepreneursconsumption,  . Assuming all the other
parameter values are the same as in Table 9, this value can be tied down so that
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all the steady state values of variables in the OLG entrepreneurscase are the same
as the ones in the Euler equations entrepreneurscase. The obtained value of   is
0:184. Given that   also represents the entrepreneursdeath ratio, it implies that on
average, entrepreneurs survive for 5.4 periods.
4.3.2 Solution strategy
Euler equation entrepreneurs First, realise from Eqs.177 and 183 that the real
price of wholesale goods, 't is expressed as a function of C
h
t , st, Ht and Kt. Then,
noticing from Eqs.178 and 179 that the cut-o¤ value of !t and return on the internal
funds, t are implicit functions of the mark up, st, Eqs.176 and 180 lead to aggregate
household labour, Ht as a function of Kt, Ket , C
h
t and st. It is then clear that Y
W
t
and 't are also a function of the four variables. Meanwhile, Eq.186 indicates that
entrepreneurial consumption, Cet is a function of Kt, K
e
t , C
h
t , st and K
e
t+1.
Now, observe that the market clearing conditions of nal goods and two consump-
tion Euler equations for households and entrepreneurs can be expressed as a function
of Kt, Ket , C
h
t and st and Kt+1, K
e
t+1, C
h
t+1 and st+1. I then log linearise these three
equations around the zero ination steady state to obtain three rst order di¤erence
equations in cKt, cKet , cCht and bst. (In what follows, the term with upper hat indicates
the log deviation from the steady state value.) In a matrix form, they are expressed
as:
0BBBB@
A11 A12 A13 A14
A21 A22 A23 A24
A31 A32 A33 A34
1CCCCA
0BBBBBBB@
[Kt+1
[Ket+1dCht+1dst+1
1CCCCCCCA
=
0BBBB@
B11 B12 B13 B14
B21 B22 B23 B24
B31 B32 B33 B34
1CCCCA
0BBBBBBB@
cKtcKetcChtbst
1CCCCCCCA
; (191)
where the coe¢ cients can be obtained numerically with parameter values introduced
above.
I assume monetary policy is represented by an interest rate rule. Specically, I
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dene the rule as a Taylor rule (1993):
bit = 1t + 2 bYt + lt; (192)
where bit is the log deviation of gross nominal interest rate and lt is a shock term
which follows an AR(1) process:
lt+1 = 3lt: (193)
Next, I log linearise the arbitrage relation (Eq.185) and combine it with the interest
rate rule so that the interest rate, bit is eliminated. Given that Yt is also an function of
Kt, Ket , C
h
t and st, I can rewrite the combined relation as a linear di¤erence equation
in cKt, cKet , cCht and bst as well as t and lt. Dening bYt = a1cKt + a2cKet + a3cCht + a4bst
and cHt = b1cKt + b2cKet + b3cCht + b4bst, I obtain
 (b1   1)[Kt+1 + b2[Ket+1 + t+1 +  ( + b3) dCht+1 + b4dst+1 (194)
= 2a1cKt + 2a2cKet + lt + 1t + 2a3cCht + 2a4bst:
Next, log linearising retailers reset pricing equation and the equation linking
the reset price and aggregate price (Eqs.189 and 190), I obtain the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC):
t =  b't + t+1; (195)
where  = 1 

(1  ). Given that the retailersreal marginal cost can be expressed
as a function of Kt, Ket , C
h
t and st, I obtain yet another rst order di¤erence equation
in cKt, cKet , cCht and bst as well as t. Dening 1 =   (   
), I have
t+1 = (1b1    (  1))cKt+1b2cKet +t+(1b3   ) cCht +(1b4   ) bst: (196)
Combining Eqs.191, 193, 194, and 196, I have the following system of rst order
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di¤erence equations in a state space form:
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
A11 A12 0 0 A13 A14
A21 A22 0 0 A23 A24
A31 A32 0 0 A33 A34
 (b1   1) b2 0 1  ( + b3) b4
0 0 0  0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
[Kt+1
[Ket+1
lt+1
t+1dCht+1dst+1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
(197)
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
B11 B12 0 0 B13 B14
B21 B22 0 0 B23 B24
B31 B32 0 0 B33 B34
2a1 2a2 1 1 2a3 2a4
1b1    (  1) 1b2 0 1 1b3    1b4   
0 0 3 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
cKtcKet
lt
tcChtbst
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
More succinctly, it is described as Axt+1 = Bxt. In the vector xt, cKt, cKet , and
lt are predetermined variables while t, cCht , and bst are control variables. It is the
existence of cKet as a predetermined variable that enriches the dynamics compared to
the standard NK model without credit frictions.
Because of the entrepreneurs Euler equation, the matrix B is not invertible.
Thus, I can not use an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition proposed by Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) to solve the model. Instead, I use generalised Schur decomposition
as in Klein (2000) and Söderlind (1999).79
OLG entrepreneurs The only di¤erence from the Euler equation entrepreneurs
case is that the entrepreneursconsumption/saving allocation is governed by Eq.188
instead of Eq.187. Thus, the solution strategy is similar to the one above. First, I
again obtain Ht, Y Wt , and 't as a function of C
h
t , st, Kt, and K
e
t . Then, I realise
from Eq.180 that nwt is also a function of those variables. Combining Eqs.186 and
79I used Matlab to conduct the decomposition.
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188, I have the rst intertemporal relation as a function of Ct, st, Kt, Ket and K
e
t+1:
Ket+1 = (1   ) tnwt:
With the market clearing condition (Eq.182) and households consumption Euler
equation (Eq.184), I again obtain three rst order di¤erence equations in cCht , bst, cKt
and cKet .
The rest of the process to obtain a state space form is the same as the previous
case. That is, obtaining another three rst order di¤erence equations from the interest
rate rule and arbitrage condition, NKPC and shock process, I again have the system
of equations described succinctly as Cxt+1 = Dxt. As in the previous case, the
vector xt is composed of t, cCht , and bst as control variables and cKt, cKet , and lt
as predetermined variables. Since D is invertible this time, I use the eigenvalue-
eigenvector decomposition to solve the model.8081
4.3.3 Impulse responses to interest rate shocks
I now compare business cycle dynamics to interest rate shocks for Euler equation
and OLG entrepreneurs. As mentioned, the monetary policy is modelled as a Taylor
rule: bit = 1t + 2 bYt + lt (Eq.192). Following Taylor (1993), I set 1 = 1:5 and
2 = 0:5. The shock term, lt, follows the AR(1) process: lt+1 = 3lt (Eq.193), where
I set 3 = 0:8.
Before comparing the dynamics for each case, it is convenient rst to consider the
dynamics in the NK model without credit frictions as a reference point.
The NK model without credit frictions (standard model) In order to model
credit frictions, I specically introduced entrepreneurs (borrowers) and banks (nan-
cial intermediaries). Indeed, the model without these agents can be regarded as a
standard NK model with capital stock. In the standard NK model I consider here,
80To conduct the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition, I used the Matlab code written by Ryo
Kato. His published codes are found in http://ideas.repec.org/e/pka55.html.
81Instead, I can again use the generalised Schur decomposition as above. I obtain the same result.
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those agents are absent and households provide labour and capital to retailers. Us-
ing these inputs, retailers, who are monopolistic competitors subject to Calvo-style
staggered pricesetting, produce retail goods. Otherwise, the model structure is the
same (see Figure 6). Since the solution strategy to solve this standard NK model is
similar to the ones discussed above (in fact, simpler than those), the detail is given
in the Appendix.
Figure 7 presents the impulse responses of output, consumption and investment
in the face of an unexpected expansionary monetary shock in Period 0, represented
by l0 =  0:3.82 Responding to this expansionary shock, output increases in Period
0 and then decreases gradually. The ination rate also has the maximum impact in
Period 0 then decreases (Figure 8). One seemingly counter-intuitive aspect is that this
expansionary shock leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate (Figure 8). This
happens because given that the nominal interest rate is determined endogenously
by the Taylor rule, although the shock itself is expansionary, the nominal rate rises
responding to positive reactions of output and ination rate. This increase in nominal
interest rate also corresponds to an increase in the real interest rate (not shown in the
gure). This is what explains the initial fall in consumption through the consumption
Euler equation. On the other hand, an investment increases. Finally, Figure 7 shows
that this standard NK model fails to replicate the hump-shaped response of output,
which is typically observed in the VAR analysis in the literature.
In the following, I see how business cycle dynamics to the same interest rate shock
(l0 =  0:3) are altered by the endogenous agency costs. The dynamics turn out to
di¤er dependent on whether Euler equation or OLG entrepreneurs is assumed.
82Note that the steady state gross nominal interest rate is given as 1 (cf. Eqs.184 and 185).
Then, it represents a reduction in the nominal rate of about 0.3% in Period 0.
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Figure 7: Standard NK model, dynamics 1
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Figure 8: Standard NK model, dynamics 2
Euler equation entrepreneurs An obvious advantage of incorporating credit
market frictions into a standard NK framework is that I can now study the behaviour
of some additional variables in the business cycle dynamics, such as net worth, default
ratio, and external nance premium. What is more, I show that the behaviour of
these variables are important to understand how other variables, such as output,
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investment and consumption evolve over time.
Figure 9 shows that in Period 0 when the expansionary interest rate shock hits,
the change in entrepreneursnet worth is rather small. This is because the main
component of net worth is their capital saved from the previous period (Eq.180).
Though the rental rate of capital and entrepreneurial wage go up, the increase in
net worth is still small. Meanwhile, responding to an increase in demand, the whole
nance required by entrepreneurs increases greatly. Thus, what happens is that
entrepreneurscontribution in the whole nance becomes smaller.83 Intuitively, this
increases agency costs. In fact, it leads to an increase in the probability of default,
 (!t) and deadweight loss,  (!t) in Period 0 (both of which are increasing in
the cuto¤ value, !t). Then, to o¤set the increase in agency costs, the mark up
entrepreneurs charge over production costs, st increases. Also, banks charge higher
external nance premium (as reected in the increase in the loan interest rate).
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-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
time
Net worth
Cut-off value
Mark up
Loan interest rate
Figure 9: Euler equation entrepreneurs, dynamics 1
At the end of Period 0, entrepreneurs decide to save substantially by giving up
their consumption (Figure 10)84. Compared to the standard NK case, that is what
causes a large amplication in aggregate investment in Period 0. The reason why
83In other words, the leverage ratio rises.
84Entrepreneurial consumption in Period 0 falls to almost 4% below the steady state level.
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entrepreneurs do this becomes clear when I look at what happens to the net worth and
external nance premium in the subsequent periods. Reecting the saving decision,
net worth increases greatly in Period 1. By increasing the entrepreneurscontribution
in the whole nance and thus reducing the agency costs, it reduces the external
nance premium greatly. In fact, the latter becomes negative. Over the subsequent
periods, net worth decreases only gradually. Thus, the external nance premium
is kept low. Indeed, by increasing the net worth and decreasing external nance
premium, they can keep high level of consumption from Period 1 onwards. For the
Euler equation entrepreneurs, this turns out to be the best way to maximise their
intertemporal utility.
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Figure 10: Euler equation entrepreneurs, dynamics 2
Focusing on the output dynamics, notice that output shows a hump shaped re-
action to the interest rate shock. This, in fact, is a phenomenon widely conrmed in
VAR literature (for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). The mech-
anism behind this hump shape is again related to the behaviour of net worth. As
discussed, given the almost predetermined nature of net worth, agency costs, which
are mirrored in the deadweight loss, increase on impact. However, since net worth
jumps in Period 1, the external nance premium falls.85 In turn, this induces entre-
85In fact, the premium reacts pro-cyclically in the impact period and then counter-cyclically
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preneurs to produce more. Therefore, output increases. Indeed, bY0 = 0:092 (output
is higher than the steady state by 9.2% in Period 0) and bY1 = 0:171, while in the
standard NK case, bY0 = 0:170 and bY1 = 0:142.86 The impact e¤ect on output in the
Euler equation entrepreneurscase is dampened relative to the standard case.
The dynamics of other variables such as ination rate and household employment
do not show much di¤erence compared to the standard NK case presented in Figure
8 (thus not shown here).
OLG entrepreneurs Given its almost predetermined nature, net worth again does
not change much in Period 0. However, the evolution afterwards will di¤er greatly
with OLG entrepreneurs. When a xed proportion of entrepreneursprot is saved
(and consumed), net worth increases only gradually (Figure 11). Indeed, OLG en-
trepreneurs do not increase investment greatly in Period 0 to take advantage of
subsequent periods of low external nance premium. Therefore, a fall in the agency
costs happens rather gradually. This is reected in the sluggish fall in the external
nance premium (see the loan interest rate). The premium falls below the steady
state level only after more than a year (Period 5).
afterwards. Interestingly, the VAR study presented by Bernanke et al. (1999) also shows the same
pattern of evolution of the premium in the face of expansionary monetary policy shock. (The
premium in their paper is measured as the spread between prime lending rate and T bill rate.)
86Note that the steady state level of output is di¤erent with and without the frictions: the output
with frictions turns out to be 21% lower than the one without.
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Figure 11: OLG entrepreneurs, dynamics 1
Without the large increase in investment by entrepreneurs in Period 0, the reac-
tion of aggregate investment does not show amplication compared to the standard
NK case (Figure 12). Also, with only a gradual decrease in the external nance
premium following the shock, the hump shape reaction of output is not as clear as
before.87 More generally, the sluggish adjustment of net worth, implying the slug-
gish change in the external nance premium, results in the persistent movement of
output. Even in Period 8, bY8 = 0:074 while bY2 = 0:094. In contrast, in the standard
NK case, bY8 = 0:050 while bY0 = 0:170 (and bY2 = 0:120).88 Indeed, output dynamics
with OLG entrepreneurs are characterised by more persistent movement compared
to the standard case.
As for the dynamics of other variables such as ination rate, they again do not
seem a¤ected much.
87Actually, the peak is in Period 2 at 9.4% higher than the steady state (i.e. cY2 = 0:094).
88In case of Euler equation entrepreneurs, cY1 = 0:171 (the peak) while cY8 = 0:062.
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Figure 12: OLG entrepreneurs, dynamics 2
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter studied the di¤erence in business cycle dynamics to monetary policy
shocks between the two strategies; Euler equation entrepreneurs and OLG entrepre-
neurs. I showed that the dynamics are indeed di¤erent. Output dynamics with Euler
equation entrepreneurs is characterised by the hump shaped reaction, while the dy-
namics with OLG entrepreneurs is by the highly persistent nature. The key factor
behind this is the di¤erent behaviour of entrepreneursnet worth. Therefore, the
choice of modelling strategies matters when one considers the credit channels within
the NK framework.
However, I argue that the output dynamics observed under the OLG entrepre-
neurs is more realistic. The reason is as follows. Throughout the chapter, entrepre-
neurs are assumed to be risk neutral in order to simplify the contracting problem with
nancial intermediaries. In fact, this assumption of risk neutral entrepreneurs is quite
common in the literature (for example, Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997, 98, 2001) among others). Assuming risk-averse entrepreneurs compli-
cates the contracting problem greatly. Then, under the Euler equation entrepreneurs,
what is implied is the lack of consumption smoothing. In relation to this, the en-
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trepreneurs consumption pattern showed rather extreme volatility. On the other
hand, with the OLG entrepreneurs, aggregate entrepreneurial consumption/saving
evolves rather smoothly after the shock. Thus, to the extent that entrepreneurs have
a consumption smoothing motive, I tend to argue that the assumption of OLG entre-
preneurs leads to more realistic dynamics. Thus, I conclude that the dening e¤ect
of endogenous agency costs in the NK model is to make real e¤ects more persistent.
However, in relation to the empirical evidence from the VAR analysis, since the real
impact is not amplied due to the increase in the external nance premium, the
endogenous agency costs are not necessarily a modication towards greater realism.
4.5 Appendix to Chapter Four: Standard New Keynesian
model
In the standard NK case, entrepreneurs and banks are absent. Households pro-
vide labour and capital to retailers. Retailer is production function is Yt (i) =
Ht (i)
Kt (i)
1 . Using Lagrangian, his cost minimisation problem is described as:
Lt = wtHt (i) + rtKt (i) + 't(Yt (i)   Ht (i)Kt (i)1 ): Given that the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale, 't is the real marginal cost as well as
real average cost. Di¤erentiating this with respect to Ht (i) and Kt (i) and set-
ting them to be zero, I have the optimisation conditions: wt = 't

Yt(i)
Ht(i)

and
rt = 't (1  )

Yt(i)
Kt(i)

:
Since each retailer uses each input in the same proportion, the individual pro-
duction function can be aggregated as:
R 1
0
Yt (i) di = H

t K
1 
t , where Ht and Kt are
aggregate labour and capital. Final good producers produce nal goods following the
CES production function: Yt =
R 1
0
Yt (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
. Then, around the zero ination
steady state where Yt (i) = Yt, the aggregate production function can be expressed
as
Yt = H

t K
1 
t : (198)
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Likewise, I can express the above mentioned optimisation conditions as
wt = 't

Yt
Ht

and
rt = 't (1  )

Yt
Kt

:
The market clearing condition for the nal goods is:
Yt = Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt; (199)
where Ct is an aggregate consumption (i.e. household consumption). Solving the
same householdsutility maximisation problem as in the main text, I have the labour
supply relation: wt = Ct H
 1
t (cf. Eq.164). With the labour demand function, the
labour market equilibrium condition is obtained as:
Ct H
 1
t = 't

Yt
Ht

: (200)
Incorporating the demand function for capital, the consumption Euler equation (cf.
Eq.184) becomes
(Ct)
  =  (Ct+1)
 

't+1 (1  )

Yt+1
Kt+1

+ 1  

: (201)
Again, since households have a choice of saving either in bonds or capital, the arbi-
trage condition (cf. Eq.185) is given as:
1 + it
1 + t+1
= 't+1 (1  )

Yt+1
Kt+1

+ 1  : (202)
Retailers maximise prots subject to the Calvo-style staggered pricesetting. As
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before, their reset real price, Qt

=
P calvo;t
Pt

is given as (cf. Eq.189):
Qt =

  1
P1
i=0

it;t+i't+i

Pt+i
Pt

Yt+i

P1
i=0

it;t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Yt+i
 : (203)
Also, the evolution of price index is expressed as (cf. Eq.190):
1 =
 
 (1 + t)
 1 + (1  )Q1 t
 1
1  : (204)
Thus, I have 8 endogenous variables, Yt, Ht, Kt, Ct, 't, it, Qt and t and 7
equations. The model then can be closed with the interest rate rule (Taylor rule).
The solution strategy is similar to the ones in the main text. First I can obtain
the steady state values in the zero ination steady state. Log linearising around the
state, Eqs.198,199,200 and 201 lead to two rst order linear di¤erence equations inbCt, cHt and cKt. Next, log linearising the arbitrage condition (Eq.202) and equating
it with the Taylor rule, bit = 1t + 2 bYt + lt (cf. Eq.192), I have another rst order
di¤erence equation in t, bCt, cHt;cKt and lt. I obtain two further di¤erence equations
in the form of New Keynesian Phillips curve (obtained from Eqs.203 and 204) and the
AR(1) process of the shock term, lt. Thus, I obtain 5 rst order di¤erence equations
composed of control variables of t, bCt, and cHt and predetermined variables of cKt
and lt. Having obtained the state space form, the model can be solved using the
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition as in Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
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5 Chapter Five: The E¤ect of Credit Market Shocks
on Business Cycle Dynamics
5.1 Introduction
Using a variant of DGE frameworks, a large number of models have discussed the
role of exogenous shocks such as technology shocks or monetary shocks in business
cycle uctuations. However, since many of the DGE models do not take account of
credit market imperfections, shocks happening to credit markets are often ignored.
Acknowledging this, I study the potentially important role of credit market shocks
as a source of business cycle dynamics.
As in the previous chapters, credit frictions are modelled following the Costly
State Verication (CSV) framework. As an example of shocks to credit markets, I
focus on the shock to the variance of idiosyncratic shock rms (entrepreneurs) are
subject to. An increase in the variance, for example, aggravates the informational
asymmetry so that agency costs increase. The increase in agency costs is then re-
ected in an increase in the external nance premium faced by entrepreneurs. In the
sense that the shock has a direct e¤ect on the contractual relationship between entre-
preneurs and nancial intermediaries, this is indeed a shock to credit markets. This
chapter considers the e¤ect of the credit market shock on business cycle dynamics.
First, I consider the e¤ect of the credit market shock using the framework de-
veloped in Chapter 2. The framework is convenient to highlight the direct e¤ect
of the shock on business cycle dynamics. As noted above, the increase in the vari-
ance, implying the worsening of informational asymmetry, leads to an increase in
the external nance premium. In turn, this has a recessionary e¤ect by discouraging
entrepreneursproduction.89
Then, using the model developed in Chapter 4, I demonstrate that the shock (the
89This counter-cyclical external nance premium appears to be supported by data. For example,
Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2003) report a negative correlation between total factor productivity
and alternative measures of nancing premium. Also, Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajsek (2004) show
that credit spread on corporate borrowing is particularly low in the late 1990s in the US when the
output growth is high.
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increase in the variance) has an indirect e¤ect through the endogenous development
in entrepreneurs net worth. What happens is that their net worth decreases as
long as the credit market shock has a recessionary e¤ect. Then, as emphasised in
Chapter 4, the decrease in net worth leads to an increase in the external nance
premium. Indeed, there is a feedback e¤ect on the premium. In turn, this feedback
e¤ect decreases output further.
Furthermore, as Chapter 4 implies, the way net worth evolves in the face of
the credit market shock turns out to depend on how to model entrepreneurscon-
sumption/saving decisions. Specically, I again consider two alternative assump-
tions: Euler equation and OLG entrepreneurs. Euler equation entrepreneurs make
the decision following their consumption Euler equation. Meanwhile, OLG entre-
preneurs simply consume all the accumulated prots before dying. As mentioned,
the latter arrangement implies that a constant fraction of their aggregate prots is
consumed/saved in each period.
Suppose that the credit market shock persists for some periods, i.e. it takes
a while for the increase in the variance to die down. In this case, the behaviour
of net worth to the shock di¤ers between the two assumptions as follows. Euler
equation entrepreneurs choose to decrease their saving greatly soon after the shock
happens so that their net worth drops rapidly. After the large fall, their net worth
starts bouncing back immediately. However, with OLG entrepreneurs, their saving
decreases only gradually so that net worth goes down slowly. It actually takes a while
before the net worth starts increasing.
One important reason why the Euler equation entrepreneurs behave that way
is better understood if I rst discuss how external nance premium evolves with
OLG entrepreneurs. With OLG entrepreneurs, while agency costs from aggravated
informational asymmetry decrease over time as the shock calms down (as the variance
falls), agency costs from gradually lowering net worth actually work to o¤set the
decrease in the agency costs. As a result, the external nance premium decreases
only quite slowly. In turn, this persistent premium has a prolonged negative e¤ect
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on the entrepreneurial consumption. With Euler equation entrepreneurs, however,
net worth goes down swiftly and starts bouncing back immediately. Then, although
it leads to a higher external nance premium in the short run, it falls rather quickly.
Therefore, the negative impact on their consumption dies down quickly. This is what
prompts Euler equation entrepreneurs to decrease saving and thus their net worth
quickly.
The di¤erent ways external nance premium evolves are reected in the di¤er-
ent output dynamics. With Euler equation entrepreneurs, the rapid increase in the
premium and the subsequent fall leads to the hump shaped behaviour of output, i.e.
decreases in the period after the shock and then starts increasing. Meanwhile, with
OLG entrepreneurs, the external nance premium shows high persistence (i.e. takes
time to die down). This, in turn, is reected in persistently low output.
In relation to empirical evidence, Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2009) shows
that a cross-sectional spread of rm- and industry-level growth rates is higher during
recessions. For example, the spread of rm-level sales growth rates measured by
the quarterly inter quartile range is 23.1% higher during recessions. The variance
of idiosyncratic shocks rms are subject to appears volatile in business cycles. This
gives the validity of considering the e¤ect of the credit market shocks on business
cycle dynamics.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Based on the model in Chapter 2,
Section 2 introduces the basic model to focus on the direct e¤ect of the credit market
shock. Then, based on the model in Chapter 4, Section 3 introduces the fullmodel
in which the credit market shock has also an indirect e¤ect through the endogenous
movement of net worth. As mentioned, two di¤erent versions, i.e. Euler equation
and OLG entrepreneurs are considered there. Section 4 concludes.
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5.2 The basic model
5.2.1 The model
The basic model is based on the model presented in Chapter 2 (cf. Figure 1). Thus,
I here only sketch the model without detailed explanation. The only important
di¤erence is that the variance of idiosyncratic shock to entrepreneursproduction is
now time-varying. I assume that the distribution function of ! is uniform in the region
[1  t; 1 + t] (0 < t  1) so that E (!) = 1 and V ar (!) = 132t . An increase in t,
which corresponds to the increase in the variance, implies that the lending becomes
riskier. Indeed, if t = 0, entrepreneursproduction outcome is public information
and no informational asymmetry arises. I am interested in the role of an exogenous
shock to t (i.e., credit market shock) in business cycle dynamics.
Solving the entrepreneurs optimisation problem as before, I obtain the time-
variant cut-o¤ value, !t:
!t = (1 + t)  + "t; (205)
where
"t =
1
2
( 
p
22 + (1  )(42 + 16t   16t)): (206)
Given that  and  are still time-invariant, !t is simply a function of t: !t = ! (t).
The solution of the problem also leads to the implicit labour demand function:
wt =
1
s (!t)
'tH
 1
t ; (207)
where
s (!t) =
1
1   (!t) + (!t)f(!t)f 0(!t)
: (208)
In the previous equation,  (!t) represents the default ratio:  (!t) =
!t (1 t)
2t
. The
probability density function of !t:  (!t) is given as 12t , while the expected share
of revenue from wholesale goods going to entrepreneurs, f (!t) as
R 2t
!t
!d (!)  
(1   (!t))!t. s (!t) can be again interpreted as a mark up entrepreneurs charge
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over their marginal costs to cover the deadweight loss,  (!t).
The external nance premium,  (!t) is dened by the cost of external nance
(gross interest rate), 	t minus the safe rate of return, which is unity90:
 (!t) = 	 (!t)  1; (209)
where
	 (!t) =
!t
g (!t)
: (210)
In the expression of 	 (!t), g (!t) is the expected share of the revenue going to banks:
g (!t) =
R !t
0
!d (!) + (1   (!t))!t    (!t).
I now turn to the households utility maximisation problem. They maximiseP1
t=0 
t
 
lnCht +

Mt
Pt
1 
1   Ht
!
subject to PtCt +Mt + Bt = WtHt +Mt 1 + (1 +
it 1)Bt 1 + t + Tt.91 Solving this, I obtain the consumption Euler equation,
 
Cht
 1
=  (1 + rt)
 
Cht+1
 1
; 92 (211)
the money demand function,
Mt
Pt
=

1 + it
it
Cht
 1

; (212)
and the labour supply function
wt = C
h
t H
 1
t : (213)
Given the opportunity to reset the price under Calvo-style staggering, retailers
90This is because lending takes place within a period.
91While the utility function is slightly simplied compared to the one in Chapter 2, the constraint
is exactly the same.
92Due to the Fisher equation: 1 + rt  (1 + it) PtPt+1 .
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set the real price of Qt:
Qt =

  1
P1
i=0

it;t+i't+i

Pt+i
Pt

Yt+i

P1
i=0

it;t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Yt+i
 : (214)
Ination rate and the reset price are related as:
1 =
 
 (1 + t)
 1 + (1  )Q1 t
 1
1  : (215)
Aggregate relations I now obtain the aggregate relations. First, taking account
of the deadweight loss incurred through the bankruptcy process,  (!t), the net
aggregate output of wholesale goods, Y Wt;net is obtained as Y
W
t;net = (1   (!t))Ht .93
Rewriting this, the aggregate household labour is expressed as
Ht =
 
Y Wt;net
1   (!t)
! 1

: (216)
Given that !t is a function of t, the household labour, Ht is a function of t and
Y Wt;net. Since entrepreneurs, who live only one period, spend all the prots on the
consumption of nal goods, the aggregate entrepreneurial consumption, Cet is given
as Cet = 'tf (!t)H

t :Using Eq.216, it is written as
Cet = 't
f (!t)
1   (!t)Y
W
t;net: (217)
With the market clearing condition for nal goods, Yt = Cht + C
e
t , the aggregate
household consumption, Cht is given as
Cht = Yt   't
f (!t)
1   (!t)Y
W
t;net: (218)
Finally, from the household labour market equilibrium condition (Eqs.207 and 213),
the real marginal cost for retailers is obtained as: 't =


s (!t)C
h
t H
 
t . Substituting
93In Chapter 2, the net aggregate output of wholesale goods was denoted as YWt .
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Eqs.216 and 218 into this and rewriting, I have
't =


s (!t)

YWt;net
1 (!t)
  

Yt
1 + 

s (!t) f (!t)

YWt;net
1 (!t)
 

: (219)
Notice that 't is a function of t, Yt and Y
W
t;net. Subsequently, C
h
t and C
e
t are also a
function of those variables.
5.2.2 Simulations
To consider the e¤ect of credit market shocks on business cycle dynamics, I log
linearise the model around the zero ination steady state and conduct simulation
analysis. Specically, I look at the impulse responses to a shock to the variance
parameter, t. As in Chapter 4, the aim of the simulation is to explore theoretical
possibilities of the model.
Steady state In the zero ination steady state, every retailer sets the same price
every period94. Then, Eq.214 implies that the retailers real marginal cost in the
steady state, ' is given as
' =
  1

: (220)
I assume that the variance parameter is constant in the steady state, i.e., t = .
Subsequently, the cuto¤ value of idiosyncratic shock is also constant in the state, i.e.,
!t = !. Further, the aggregate productions of wholesale goods and nal goods are
the same in the steady state: Yt = Y Wt;net = Y :
95 Then, I can obtain Y from Eq.219:
Y =
 
' (1   (!)) 
s (!) 

(1  'f (!)   (!))
!

: (221)
94In this sense, zero ination steady state is equivalent to exible price steady state.
95This is proved in Chapter 2.
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Making use of Eqs.216, 217 and 218, I have
H =

Y
1   (!)
 1

; (222)
Ce = '
f (!)
1   (!)Y ; (223)
and
Ch =

1  ' f (!)
1   (!)

Y : (224)
Parameter values To conduct an impulse response analysis, I set parameter values
as shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Parameter values in the Basic model
: preference parameter 4.5
: technology parameter 0.99
: elasticity of demand 10
: monitoring costs 0.20
: discount factor 0.99
: stickiness parameter 0.75
The parameter values apart from the variance parameter are the same as the
ones in Chapter 2. Again, the variance parameter is treated as an unobservable
parameter. I tie down its steady state value,  so that an annual external nance
premium is 0:02 (200 basis points). This is the steady state value followed by Faia
and Monacelli (2007). Given that the time unit is a quarter, I solve the relation:
 (!) = !
g(!)
  1 = 0:005. Given that ! is a function of , I obtain  = 0:11.
Log linearisation In this basic model, the cuto¤ value, !t is a function of t,
independent of macroeconomic variables. Thus, other contract related variables such
as the default ratio (drt),  (!t), mark up, s (!t), and loan interest rate, 	 (!t) (thus
external nance premium,  (!t)) are also functions of t. Letting a hat notation
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represent the log deviation from the steady state values, I have b!t = 1bt, cdrt = 2bt,bst = 3bt, and c	t = 4bt. Given the above parameter values, the coe¢ cients, 1 to
4 can be calculated.
I now turn to macroeconomic relations. As for the aggregate demand side, log
linearising the consumption Euler Equation (Eq.211) leads to:
cCht = dCht+1   bit   t+1 96: (225)
Aggregate supply relation is summarised by the NewKeynesian Phillips curve (NKPC),
which is obtained by combining log linearised versions of Eqs.214 and 215:
t =  b't + t+1; (226)
where  = 1 

(1  ). Further, I assume that monetary policy is represented by
the simple Taylor rule (1993):
bit = 1t + 2 bYt: (227)
I saw above that Cht , C
e
t and 't are a function of t, Yt and Y
W
t;net. Then, in a log
linearised form, cCht , cCet and b't are a function of bt, bYt and[Y Wt;net. Further, recognising
that bYt = [Y Wt;net97, they are simply functions of bYt and bt. Likewise, employment, cHt
is a function of bYt and bt. Then, I have
cCht = 11 bYt + 12bt; (228)
cCet = 21 bYt + 22bt; (229)
b't = 31 bYt + 32bt; (230)
and cHt = 41 bYt + 42bt: (231)
96 bit is the log deviation of gross nominal interest rate from the steady state value.
97This is proved in Chapter 2.
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The coe¢ cients are again calculated with the given parameter values.
State space form I express the dynamics of Yt, t and t in a state space form.
First, substituting the expression for b't (Eq.230) into the NKPC (Eq.226), I obtain
t+1 =  31bYt + t   32bt: (232)
Second, substituting the expression for cCht (Eq.228) and the interest rate rule (Eq.227)
into the consumption Euler equation (Eq.225), I have
11dYt+1 + t+1 + 12dt+1 = (11 + 2) bYt + 1t + 12 bt: (233)
Third, I assume that shock process follows an autoregressive process:
dt+1 = bt + "t; (234)
where "t is an exogenous shock term. Overall, I have the three linear rst order
di¤erence equations in the following state space form:
0BBBB@
0  0
11 1 12
0 0 1
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
dYt+1
t+1dt+1
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
 31 1  32
11 + 2 1 12
0 0 
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
bYt
tbt
1CCCCA : (235)
This system of equations can be solved using an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition
(Blanchard and Kahn (1980)).98
Impulse response to credit market shocks I consider the role of the credit
market shock in business cycle dynamics. Specically, suppose that there is an ex-
ogenous shock to bt in Period 0: "0 = 0:3 and the AR(1) coe¢ cient,  is set to be
0:9 (Eq.234).
98As in Chapter 4, to conduct the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition, I used the Matlab code
written by Ryo Kato.
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Figure 13 looks at the e¤ect on contract related variables, cut-o¤ value, default
ratio, mark up, and loan interest rate. The horizontal axes represent time. As pointed
out, the contract related variables, being functions of only t, are independent of
macro variables.
Intuitively, an increase in t corresponds to the aggravation of informational asym-
metry. This implies an increase in the agency costs, which is mirrored in an increase
in default ratio (and the deadweight loss). In order to cover the loss, the mark up
charged by entrepreneurs need to increase. At the same time, the loan interest rate
goes up. Given the safe rate of (intratemporal) return is unity, the increase in the
loan rate corresponds to an increase in the external nance premium.
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Figure 13: Basic model, dynamics 1
Figure 14 shows the e¤ect on macro variables. Reecting the increase in the
external nance premium, entrepreneurs reduce production. Correspondingly, pro-
duction of nal goods also falls. Observe that the external nance premium moves in
a counter-cyclical way. As for the component, Cet decreases relatively more because
the share going to entrepreneurs, f (!t), goes down when the cut-o¤ value increases.
The ination rate rises because of the mark up charged to cover the agency costs: if
the wholesale good become more expensive, it a¤ects retailersreset prices and thus
aggregate price rises.
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Figure 14: Basic model, dynamics 2
5.3 The full model: with endogenous net worth
In the basic model, all the contract related variables, such as the external nance
premium, are independent of macroeconomic conditions. Thus, there is no feedback
from macroeconomic conditions to the external nance premium. However, in a
framework with endogenous entrepreneursnet worth, the change in macroeconomic
conditions does have a feedback e¤ect on the premium through its e¤ect on the net
worth. Indeed, Chapter 4 shows that in a boom caused by an expansionary interest
rate shock, entrepreneursnet worth increases. The increase in net worth, in turn,
works to decreases the agency costs so that the external nance premium falls.
Having acknowledged this feedback e¤ect, I now study the role of credit market
shocks in business cycles using a model with the endogenous net worth. To distinguish
from the basic model presented previously, I call it the full model. As in Chapter
4, I consider two di¤erent strategies of modelling entrepreneursconsumption/saving
decisions; Euler equation entrepreneurs and overlapping generations (OLG) entre-
preneurs. It turns out that the di¤erent strategies again lead to di¤erent evolution
of net worth in response to credit market shocks. Expect that the variance of the
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idiosyncratic shock is now time-varying, the model presented below is directly based
on the one in Chapter 4. Therefore, the detailed explanation is not repeated.
5.3.1 The model
First, the solution of the contracting problem between entrepreneurs and banks can
be summarised as:
'tf (!t)Y
W
t = tnwt; (236)
where Y Wt is the gross aggregate wholesale goods production (i.e., the output before
subtracting the deadweight loss):
Y Wt = H

0
t K
1 0
t
99. (237)
The expected intratemporal return on the entrepreneurs net worth (internal funds),
t is given as:
t =
stf (!t)
1  stg (!t) ; (238)
where the mark up, st is expressed as:
st =
1
1   (!t) + (!t)f(!t)f 0(!t)
: (239)
The cut-o¤ value, !t is an implicit function of t and st. The same applies to the
return on internal funds, t.
The aggregate net worth, composed of the gross return from capital holding and
entrepreneurial wage, is given as:
nwt =

't
st
Y Wt
Kt
(1  0) + 1  

Ket +
't
st
Y Wt (1  
)0: (240)
The net aggregate production of wholesale goods (the production after deducting
99Given that  was already used in the basic model, I use 0 instead of .
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the deadweight loss) is equal to the aggregate production of nal goods100:
(1   (!t))Y Wt = Yt: (241)
With Eq.241, the market clearing condition for the nal goods is expressed as:
(1   (!t))Y Wt = bCht + (1  b)Cet +Kt+1   (1  )Kt (242)
I assume that householdsutility function is the same as the one in the basic
model101. Then, the household labour market equilibrium condition is:
Cht H
 1
t =
't
st
Y Wt
Ht

0: (243)
Householdsconsumption/saving relation is governed by the Euler equation:
 
Cht
 1
= 
 
Cht+1
 1't+1
st+1
Y Wt+1
Kt+1
(1  0) + 1  

: (244)
As for the householdssaving decision, the arbitrage condition ensures
1 + it
1 + t+1
=
't+1
st+1
Y Wt+1
Kt+1
(1  0) + 1  ; (245)
Entrepreneurs aggregate prot, 'tf (!t)Y
W
t (= tnwt) is either consumed or
saved:
'tf (!t)Y
W
t = C
e
t +K
e
t+1: (246)
Euler equation entrepreneur j makes a consumption/saving decision to maximise
his utility function: Et
P1
t=0 ()
tCet (j). Then, the consumption Euler equation
100As pointed out in Chapter 4, this is actually an approximate relation which only holds around
the zero ination steady state.
101The households utility function in the Chapter 4 is slightly more general in that the con-
sumption component of the function takes the CRRA form: (
Cht )
1 
1  . I here set  = 1 from the
outset.
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indicates that the decision is governed by:
1 = t+1

't+1
st+1
Y Wt+1
Kt+1
(1  0) + 1  

: (247)
In the case of OLG entrepreneurs, an aggregate entrepreneurial consumption is simply
a constant fraction,   of the aggregate prot:
Cet =  'tf (!t)Y
W
t : (248)
Finally, the retailerspricing decision and the evolution of aggregate price are the
same as the ones in the basic model (Eqs.214 and 215):
Qt =

  1
P1
i=0

it;t+i't+i

Pt+i
Pt

Yt+i

P1
i=0

it;t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Yt+i
 ; (249)
and
1 =
 
 (1 + t)
 1 + (1  )Q1 t
 1
1  : (250)
5.3.2 Simulations
Again, the aim of the simulation is to explore theoretical possibilities of the model.
Parameter values The parameters which also appear in the Basic model have the
same values here; that is,  = 4:5,  = 10,  = 0:2,  = 0:99 and  = 0:75. The other
values specic to the full model are shown in Table 11.
Table 11: Parameter values specic to the full model
0: technology parameter (1) 0.67

: technology parameter (2) 0.99
b: householdsproportion 0.7
: depreciation rate 0.025
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From Chapter 4, I know that the steady state value of  is 0:61. Likewise, the
patience parameter,  (specic to Euler equation entrepreneurs) is tied down as 0:83,
while the constant consumption ratio,   (specic to OLG entrepreneurs) as 0:18.
Solution strategies The solution strategies for both Euler equation and OLG
entrepreneurs are quite similar to the ones presented in Chapter 4. The appendix
provides the sketch for both cases.
Impulse responses to credit market shocks I now study the impulse responses
to the same credit market shock as the basic model. That is, I assume that there is
an exogenous shock to bt in Period 0: "0 = 0:3 and the shock persists following the
AR(1) process; dt+1 = 0:9bt + "t (Eq.234).
Euler equation entrepreneurs First, in Period 0 when the shock hits, the
agency costs (reected in the deadweight loss) increase due to the worsening of infor-
mational asymmetry. That is mirrored in the positive mark up and loan interest rate
(thus external nance premium) in the period (Figure 15). Meanwhile, net worth,
mainly composed of the capital from the last period, barely changes. At the end
of Period 0, however, entrepreneurs radically decrease investment as reected in the
large fall in aggregate investment (Figure 16).102 Thus, in Period 1, the net worth
falls greatly. This fall leads to a further increase in the deadweight loss in the period.
Thus, there is an increase in the mark up and external nance premium.
102On the other hand, entrepreneurial consumption jumps in Period 0 (76% higher than the steady
state).
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Figure 15: Euler equation entrepreneurs, dynamics 1
The rapid increase in the external nance premium in Period 1 corresponds to
the decrease in output in the period; bY1 =  0:047 (the output is 4.7% lower than
the steady state), while bY0 =  0:032 (Figure 16). After Period 1, net worth starts
increasing and thus the premium starts falling. Correspondingly, output starts in-
creasing. The hump shaped reaction in output is the notable feature with Euler
equation entrepreneurs. The reason why Euler equation entrepreneurs decrease in-
vestment in Period 0 is partly because they benet from the high consumption in
Period 0. (Another important reason becomes clear once the behaviour of OLG
entrepreneurs is studied.)
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Figure 16: Euler equation entrepreneurs: dynamics 2
After Period 1, output and aggregate consumption starts increasing. The reason
why aggregate consumption recovers more slowly than output is because of the high
real interest rates (Figure 17). Due to the large drop in the investment at the end of
Period 0, capital level tends to be low afterwards. That causes the subsequent high
real interest rates. They, in turn, dampen household and entrepreneurial consump-
tion. The ination rate increases because of the mark up charged to cover the agency
costs. Its hump shaped reaction reects the low mark up in Period 0.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-0.05
0
0.05
Time
Real interest rate
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Time
Inflation rate
Figure 17: Euler equation entrepreneurs, dynamics 3
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OLG entrepreneurs When the constant fraction of the aggregate prots is
invested each period, entrepreneursnet worth adjusts only gradually (Figure 18).
While agency costs from the uncertainty shock lessens over time because of the AR(1)
process of the shock, the decreasing net worth work to slow down the decrease of the
agency costs. Further, even after the net worth reaches the bottom after 2 years,
its subsequent increase is quite slow. This explains why both mark up and external
nance premium are highly persistent. Looking at the loan interest rate, it is 8.8%
higher than the steady state in Period 0. However, it still stands 6.2% in two years
and 3.6% even in four years. Meanwhile, with Euler equation entrepreneurs, although
the loan interest rate is 13.6% higher in Period 1 at its peak, it falls to 6.4% in two
years after the shock and 2.7% in four years. This highly persistent external nance
premium in case of the constant saving ratio is the important reason why Euler
equation entrepreneurs choose to decrease the net worth rapidly in Period 1.
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Figure 18: OLG entrepreneurs, dynamics 1
The persistent external nance premium leads to the slow recovery of output
(Figure 19). While output is 3.1% lower than the steady state value in Period 0, it
is still 2.4% lower in 2 years and 1.5% lower even in 4 years. With Euler equation
130
entrepreneurs, output in Period 1 (bottom) is 4.7% lower than the steady state while
2.5% lower in 2 years after the shock and 1.2% lower in 4 years.103 Indeed, output
dynamics with OLG entrepreneurs are characterised by the highly persistent nature.
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Figure 19: OLG entrepreneurs, dynamics 2
The slow adjustment of entrepreneurs investment and thus aggregate capital
contribute to the sluggish reaction in the real interest rate (Figure 20). It only starts
decreasing after 4 years. This further slows the recovery of household consumption
and thus aggregate consumption. Ination rate is also quite persistent: it halves only
after 4 years. This again reects the slow adjustment of agency costs and the mark
up.
103In the basic model, while the output is 4.2% lower than the steady state in Period 0, it becomes
1.8% lower after 2 years and 0.8% in 4 years.
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Figure 20: OLG entrepreneurs, dynamics 3
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter studied the role of credit market shocks in generating business cycle
dynamics. The basic model (based on Chapter 2) demonstrates that an increase in
the variance of idiosyncratic shocks entrepreneurs are subject to leads to an increase
in the external nance premium. This, in turn, decreases output. Then, the full
model (based on Chapter 4) highlights that there is an important feedback e¤ect from
macroeconomic conditions to the external nance premium through endogenous net
worth. The way net worth evolves depends on whether Euler equation entrepreneurs
or OLG entrepreneurs are assumed. Therefore, output dynamics also di¤er dependent
on the assumption.
However, again for the reason specied in the previous chapter (entrepreneurs
consumption shows rather extreme volatility when risk neutral entrepreneurs follow
the consumption Euler equation), the dynamics under OLG entrepreneurs seem more
plausible. With OLG entrepreneurs, in the face of an exogenous increase in the
variance, the output dynamics is characterised by highly persistent movement. That
is, recession persists for long time. Also, ination stays high for long time. To sum up,
an increase in uncertainty at micro level brings about prolonged stagation through
the endogenous developments in credit markets.
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This result is related to the empirical evidence provided by Bloom, Floetotto and
Jaimovich (2009). They show that a cross-sectional spread of rm- and industry-level
growth rates is higher during recessions. For example, the spread of rm-level sales
growth rates measured by the quarterly inter quartile range is 23.1% higher during
recessions. The variance of idiosyncratic shocks rms are subject to appears to be
countercyclical. The results of this chapter indicate that credit market frictions can
be one of the main factors behind this evidence.
5.5 Appendix to Chapter Five: Solution strategy for the full
model
5.5.1 Euler equation entrepreneurs
The solution strategy is quite similar to the one in Chapter 4. The only di¤erence is
that the cut-o¤ value, !t and return on internal funds, t are now implicit functions
of the mark up, st as well as the variance parameter of t (Eqs.238 and 239), while
they are the functions of only st in Chapter 4.
First, the market clearing condition of nal goods (Eq.242) and two consump-
tion Euler equations for households and entrepreneurs (Eqs.244 and 247) can be
expressed as a function of Kt, Ket , t, C
h
t and st and Kt+1, K
e
t+1, t+1, C
h
t+1 and st+1.
Log linearising the relations, I obtain the following system of rst order di¤erence
equations:
0BBBB@
A11 A12 A13 A14 A15
A21 A22 A23 A24 A25
A31 A32 A33 A34 A35
1CCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBB@
[Kt+1
[Ket+1dt+1dCht+1dst+1
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBB@
B11 B12 B13 B14 B15
B21 B22 B23 B24 B25
B31 B32 B33 B34 B35
1CCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBB@
cKtcKetbtcChtbst
1CCCCCCCCCCA
:
As before, the hat notation indicates the log deviation from the zero ination steady
state.
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The second step is again to combine the log linearised arbitrage condition (Eq.245)
and the Taylor rule: bit = 1t + 2 bYt where 1 = 1:5 while 2 = 0:5. Given that both
Yt and Ht are functions of Kt, Ket , t, C
h
t and st, I have bYt = a1cKt + a2cKet + a3bt +
a4
cCht + a5bst and cHt = b1cKt + b2cKet + +b3bt + b4cCht + b5bst. Incorporating these, the
arbitrage condition and Taylor rule yields
 (b1   1)[Kt+1 + b2[Ket+1 + b3dt+1 + t+1 +  (1 + b4) dCht+1 + b5dst+1
= 2a1cKt + 2a2cKet + 2a3bt + 1t + 2a4cCht + 2a5bst;
where  = 1   + .
Third, with the New Keynesian Phillips curve: t =  b't + t+1 where  =
1 

(1  ) (derived from Eqs.249 and 250), I have another rst order di¤erence
equation:
t+1 = (1b1    (  1))cKt +1b2cKet +1b3bt +t + (1b4   ) cCht + (1b5   ) bst;
where 1 =   (   
).
Finally, I assume that the log linearised variance term follows an AR(1) process:
dt+1 = 3bt:
Combining all the linear di¤erence equations, I obtain the following state space
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form: 0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
A11 A12 A13 0 A14 A15
A21 A22 A23 0 A24 A25
A31 A32 A33 0 A34 A35
 (b1   1) b2 b3 1  (1 + b4) b5
0 0 0  0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
[Kt+1
[Ket+1dt+1
t+1dCht+1dst+1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
B11 B12 B13 0 B14 B15
B21 B22 B23 0 B24 B25
B31 B32 B33 0 B34 B35
2a1 2a2 2a3 1 2a4 2a5
1b1    (  1) 1b2 1b3 1 1b4    1b5   
0 0 3 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
cKtcKetbt
tcChtbst
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
Succinctly, Axt+1 = Bxt. In the vector, xt, cKt, cKet , and bt are predetermined,
while t, cCht , and bst are control variables. Given that B is not invertible, this is again
solved using generalised Schur decomposition (Klein (2000) and Söderlind (1999)).
5.5.2 OLG entrepreneurs
Again, the solution strategy for OLG entrepreneurs is quite similar to the one shown
in Chapter 4. I obtain the rst intertemporal relation: Ket+1 = (1   ) tnwt from
Eqs.236,246 and 248. Noticing that !t and t are now implicit functions of st as
well as t, nwt is a function of C
h
t , st, Kt, K
e
t , and t. Then, the above relation is
expressed as a rst order di¤erence equation in Cht , st, Kt, K
e
t , and t. Likewise,
the market clearing condition (Eq.242) and the consumption Euler equations for
households (Eq.244) can also be expressed as rst order di¤erence equations in Cht ,
st, Kt, Ket , and t. Log linearising the three di¤erence equations, I have three linear
rst order equations. Next, I have three additional di¤erence relations in t, Cht ,
st, Kt, Ket , and t from the interest rate rule and arbitrage condition, the NKPC
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and the shock process. Without the non-invertibility issue this time, the system of
equations is solved using an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition (Blanchard and
Kahn (1980)). Using the generalised Schur decomposition yields the same result.
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6 Chapter Six: General Conclusion
Chapters 2-4 of the thesis studied the credit channel of monetary transmission mech-
anism within the NK framework. Chapter 2 presented an analytical framework to
shed more light on the workings of the channel. Although the endogenous devel-
opments of agency costs are an undoubtedly critical channel through which credit
frictions alter the output dynamics intrinsic to the otherwise standard NK model,
Chapter 2 showed that even when agency costs are modelled as acyclical, the output
dynamics are still altered. Importantly, by solving the model analytically, the chap-
ter revealed how this happens. It was shown that time invariant agency costs atten
both AS and AD relations by making a wedge between household consumption and
output. As a result, compared to the otherwise standard NK model, the real impact
of money shocks is amplied, but the persistence is reduced. Given that the cycli-
cal developments of agency costs are deliberately cut o¤, the chapter is, in nature,
qualitatively oriented. However, the supplementary quantitative exercise indicates
that the amplication of the impact is sizable while the reduction of persistence is
rather negligible. Thus, in the light of the VAR analysis which reveals that exogenous
monetary shocks have sizable and persistent real e¤ects, the acyclical agency costs,
on their own, seem to be a modication in the direction towards greater realism.
Chapter 3 extended the framework in Chapter 2 by incorporating a segmented
input markets structure. This chapter can be seen as a robustness check of the
results obtained in Chapter 2. Indeed, the qualitative and also quantitative results
obtained in Chapter 2 (with economy wide input markets) still hold. That is, credit
frictions still amplify the impact e¤ect of the shock while reducing the persistence of
the e¤ects. Also, the impact e¤ect can be quantitatively signicant, but the e¤ect
on persistence is small. Also, this chapter showed that for a given degree of credit
frictions (for given agency costs), both the impact and persistence of the shocks
are much greater in a framework with segmented input markets than in one with
economy-wide markets. The analytical solution claried that this happens because
the segmented input market assumption atten the AS curve greatly. In the light of
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the VAR analysis, this nding indicates that even in the presence of credit market
imperfections, the assumption of segmented input markets is a modication in the
direction towards greater realism.
Chapter 4, focusing directly on endogenous agency costs, showed that how the
credit channel operates within the NK framework depends on the assumptions made
on entrepreneursconsumption/saving behaviour. Judging from the rather extreme
uctuations in entrepreneursconsumption pattern in the Euler equation entrepre-
neurscase, I argued that dynamics in the OLG entrepreneurscase is more realistic.
In the OLG case, although the real e¤ects persist longer than in the standard NK
case without credit frictions, the impact is not amplied. In the case of expansionary
monetary shock, the smaller increase in output at impact is explained by the initial
increase in the external nance premium. This, in turn, is caused by the fact that net
worth is practically predetermined while the whole nance required is expanded in
the boom. This decrease in entrepreneurscontribution in the whole nance worsens
the agency problem and increases the premium. On the other hand, the greater per-
sistence is due to the slow adjustment process of external nance premium. Overall,
in the sense that the real e¤ects are not sizable although persistent, the fully edged
credit channel characterised by endogenous agency costs might not be a modication
towards greater realism.
The results obtained for the OLG case are comparable with the results obtained by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001). As pointed out, the key di¤erence is that they consider
the real e¤ect of monetary shocks in a exible price environment. Their results show
that in the case with the OLG entrepreneurs104, compared to an otherwise standard
RBC model with monetary sector, endogenous agency costs lead to less real impact
but greater persistence in the e¤ects. My results indicate that the introduction of
NK elements, i.e., imperfect competition and staggered price setting, does not alter
the way endogenous agency costs exert their e¤ect on output dynamics.
However, Bernanke et al. (1999), which incorporates endogenous agency costs
104They rather use the term "permanent income entrepreneurs".
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into a NK framework, reports that the real e¤ect of monetary shock is amplied
in the case with OLG entrepreneurs.105106 However, there are potentially important
di¤erences in the assumptions. For example, the timing of nancial contract between
entrepreneurs and banks is di¤erent. In my framework (also in the Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001) framework), the contract is intra-temporal, but in the Bernanke et
al., it is inter-temporal. Thus, in their framework, aggregate (monetary) shock is
observed after the contract is made and before the repayments are made (if entre-
preneurs do not default). Meanwhile, in my setting, the contract is subject to only
idiosyncratic shock and not aggregate shock. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) casts a
doubt on Bernanke et al.s setting by pointing out that agents would be better o¤ by
signing a contract which is indexed to the aggregate shock (Bernanke et al. actually
assume a non-indexed contract). Carlstrom and Fuerst argue that this lack of agents
natural action is one important factor behind the amplication result in their setting.
I leave rigorous investigation on this amplication/non-amplication issue as a topic
for future research.
Although the focus of Chapters 2 to 4 was monetary theory, especially the work-
ings of credit channels within the NK framework, the NK framework is often used to
answer normative questions thanks to its solid microfoundations inherited from the
RBC literature (see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) among others). For example, it
allows one to consider how monetary policy should be designed in the face of shocks
to the economy in such a way that agentswelfare losses are minimised. Indeed, with
monetary non-neutrality and solid microfoundations, the NK framework has become
an essential basis for monetary policy analysis in many central banks around the
world. Given that monetary theory is important when one considers optimal mone-
tary policy, the theoretical understanding of credit channels obtained from Chapters
2 to 4 can be potentially useful for normative analysis.107
105They do not use the term, "OLG entrepreneurs", but adopts the same assumption of constant
death ratio to restrict the accumulation of net worth.
106Unlike Chapter 4 of the thesis, they do not make a comparison between the OLG entrepreneurs
and Euler equation entrepreneurs.
107Some recent works such as Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) and Faia and Monacelli (2007) discuss
optimal monetary policy in the NK framework incorporating credit frictions.
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Chapter 5 studied the role of credit market shocks in business cycle dynamics.
Specically, the chapter focused on an exogenous increase in the variance of idio-
syncratic shocks entrepreneurs are subject to. In the sense that this has a direct
inuence on the contractual relationship between entrepreneurs and banks, it can be
regarded as a credit market shock. Based on the framework developed in Chapter
4, it showed that the shock has important macroeconomic e¤ects. Chapter 5 again
compared the dynamics under the Euler equation and OLG entrepreneurs. Following
the same logic as Chapter 4 (concerning the entrepreneursconsumption pattern),
I argued that the dynamics under the OLG entrepreneurs is more plausible. Then,
what was observed is prolonged stagation. The output is low because of the in-
crease in agency costs due to the worsening of the information asymmetry. Further,
it shows persistence because of the slow adjustments of net worth and agency costs.
Also, the persistently high agency costs are reected in the prolonged ination. The
result indicates that policy makers need to be aware of the macroeconomic e¤ects
of this sort of second moment shocks at the micro level. In relation to the stylised
fact observed by Bloom et al. (2009), the chapter suggests that the countercyclical
uncertainty at the micro level can be caused by endogenous developments in credit
markets.
Finally, I state a few ideas for future research. First, although the numerical
analysis conducted in Chapter 4 surely indicates the importance of time-varying
agency costs in the monetary transmission mechanism, the analytical exercise in
Chapter 2 reveals that this is not the only channel through which credit frictions alter
the output dynamics intrinsic to the otherwise standard NK model. Indeed, Chapter
2 shows that time invariant agency costs atten both AS and AD curves by creating
a wedge between household consumption and output. Then, what I am interested
in doing is to decompose the overall e¤ects observed with endogenous agency costs.
It is di¢ cult to do this simply using the frameworks used in those chapters, because
the settings are quite di¤erent. For example, in Chapter 2, the input for production
used by entrepreneurs is only labour, while Chapter 4 also incorporates capital stock
whose accumulation also plays a part in dynamics. Further, Chapter 2 considers a
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change in money supply while Chapter 4 looks at the shock to the interest rate rule.
Importantly, the Taylor rule itself a¤ects the dynamics. Thus, I am interested in
making a unifying framework which can be used for the decomposition exercise.
Next, I entirely focused on corporate borrowing in the thesis. For example, it
totally abstracts away from credit frictions in household borrowing. However, in
reality, a large proportion of household borrowing is secured by real estate. In fact,
the role of frictions in household borrowing in monetary transmission mechanism
seems to be non trivial. Suppose that expansionary monetary shocks lead to an
increase in the house price. When a house is used as collateral by households, it
can then increase their borrowing capacity. That leads to an increase in household
spending and output. It thus appears that the real e¤ect of monetary shocks can be
amplied. More generally, Iacoviello (2005) demonstrates the importance of collateral
constraints tied to the value of real estate for households (as well as for rms) in the
business cycle dynamics. The macro e¤ect through household borrowing constraints
is one of the research areas I am interested in.
Finally, the thesis also disregards the potential role played by banks balance
sheets condition. In fact, this appears to be a critical factor which aggravated the
nancial crisis subsequent to the US subprime crisis of 2007. Before the crisis, many
banks were already highly leveraged, that is, they held small capital. Then, as
asset prices started falling, their capital became even smaller. Since they found
it increasingly di¢ cult to obtain nance in money markets amid the fear of them
becoming insolvent, they were often forced to sell their assets at re sales prices.
In case other banks had the same assets, this reduced their capital. In turn, this could
lead to yet another re sales by those other banks. The contagion e¤ect amplied
the initial negative impact and led to rapid deterioration of banksbalance sheet in
general.
Furthermore, an increase in uncertainty over the value of asset prices seemed to
play a role behind the deterioration of banksbalance sheets. Due to the development
of securitisation, it has often become di¢ cult to assess the true value of assets. This
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implies that the perceived risk of banks going bankrupt increased. Then, it became
even more di¢ cult for banks to nance themselves in money markets. This, again,
prompted the re sales of assets, led to the contagion e¤ect and worsened the banks
balance sheets condition further. (These amplication mechanisms introduced here
are discussed in Blanchard (2008) in more detail.) Overall, banks had to tighten
lending standards and thus credit spreads increased. Consequently, the ow of funds
in the economy stagnated and output fell dramatically.
Having seen the above intuitive arguments, there seems little doubt that a dis-
ruption of nancial intermediation played an important role in the recent economic
crisis around the world. However, looking at the theoretical literature on the role
of credit market imperfections in the macroeconomy, the emphasis has been rather
given on the credit market constraints on non-nancial borrowers. In fact, there have
been not many formal models on the role of nancial intermediaries.108 Given this
state, I would like to work on the role of nancial intermediaries in the economy.
108One exception is Chen (2001), which formally studies the role of bank net worth and asset
prices in macroeconomy.
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